

T.1 *Theaet.* 176a: Ἄλλ' οὐτ' ἀπολέσθαι τὰ κακὰ δυνατόν, ὧ Θεόδωρε— ὑπεναντίον γάρ τι τῷ ἀγαθῷ αἰεὶ εἶναι ἀνάγκη—οὐτ' ἐν θεοῖς αὐτὰ ἰδρῦσθαι, τὴν δὲ θνητὴν φύσιν καὶ τόνδε τὸν τόπον περιπολεῖ ἐξ ἀνάγκης.

« But, Theodorus, evils cannot be destroyed because there must always be something **opposite to the good**, nor can they take place among the gods; of necessity, they haunt moral nature and this region here. (That's why we ought to try to escape.) »

T.2 Do the people who say these things say that everything is possible for God, or do they say that some things are impossible even for him? For if there were some things that were according to these people impossible for God, it is clear that they would be so in their own nature. But they do hold that some things are impossible even for God; for in saying "but evils cannot be destroyed, Theodorus, nor can these things take their place among the gods; of necessity, they haunt mortal nature and this region here", (Plato) says that there is something such as to be impossible even for God. For if, (Alexander) says, it were possible for him, what could he have preferred instead of it? But if things which are in their nature impossible are also impossible for the gods, and it is impossible in its nature for something destructible not to be destroyed, and the world is destructible, it will be impossible even for God that the world be not at some time destroyed. For if this impossibility were possible for him, why should he not have made each of the other generable and destructible things indestructible? For in each case, it is reasonable to suppose that the divine is without envy. (Alexander in Simplicius, *In DC* 359.20-360.2)

T.3. And it is, I think, unworthy of Alexander's seriousness to say that "if it were possible for God to destroy evil he would have preferred nothing instead of it", and to say "why then has he not made each of the other generable and destructible things indestructible? For in each case, it is reasonable to suppose that the divine is without envy". These are the words of a man who thinks that God's power is weaker than his will - and yet what could hinder the power of God who produced the natures of all beings?" If he had thought it to be good that there be no evil at all, why has he made room for it [sc. evil] to insinuate itself into beings, by making the lowest of them of such a kind such that evil could arise along with them? And I say these things against Alexander who does not want to say that there are two principles of beings but is persuaded to posit only one principle by Aristotle's insistence that 'a plurality of rulers is not good'. (Simplicius *In DC* I (concl.))

T.4 If God had existed as far as the heaven in the progression of his activity, evil would have had no entrance into beings. But since God exists as the fount of all goodness, he did not pass over that lowest goodness in the sublunary realm, where there is generation and destruction, and where not only the form but also the privation of the form are necessarily produced, so that something contrarily opposed to the lowest good is generated, which is considered as its privation. If this were not the case, then the lowest thing opposite to it would not be good, nor would God be the cause of all goodness. Consequently God will not wish evils to perish, since he would thus also wish the goods opposed to them to perish and he himself no longer to be the cause of all goodness. (*In DC* I concl.)

T. 5 But if someone were to say : what is there to prevent that even these things are good and not evil?, he would not realise that these goods would not be good. For there would not be human justice and temperance if it were not possible for them to be worn out and changed into their privations, nor would there be health among the animals made of the elements if they could not also grow sick. They would be powers of <divine> souls and undefiled <dispositions> of divine bodies; but this genus of souls and bodies would be completely excised from the world, and the world would be imperfect (not complete), since it would not be completed with the lowest goods; and the first

goods would be the ultimate and infertile <and> entirely impotent and would seem to be in no way different from matter. (In DC I, concl.)

T. 5b) G Si autem dicat aliquis: quid autem prohibet et bona hec esse et mala non esse, ignorat quod non iam hec utique essent bona; non enim utique humana iustitia et temperantia, si non esset possibile ipsas detritas in privationes sui ipsarum transmutari; neque sanitas utique esset elementarium animalium, si non et egrotare possent, sed essent virtutes animarum et infinitates corporum divinorum, et hoc utique animarum et corporum genus abscisum esset penitus a mundo et esset etiam mundus imperfectus non etiam extremis bonis completus et prima bona extrema et illaboriosa perfecte delicta a materia vide<re>ntur differre nichil.

T. 5c) Τ εἰ δὲ λέγοι τις· τί δὲ κωλύει καὶ ἀγαθὰ ταῦτα εἶναι καὶ κακὰ μὴ εἶναι; ἀγνοεῖ ὅτι οὐκέτι ταῦτα ἦν ἂν ἀγαθὰ· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀνθρωπίνη ἢ δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη, εἰ μὴ δυνατὸν ἦν αὐτὰς παρατετραμμένας εἰς τὰς στερήσεις αὐτῶν μεταβάλλειν· οὐδ' ἂν ἡ ὑγίεια ἦν τῶν στοιχειωδῶν ζώων, εἰ μὴ καὶ νοσεῖν ἐδύναντο· ἀλλ' ἦσαν <ἂν> ἀρεταὶ <θείων> ψυχῶν καὶ ἀκήρατοι <διαθέσεις> θείων σωμάτων· καὶ τοῦτο δὴ τὸ τῶν ψυχῶν καὶ σωμάτων γένος ἀποτετμημένον ἂν ἦν παντάπασιν τοῦ κόσμου, καὶ ἦν <ἂν> καὶ ὁ κόσμος ἀτελής οὐκέτι τῶν ἐσχάτων ἀγαθῶν πεπληρωμένος, καὶ τὰ πρῶτα ἀγαθὰ ἔσχατα καὶ ἄγωνα <καὶ> παντελῶς ἀδρανῆ τῆς ὕλης ἐδόκουν <ἂν> διαφέρειν μηδέν.

T.5d. Simplicius, *In Ench.* I, 435-43: ἵνα καὶ τέλειον τὸ πᾶν οὕτως ἀποτελεσθῆ, καὶ τὰ πρῶτα ὄντως πρῶτα μένη, καὶ μὴ ἔσχατα, καὶ ἄγωνα, καὶ ἀδρανῆ καὶ ὑλικά γένηται)

T. 6. Just as the health of the bodies of this world would not itself be health, if it were not in the nature of these bodies to become ill - in other words it would be a certain pure disposition, which is not the opposite of illness, as is that of the heavenly bodies - so it is with the virtues of human souls, temperance, justice, prudence and their whole chorus, which would not exist if it were not in the nature of souls to become evil, but if they had angelic or divine virtues, and certainly not human ones. (Simpl., *In Ench.* XIV, 425-435)

T.7 See what a great and multiple cause of evils would be the loss of evils! And it is clear that if he [sc. God] were to wish it [sc. evil] not to exist, he would not be good. But Plato rightly both understood and conveyed to later generations that evil must necessarily exist and arise adventitiously for the sake of the good. From what he says it is perfectly clear that it would not have been good to make all of the generated and destructible things and the lowest things of the world indestructible. (*In DC*, concl.)

T.8 It seems to me that this is also shown by Socrates in the *Theaetetus*, to those who are capable of following him more or less, when he calls evil neither a privation nor contrary to the good. For privation is not capable of producing anything, and has indeed no capacity at all. Nor does the contrary of itself possess a power or activity. But Socrates calls evil a 'subcontrary' (hupenantion) somehow, since in itself it is a privation indeed, though not an absolutely complete privation, but a privation that, together with a disposition and participating in the power and activity of this disposition, assumes 'the part of the contrary'. And it is neither a complete privation, nor contrary to the good, but subcontrary to it. And to those who are accustomed to listen attentively to what he says it is clear that *parupostasis* is what is really meant. (**Proclus**, *de mal. subst.*, ch. 54).