Διαδικτυακή Διάλεξη
The Reinterpretation of Plato's Cardinal Virtues in Plotinus
15 Μαΐου, 2024
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7-9μ.μ. (ώρα Ελλάδος)
Image: Correggio, Allegory of Virtue, c. 1530, tempera on canvas, 148 x 88 cm, Louvre, Paris, Inv. 5926
Abstract
In this paper I discuss the consequences, as regards the theory of virtue, of Plotinus’ denial that ‘spirit’ (thumos) and ‘desire’ (epithumia) are parts of the nature of soul. This denial contrasts with Plato’s tripartition of the soul (including spirit and desire) in the Republic, a tripartition which serves in Plato to define the cardinal virtues. Plotinus consequently defines the cardinal virtues (named by him the ‘political’ virtues) in a different way, as the measure and order brought by rational soul to the affects which arise in the living body. Plotinus introduces furthermore a higher level of virtues, the ‘higher’ virtues. I will discuss the relation between these higher virtues and the political virtues: what principle of priority governs this scale of virtues? What relations of independence or dependence obtain between the two levels of virtues?
Dominic O’Meara ( Université de Fribourg)
Dominic J. O’Meara studied at Cambridge University and in Paris, where his doctoral thesis was directed by Pierre Hadot. He is Professor Emeritus of philosophy at the Université de Fribourg (Switzerland). Among his books are: Pythagoras Revived: Mathematics and Philosophy in Late Antiquity (Oxford University Press, 1989); Plotinus: an Introduction to the Enneads (Oxford University Press, 1993); Platonopolis: Platonic Political Philosophy in Late Antiquity (Oxford University Press, 2003); Cosmology and Politics in Plato’s Later Works (Cambridge University Press, 2017); Plotin Traité 19 Sur les vertus: introduction, traduction, commentaire (Vrin, Paris, 2019).