

T1. Porphyry, *Πλωτίνου Λυκοπολίτου Ἐννεάδες*, Ε΄ 1, Περὶ τῶν τριῶν ἀρχικῶν ὑποστάσεων

T2. Syrianus, *In Metaph.*, 165.33-166.8: "Ὀλως δὲ οὐδὲ ἀπὸ τῶν ὡσανεὶ ἀντικειμένων οἱ ἄνδρες ἤρχοντο, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν δύο συστοιχιῶν τὸ ἐπέκεινα ἤδεσαν, ὡς μαρτυρεῖ Φιλόλαος τὸν θεὸν λέγων πέρας καὶ ἀπειρίαν ὑποστήσαι, διὰ μὲν τοῦ πέρατος τὴν τῷ ἐνὶ συγγενεστέραν ἐνδεικνύμενος πᾶσαν συστοιχίαν, διὰ δὲ τῆς ἀπειρίας τὴν ταύτης ὑφειμένην, καὶ ἔτι πρὸ τῶν δύο ἀρχῶν τὴν ἐνιαίαν αἰτίαν καὶ πάντων ἐξηρημένην προέταπτον, ἣν Ἀρχαίνετος μὲν αἰτίαν πρὸ αἰτίας εἶναι φησι, Φιλόλαος δὲ τῶν πάντων ἀρχὰν εἶναι διυσχυρίζεται, Βροτίνος δὲ ὡς νοῦ παντός καὶ οὐσίας δυνάμει καὶ πρεσβείᾳ ὑπερέχει· ἀφ' ὧν ὀρμώμενος καὶ ὁ θεῖος Πλάτων ἐν τε Ἐπιστολαῖς καὶ ἐν Πολιτείᾳ καὶ ἐν Φιλήβῳ κἀν Παρμενίδῃ τὰς αὐτὰς περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν φωνὰς ἀφήσιν.

"[...] the divine Plato, taking his start from these [Pythagorean philosophers], utters the very same words in the *Letters*, in the *Republic*, in the *Philebus*, and in the *Parmenides*."

T3. Simplicius, *In Phys.* 230.35-231.6 (quoting Porphyry, *On Matter*): «Οὗτος γὰρ κατὰ τοὺς Πυθαγορείους τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐν ὑπὲρ τὸ εἶναι καὶ πᾶσαν οὐσίαν ἀποφαίνεται, τὸ δὲ δεύτερον ἐν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ ὄντως ὄν καὶ νοητὸν, τὰ εἶδη φησὶν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ τρίτον, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ ψυχικόν, μετέχειν τοῦ ἐνός καὶ τῶν εἰδῶν, τὴν δὲ ἀπὸ τούτου τελευταίαν φύσιν τὴν τῶν αἰσθητῶν οὔσαν μηδὲ μετέχειν, ἀλλὰ κατ' ἔμφασιν ἐκείνων κεκοσμηθῆσθαι, τῆς ἐν αὐτοῖς ὕλης τοῦ μὴ ὄντος πρῶτως ἐν τῷ ποσῷ ὄντος οὔσης σκιᾶς[μα] καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον ὑποβεβηκυίας καὶ ἀπὸ τούτου».

"Plato, following the Pythagoreans, proclaims (i) the first One above Being and all essence, and he says that (ii) the second One, which is what really is and is intelligible, is the Forms, and he says that (iii) the third, which is the psychic [One], participates in the One and the Forms, and that (iv) the last nature after this, which is the nature of perceptible things, does not participate in them, but it is ordered according to the reflection of the Forms, whereas (v) the matter that is in them [i.e. the perceptible things] is a shadow of the not being which first exists in quantity and is even further below than that."

T4. Plotinus, *Enneads* IV 2, 2.52-54: "Ἔστιν οὖν ψυχὴ ἐν καὶ πολλὰ οὕτως· τὰ δὲ ἐν τοῖς σώμασιν εἶδη πολλὰ καὶ ἓν· τὰ δὲ σώματα πολλὰ μόνον· τὸ δ' ὑπέρτατον ἐν μόνον.

"[...] the forms in the bodies are many and one (πολλὰ καὶ ἓν), and the bodies are merely many (πολλά), whereas the supreme is exclusively one."

T5.

Hypothesis	AMELIUS	PORPHYRY	IAMBlichUS
1 st	One	First God	One, Henads, Intelligibles
2 nd	Intellect	Intelligibles	Intellectives
3 rd	Rational souls	(all) Soul	Angels, Demons, Heroes
4 th	Irrational souls	Qualified matter	Rational souls
5 th	Quantified matter	Unqualified matter	Irrational souls
6 th	Qualified matter	Quantified matter	Forms-in-matter
7 th	Prime matter	Prime matter	Prime matter
8 th	Forms-in-matter	Forms-in-matter	Heavenly body
9 th		Universals	Sublunary body

T6. Proclus, *In Parm.* VI, 1056.1-1057.5: Κοινὸν δὲ πᾶσιν ἐστὶ παρόραμα τούτοις τὸ μὴ κατιδεῖν ὡς αἱ μὲν πέντε τῶν ὑποθέσεων ἀληθῆ συνάγουσιν, αἱ δὲ λοιπαὶ τέτταρες ἄτοπα τινὰ δεικνύουσι· καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο ἦν τὸ τῷ Παρμενίδῃ προκείμενον, δεῖξαι πῶς τοῦ ἐνός ὄντος

πάντα ἀπογεννᾶται τὰ ὄντα, καὶ πῶς μὴ ὄντος ἀναιρεῖται τὰ πάντα καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτι οὐδαμοῦ ἔσται· καὶ ἡ πᾶσα μέθοδος τοῦτο παρεκελεύετο δεικνύειν καὶ διὰ τῆς θέσεως τῶν ἀληθῶν καὶ διὰ τῆς ἀναιρέσεως τῶν ψευδῶν. [...] ἔδει τοίνυν ἐπιστῆσαι καὶ ἐν τούτοις ὅτι τῷ Παρμενίδῃ σκοπὸς δεῖξαι τῷ μὲν εἶναι τὸ ἐν πάντα τὰ ὄντα λαγχάνοντα τὴν ὑπόστασιν, τῷ δὲ μὴ εἶναι πᾶσαν ἄρδην ἀφανιζομένην τῶν πραγμάτων τὴν φύσιν—ὃ δὴ καὶ ἐν τῷ συμπεράσματι πασῶν τῶν ὑποθέσεων λέγει διαρρήδην αὐτός—καὶ τοῦτο συνιδόντας μὴ πάντως καὶ ἐν ταῖς λοιπαῖς τέτρασι τῶν ὑποθέσεων πράγματα εἰσάγειν ἕτερα, μηδὲ οἷον <κατ'> εὐθεῖαν ὁδεύειν, ἀλλὰ διὰ μὲν τῶν πέντε ὑποθέσεων θεωρεῖν τὰς τῶν ὄντων ἀρχάς, διὰ δὲ τῶν τεττάρων ἰδίας μὲν φύσεις μὴ ζητεῖν, ἀπελέγχειν δὲ ὅπως ἀναιρουμένου τοῦ ἐνὸς πολλὰ καὶ ἀδύνατα συμβαίνει τῶν δοκούντων ἡμῖν εἶναι δυνατῶν.

"There is an error common to all these exegetes, namely that they did not understand that the first five hypotheses lead to true conclusions, whereas the last four demonstrate absurdities. Indeed, this was the purpose of Parmenides, to show how, if the One exists, all beings are generated from it, and how, if the One does not exist, all [beings] disappear, and nothing will exist in any way. And this is what his whole method intended to show both through the establishment of the truths and through the refutation of the falsities. [...] We should critically observe that, here too, the purpose of [the persona] Parmenides is to show that through the fact that the One exists all beings receive their existence, whereas through the fact that the One does not exist the whole nature of real things is radically annihilated—this is what Parmenides explicitly says in the conclusion of all the hypotheses.¹ And having understood this point, we should not introduce at any cost other things as objects of the last four hypotheses, nor, so to speak, progress in a straight line, but we should consider the principles of beings through the first five hypotheses, whereas we should not look for particular natures through the last four, but show by refutation that, if the One is annihilated, we are led to many impossible conclusions in respect of things which seem possible to us.

T7a.

- (1) If the One is [one], it takes negative predicates with regard to itself and to the things that are other than it.
- (2) If the One is, it takes affirmative predicates with regard to itself and to the things that are other than it.
- (3) If the One is, it takes both affirmative and negative predicates with regard to itself and to the things that are other than it.
- (4) If the One is, the things that are other than it take affirmative predicates with regard to themselves and to the One.
- (5) If the One is, the things that are other than it take negative predicates with regard to themselves and to the One.

T7b.

- (6) If the One is not [one], it takes affirmative predicates with regard to itself and to the things that are other than it.
- (7) If the One is not, it takes negative predicates with regard to itself and to the things that are other than it.
- (8) If the One is not, the things that are other than it take affirmative predicates with regard to themselves and to the One that is not.
- (9) If the One is not, the other things take negative predicates with regard to themselves and to the One that is not.

¹ Cf. Plato, *Parmenides*, 166b 7-c 2: — Οὐκοῦν καὶ συλλήβδην εἰ εἵπομεν, ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν, οὐδὲν ἔστιν, ὀρθῶς ἂν εἵπομεν; — Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

T8. Damascius, *In Parm.*, t. IV, 135.10-15: «Οὐκοῦν καὶ συλλήβδην εἰ εἵπομεν· ἔν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν, οὐδὲν ἔστιν, ὀρθῶς ἂν εἵπομεν;» Οὐκ ἔστι τοῦτο συμπέρασμα τῶν τεσσάρων ὑποθέσεων, ὡς φησιν (οὐ γὰρ πᾶσαι τὰ ἀδύνατα συνήγον), ἀλλὰ τῶν δυεῖν μόνων ἐν αἷς τὸ μὴ εἶναι παντελεῖ ἀπόφασιν ἐδήλου· ταύταις γὰρ εἶπετο τὸ οὐδέν.

"Then if we were to say in a word, if the one is not, nothing is, should we be right?" (*Parm.* 166c 1-2). This is not the conclusion of the last four hypotheses, as [Proclus] says (**for they do not all conclude to the impossible**), but only of the two [i.e. the seventh and the ninth hypotheses] in which not-being meant complete negation; for nothingness is the consequence of these two.

T9. Damascius, *In Parm.*, t. IV, 82.13-15: Τί οὖν τὸ προκείμενόν ἐστιν εἰς ἐξέτασιν; [...] Οὐδὲν γὰρ ὑπόλοιπον εἶναι δοκεῖ, ὃ καὶ ἐς τὰ ἀδύνατα περιέωσεν τοὺς φιλοσόφους.

(Transl. Combès) "Quel est donc l'objet proposé à l'examen ? [...] En effet, il ne reste rien, semble-t-il, de ce qui a poussé les philosophes vers les impossibles."

"What is, then, the object to be examined? [...] For it seems that nothing has remained, which is what pushed the philosophers [i.e. Syrianus and Proclus] towards [positing] the impossibilities [viz. as objects of the last hypotheses].

*Not: [...] nothing remains of what pushed the philosophers towards the impossibilities.

T10. Plato, *Parmenides*, 160c 7-8 (on τὸ ἐν μὴ ὄν of the sixth hypothesis): Πρῶτον μὲν ἄρα γνωστόν τι λέγει, ἔπειτα ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων.

T11. Damascius, *In Parm.*, t. IV, 85.16-24: "Ὅτι μὲν οὖν περὶ ὑφεστῶτος διαλέγεται πρᾶγματος δηλοῖ «γνωστόν» αὐτὸ λέγων ὁ Παρμενίδης, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα αὐτοῦ καταφάσκων· ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἐν αὐτὸ βούλεται εἶναι πως καὶ ἐν σύνθετον καὶ οἷον ἐν, δηλοῖ τὸ μὲν 'ἐν' τιθεῖς, προστιθεῖς δὲ τὸ 'μὴ ὄν', οὐ τὸ πάντη, ἀλλ' ὅτι οὐ πάντη ὄν, ὡς τὴν ἀναίρεσιν τοῦ ἐνός οὐκ εἶναι παντελεῖ, ἀλλ' ὥστε μὴ εἶναι αὐτὸ τι τῶν ἄλλων, ἀλλ' «ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων», ὡς φησιν. Οὔτε ἄρα ἐν οὔτε τὰ ἄλλα ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ἐν μὲν οὐκ ὄν, ἕτερον δὲ τῶν ἄλλων.

T12. Damascius, *In Parm.*, t. IV, 83.12-21: Διὰ τί οὖν μὴ πᾶν τὸ σύνθετον ἤδη προκεῖσθαι φήσομεν ἐν τῇ ἕκτη ὑποθέσει, λέγω δὴ τὸ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων συγκείμενον, τῶν τε εἰδητικῶν καὶ τῶν ὑλικῶν τῶν εἰρημένων, ὥστε εἶναι τὸν λόγον περὶ τῶν ὑπὸ σελήνην ἀτόμων τε καὶ συνθέτων πραγμάτων; Τοῦτο γὰρ ὑπελέλειπτο τῶν ὄντων τὸ φύλον, καὶ τοῦτο ἦν τὸ φαινόμενον ἐν καὶ ἐν μὴ ὄν ὡς ἀληθῶς. ὡς γὰρ σύνθετον, ἅμα μὲν τὸ ἐν ἐμιμήσατο τῇ συγκράσει τῶν ἄλλων, ἅμα δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν· ἀναίνεται γὰρ τὸ ἐν πᾶσαν διπλόην καὶ μάλιστα σύνθεσιν, καὶ ἔτι μειζόνως τὴν ἐξ ἄλλων δυεῖν.

"Why then do we not say that, in the sixth hypothesis, it is the whole composite which is the object of the discussion, I mean that which is composed of the others, the formal others and the material others which have already been mentioned [in the fourth and the fifth hypotheses], so that the discourse is about the individual and composite things of the sublunary world? In fact, this is the race of beings that has remained [->T9], and this is the phenomenal one and what-is-not-one truly. Indeed, *qua* composite, on the one hand it imitates the one through the mixture of the others, and on the other hand it is not one; for the one refuses all duality and *a fortiori* all composition, and much more the composition of the two kinds [i.e. the formal and the material] of others.

T13. Damascius, *In Parm.*, t. IV, 94.14-15: Τὸ ἐν ὕλη εἶδος ἔνυλον μὲν ὅτι ἐν ὕλη, ἀσύνθετον δὲ ὅτι ἡ χώρα οὐδὲν μέρος αὐτοῦ.

T14. Damascius, *In Parm.*, t. IV, 52.6-8: [...] τὸ δὲ ἔνυλον μέθεξις μόνον καὶ μόνον ἐτέρωθι ἐν ἑλλαμπόμενον· διὸ καὶ ὡς ἐν μεθέξει τὸ ἐν ἐώρακεν ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ παρέδωκεν.

T15. Damascius, *In Parm.*, t. IV, 95.15-25: Καὶ οὕτως ἐν μέσω (i) τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ (iv) τῆς ἐσχάτης φύσεως (iii) ἢ πρόδρομος ὑπέστη τῶν δυνάμει προέμφασις, ἢ ἐπιγίνεται (ii) τελειότερον ἄλλο δυνάμει ἀπ' αὐτῶν τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τοῦ ὄντος. Τὰ δὲ ὄντα καὶ τὰ εἶδη, ἐνεργεῖα ὃ ἐστιν εἶναι βουλόμενα καὶ ἐνθάδε, τελειοῖ μὲν εἰς τὸ ἐνεργεῖα τὸ ἀφ' ἑαυτῶν δυνάμει προδραμὸν εἰς τὴν ὕλην, ὡς μηκέτι εἶναι τοῦτο δυνάμει, ἀλλὰ δύνάμιν τοῦ ἐνεργεῖα (πῶς γὰρ ἐν τῷ τελείῳ μένει ἔτι τὸ ἀτελές; οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ γένεσις ἐν τῷ γεγονότι, οἷον τὸ ἔμβρυον ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ), συμφύεται δὲ καὶ τῷ ἐπίταδε ἄλλω δυνάμει τῷ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐνάδων ἦκοντι.

T16. Damascius, *In Parm.*, t. IV, 97.3-18: Ἐν μὲν δὴ τῇ τετάρτῃ ὑποθέσει τὰ εἶδη κατὰ τὸ ἑαυτῶν ἐνεργεῖα μόνον ἐθεωρεῖτο, ἔχοντα μὲν τὸ ἐν κατὰ μέθεξιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀσύνθετον, ὃ καὶ ἐν τῷ ὄντι ἦν, κατ' αὐτὴν λέγω τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ ὄντος, οἷον καὶ τὸ ψυχικὸν ἐωρᾶτο πρότερον· ἐν δὲ τῇ πέμπτῃ τὸ ἀπόρρητον ὑπεστήσατο τῆς ὕλης, οἷον τὴν ὑποδοχὴν τοῦ ὄντος καὶ τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τῶν προδρόμων ἐμφάσεων. Ἄμα δὲ τῷ συνθέτῳ πάντα συνεισάγεται· καὶ γὰρ τὸ σύνθετον ἀπόρροιά τις ἦν τοῦ ἐνός ὄντος, διὸ ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ δυνάμει ὁράται τοῦ ἐνός <ὄντος> [addidi] ὄν προαπήχημα, καὶ τὸ ὄν αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ εἶδος, ὃ τῷ ἐνὶ σύνεσι πανταχοῦ, καὶ ἐνταῦθα τῷ δυνάμει συνυφίσταται. Καὶ γίνεται δὴ τοιοῦτον οἷον τὸ ἐν ὄν καὶ φαινόμενον ἔν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐν μὴ ὄν, ὅτι φαινόμενον, καὶ ὅτι συμπαγὲς ἐξ ἄλλων, καὶ ὅτι κατὰ ἀναλογίαν ἔν ἐστιν. Ἐπὶ <δὲ> τῆς τῶν ἄλλων φύσεως καὶ τὸ «ἔστιν» ὡσαύτως διαρρήδη ὁ Παρμενίδης ἐρεῖ ἐν τῇ ὀγδόῃ τῶν ὑποθέσεων.

“In the fourth hypothesis, the forms were considered only in their actuality, having the one by participation, but the incomposite [one], which was also [viz. discussed in the second hypothesis] in being, I mean [which was in being] in accordance with the very essence of being [and not from the point of view of coming-to-be], like the psychic [one] too, which we saw before. In the fifth hypothesis, [Parmenides] gave existence (ὑπεστήσατο) to the ineffable of matter, that is, to what is like the receptacle of being, of forms, and of prodrome reflections. All these [i.e. the being, the forms, and the prodrome reflections] are introduced together with the composite [one]; for the composite was like an emanation of the One-that-is. This is the reason for which we can see in it both the potentiality which is a preliminary echo of the One-that-is [i.e. ‘the potentiality below’], and the being itself, i.e. the form, which everywhere coexists with the one, and which here below [i.e. in the sublunary world] is given existence (συνυφίσταται) together with the potentiality. And, therefore, it comes to be like the One-that-is and a phenomenal one, and for this reason it is what-is-not-one, because it is phenomenal and is constituted of others and is one by analogy. With regard to the nature of the others, Parmenides, in the eighth hypothesis,² will explicitly predicate of them the ‘is’.”

T17. Damascius, *In Parm.*, t. IV, 93.19-22 (discussing the sixth hypothesis): Ἐκ δὲ πάντων ἐκεῖνο συνάγομεν ὅτι, ὡσπερ ἕκαστον ἐν πρὸς τὰ ἑαυτοῦ ἄλλα παρεβάλλομεν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ φαινόμενον ἐν πρὸς τὰ φαινόμενα ἄλλα, ἄπερ ἐν τῇ ὀγδόῃ παραδίδοται.

T18. Damascius, *In Parm.*, t. IV, 122.6-123.8: Πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὸ πρῶτον ἀποκρινόμεθα ὡς πρόκειται διελεῖν τοῦ ἐνός μὴ ὄντος τὰ ἄλλα, τοῦ προτέρου δηλαδὴ τὰ πρότερα. οἷον ἄρα ἐκεῖνο, τοιαῦτα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα αὐτοῦ· ἐκεῖνο δὲ τὸ σύνθετον ἐν καὶ τὸ φαινόμενον ἔν, τοιαῦτα ἄρα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, σύνθετα καὶ φαινόμενα. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ φαινόμενα, διαρρήδη ὁ Παρμενίδης ἀποφαίνεται, ὅτι δὲ καὶ σύνθετα, σαφῶς λέγει <ἐνδεικνύμενος> ὄγκον αὐτὰ ἔχειν καὶ εἶδη εἶναι διαστατά. μόνον δὲ ὡγκῶται τὸ σύνθετον· οὔτε γὰρ ἡ ὕλη οὔτε τὸ εἶδος αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό.

² Cf. Plato, *Parmenides*, 164d 6: ἐνός μὴ ὄντος ἄλλα ἔστιν.

ποῖα οὖν εἰσῆγηται διὰ τῶν ἄλλων; ἢ τὰ σύνθετα μέρη τοῦ συνθέτου ἑνός. καὶ ἵνα μὴ ἀποστῶμεν τοῦ περὶ ἀρχῶν λέγειν, τὰ μερικώτερα στοιχεῖα φήσομεν εἶναι τὰ ἄλλα, οἷον τὰ κατὰ ἔθνη ἢ πόλεις, ἐξ ὧν τὰ ἔθνη καὶ διάφορα ζῶα συντίθεται καὶ γεννᾶται, καὶ οὐ ζῶα μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅσα φυτὰ καὶ ὅσα ἄψυχα. εἰ δὲ βούλει, τὰ μὲν ὅλα ἔστω ἕν μὴ ὄν, τὰ δὲ καθ' ἕκαστα καὶ ἄτομα, οὐ τὰ νῦν ὄντα, ἀλλὰ τὰ αἰεὶ τοιαῦτα γιγνόμενα καὶ φθειρόμενα, ἔστω τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνός μὴ ὄντος. καὶ τὰ ἄτομα γάρ, ἢ ἄτομα ἀπλῶς, ἀρχὴ τις ἐσχάτη ἐμοῦ, εἰ τύχοι, καὶ σοῦ, καὶ ἐκάστου τῶν κατὰ μέρος, καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ κοινὸν τῶν ἀτόμων εἶδος.

"Therefore, to the first question [i.e. "what is the purpose of the eighth hypothesis?"] we will answer that [in this hypothesis] the things that are other than what-is-not-one are discussed, i.e. the things that are other than the one which we saw previously [viz. in the sixth hypothesis]. As that one was, so will its others be. That was the composite one and the phenomenal one, so that the others will also be of this kind, namely composite and phenomenal. Parmenides explicitly declares that they are phenomenal; that they are also composite, he says it clearly, <when he asserts> that they have mass and are extended forms.³ Only what is composite has a mass. For neither the matter nor the form-itself have mass. So, what are the things that Parmenides introduces with 'the others'? Well, they are the composite parts of the composite one. And to stay within the realm of speaking about principles, we will say that these 'others' are the more particular elements, such as the elements of the various peoples or states, of which the regionally different living beings are composed and produced, and not only the living beings, but also the plants and the inanimate beings. If you like, let me put it in this way: the wholes are what-is-not-one, whereas the particulars and the individuals, not those that currently exist, but those that come to be and perish perpetually, are the things that are other than what-is-not-one. Indeed, the individuals *qua* merely individuals are a certain ultimate principle, for example of me and you and of every particular thing; and this [is] the common form of the individuals."

T19. Damascius, *In Parm.*, t. IV, 53.10-14 (on the purpose of the fourth hypothesis) : Σκοπὸς ἄρα τῆδε τῆ ὑποθέσει περὶ τοῦ τοιούτου διελεθῆν εἶδους. οὐκ ἔξω δὲ οὐδὲ τοῦτο τῶν ἀρχῶν, ὅτι συναίτιον καὶ τοῦτο τῆς ὑποσελήνου διακοσμήσεως. οὐ γὰρ περὶ τῶν νῦν ὄντων διαλεχθήσεται, ἀτόμων ὄντων, ἀλλὰ καθόλου περὶ τῆς τοιαύτης φύσεως.

T20. Damascius, *In Parm.*, t. IV, 98.18-19: Τὸ μὲν οὖν γνωστὸν ὅτι αἰσθητὸν καὶ ὅτι δοξαστὸν ἐνδείκνυται, ὡς σαφῶς ἐν τῇ ὁγδόῃ λέγεται ὑποθέσει.⁴

T21. Damascius, *In Parm.*, t. IV, 84.2-5: Καὶ ἔστιν τις ἐν τῷ παντὶ καὶ ἐν τῷ ὑποσελήνω κόσμῳ καὶ τοιάδε τις ἀρχή, ὡς τὰ τέσσαρα στοιχεῖα, καὶ τὸ ἐκ τούτων ἐν πλήρωμα σύνθετον, ἐξ οὗ καὶ εἰς ὃ πάντα γίνονται καὶ φθείρεται.

T22. Damascius, *In Parm.*, t. IV, 74.6-12: "Ἡ πρὸς τοῦτό γε ἀντιτίθεμεν τὸν μέγαν Ἰάμβλιχον εἶ λέγοντα καὶ τὸ σύνθετον εἶναι ἀρχήν, οἷον τὰ τέσσαρα στοιχεῖα ἀρχὴ τῶν ζώων καὶ τοῦ ὑποσελήνου παντός, καὶ <αἰ> σφαῖραι τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, καὶ ὁ οὐρανὸς ἀρχὴ καὶ αἰτία τῆς γενέσεως.

T23. "Ὅτι δὲ οὐδὲν ἀπεμφαῖνον λέγομεν τοῖς παλαιοῖς δηλοῖ μὲν καὶ Ἰάμβλιχος, ἤδη τινὰς ὑποθέσεις τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἀπονείμας καὶ ἀτόμοις, δηλοῖ δὲ καὶ ὁ ἱερὸς Πλούταρχος, αὐτὴν ταύτην τὴν ἕκτην ὑπόθεσιν περὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ὑποθέμενος.

³ Cf. Plato, *Parmenides*, 164d 6-8: Οὐκοῦν πολλοὶ ὄγκοι ἔσσονται, εἷς ἕκαστος φαινόμενος, ὧν δὲ οὐ, εἴπερ ἕν μὴ ἔσται.

⁴ Cf. Plato, *Parmenides*, 165a1-2: καὶ ἴσος μὲν τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ μικροῖς ἕκαστος ὄγκος δοξασθήσεται.

Damascius on the objects of the sixth and eighth hypotheses of Plato's *Parmenides*
Pantelis Golitsis (AUTH) Research Project "Between Athens & Alexandria", 28.III.2024