Damascius famously reports that Porphyry and Iamblichus give priority, respectively, to philosophy and hieratic practice (On Phaedo 1.171-2). In this paper, I would explore how Hermias, Damascius, and Olympiodorus unpack and ultimately resolve the distinction. Some later Platonists frame Porphyrian philosophy as a ladder of virtues culminating, not only in contemplation, but in the ‘paradigmatic’ virtue that amounts to unity with Nous; ‘hieratic’ practice culminates in the highest inspiration, unity with the One. However, ‘hieratic’ virtue is also a parallel hierarchy coexisting alongside the philosophical scale of virtues, reaching each level of the soul by means of inspiration (enthousiasmos). Importantly, I would argue that each tier of inspiration also underlies and causes a tier of virtue, in a way that explains how Porphyry’ and Iamblichus’ views (as later Platonists construct them) can be reconciled.