

Paul Kalligas_Plotinus on Bringing Order to the Universe

T1: Plot., *Enn.* IV 7.2.11-25

Τί ἂν οὖν εἴη σῶμα ζῶην παρ' αὐτοῦ ἔχον; Πῦρ γὰρ καὶ ἀήρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆ ἄψυχα παρ' αὐτῶν· καὶ ὅτῳ πάρεστι τούτων ψυχὴ, τοῦτο ἐπακτῶ κέχρηται τῇ ζῳῇ, ἄλλα δὲ παρὰ ταῦτα σώματα οὐκ ἔστι. Καὶ οἷς γε δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ στοιχεῖα τούτων ἕτερα, σώματα, οὐ ψυχαί, ἐλέχθησαν εἶναι οὐδὲ ζῶην ἔχοντα. εἰ δὲ μηδενὸς αὐτῶν ζῶην ἔχοντος ἡ σύνοδος πεποίηκε ζῶην, ἄτοπον· εἰ δὲ ἕκαστον ζῶην ἔχοι, καὶ ἐν ἀρκεῖ· μᾶλλον δὲ ἀδύνατον συμφόρησιν σωμάτων ζῶην ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ νοῦν γεννᾶν τὰ ἀνόητα. Καὶ δὴ καὶ οὐχ ὁπωσοῦν κραθέντα ταῦτα φήσουσι γίνεσθαι. Δεῖ ἄρα εἶναι τὸ τάξιν καὶ τὸ τῆς κράσεως αἷτιον· ὥστε τοῦτο τάξιν ἂν ἔχοι ψυχῆς. Οὐ γὰρ ὅ τι σύνθετον, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἀπλοῦν ἂν εἴη σῶμα ἐν τοῖς οὗσιν ἄνευ ψυχῆς οὕσης ἐν τῷ παντί, εἴπερ λόγος προσελθὼν τῇ ὕλῃ σῶμα ποιεῖ, οὐδαμόθεν δ' ἂν προσέλθοι λόγος ἢ παρὰ ψυχῆς.

T2: Plot., *Enn.* III 8.4.5-10

Ὅτι τὸ γενόμενόν ἐστι θέαμα ἐμὸν σιωπῶσης, καὶ φύσει γενόμενον θεώρημα, καὶ μοι γενομένη ἐκ θεωρίας τῆς ὠδὶ τὴν φύσιν ἔχειν φιλοθεάμονα ὑπάρχειν. Καὶ τὸ θεωροῦν μου θεώρημα ποιεῖ, ὥσπερ οἱ γεωμέτραι θεωροῦντες γράφουσιν· ἀλλ' ἐμοῦ μὴ γραφούσης, θεωρούσης δέ, ὑφίστανται αἱ τῶν σωμάτων γραμμαὶ ὥσπερ ἐκπίπτουσαι.

T3: Plot., *Enn.* IV 7.3.1-5

Εἰ δέ τις μὴ οὕτως, ἀλλὰ ἀτόμους ἢ ἀμερῇ συνελθόντα ψυχὴν ποιεῖν τῇ ἐνώσει λέγοι καὶ ὁμοπαθεία, ἐλέγχοιτ' ἂν καὶ τῇ παραθέσει μὴ δι' ὅλου δέ, οὐ γιγνομένου ἐνὸς οὐδὲ συμπαθοῦς ἐξ ἀπαθῶν καὶ μὴ ἐνοῦσθαι δυναμένων σωμάτων· ψυχὴ δὲ αὐτῇ συμπαθήσῃ.

T4: Plot., *Enn.* IV 2.1.62-67

Ἡ δ' ὁμοῦ μεριστὴ τε καὶ ἀμέριστος φύσις, ἣν δὴ ψυχὴν εἶναί φαμεν, οὐχ οὕτως ὥς τὸ συνεχὲς μία, μέρος ἄλλο, τὸ δ' ἄλλο ἔχουσα· ἀλλὰ μεριστὴ μὲν, ὅτι ἐν πᾶσι μέρεσι τοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἔστιν, ἀμέριστος δέ, ὅτι ὅλη ἐν πᾶσι καὶ ἐν ὁτῶοις αὐτοῦ ὅλη.

T5: Plot., *Enn.* VI 6.16.21-28

Ὅταν δὲ τὸν ἄνθρωπον αὐτὸν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ λέγῃς ἀριθμὸν τινα, οἷον δυάδα, ζῶον καὶ λογικόν, οὐχ εἷς ἔστι ὁ τρόπος ἐνταῦθα, ἀλλ' ἢ μὲν διεξοδεύεις καὶ ἀριθμεῖς, ποσόν τι ποιεῖς, ἢ δὲ τὰ ὑποκείμενά ἐστι δύο καὶ ἐκάτερον ἓν, εἰ τὸ ἐν ἐκάτερον συμπληροῦν τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ ἡ ἐνότης ἐν ἐκατέρῳ, ἀριθμὸν ἄλλον καὶ οὐσιώδη λέγεις. Καὶ ἡ δυὰς αὕτη οὐχ ὕστερον οὐδὲ ὅσον λέγει μόνον ἐξωθεν τοῦ πράγματος, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ καὶ συνέχον τὴν τοῦ πράγματος φύσιν.

T6: Plot., *Enn.* VI 6.16.34-37

Ἐν δὲ τοῖς δέκα οὓς ἀριθμεῖς μὴ συντεταγμένοις εἰς ἓν οὐδὲ δεκάς ἂν λέγοιτο, ἀλλὰ δέκα σὺ ποιεῖς ἀριθμῶν, καὶ ποσὸν τοῦτο τὸ δέκα· ἐν δὲ τῷ χορῷ καὶ ἔστι τι ἕξω καὶ ἐν τῷ στρατῷ.

T7: Plot., *Enn.* VI 9.1.1-14

Πάντα τὰ ὄντα τῷ ἐνὶ ἔστιν ὄντα, ὅσα τε πρώτως ἔστιν ὄντα, καὶ ὅσα ὀπωσοῦν λέγεται ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν εἶναι. Τί γὰρ ἂν καὶ εἴη, εἰ μὴ ἐν εἴη; Ἐπεὶ περ ἀφαιρεθέντα τοῦ ἐν ὃ λέγεται οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκεῖνα. Οὔτε γὰρ στρατὸς ἔστιν, εἰ μὴ ἐν ἔσται, οὔτε χορὸς οὔτε ἀγέλη μὴ ἐν ὄντα. Ἀλλ οὐδὲ οἰκία ἢ ναῦς τὸ ἐν οὐκ ἔχοντα, ἐπεὶ περ ἡ οἰκία ἐν καὶ ἡ ναῦς, ὃ εἰ ἀποβάλοι, οὔτ' ἂν ἡ οἰκία ἔτι οἰκία οὔτε ἡ ναῦς. Τὰ τοίνυν συνεχῇ μεγέθη, εἰ μὴ τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς παρείη, οὐκ ἂν εἴη· τμηθέντα γοῦν, καθόσον τὸ ἐν ἀπόλλυσιν, ἀλλάσσει τὸ εἶναι. Καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ τῶν φυτῶν καὶ ζώων σώματα ἐν ὄντα ἕκαστα εἰ φεύγοι τὸ ἐν εἰς πλῆθος θρυπτόμενα, τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτῶν, ἣν εἶχεν, ἀπώλεσεν οὐκέτι ὄντα ἢ ἦν, ἄλλα δὲ γενόμενα καὶ ἐκεῖνα, ὅσα ἐν ἔστι.

T8: Plat., *Phlb.* 16d7-e2

Τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀπείρου ιδέαν πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος μὴ προσφέρειν πρὶν ἂν τις τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτοῦ πάντα κατίδῃ τὸν μεταξὺ τοῦ ἀπείρου τε καὶ τοῦ ἐνός, τότε δ' ἤδη τὸ ἐν ἕκαστον τῶν πάντων εἰς τὸ ἄπειρον μεθέντα χαίρειν ἔαν.

T9: Plot., *Enn.* VI 6.13.18-25

Ἐπεὶ καὶ ὅταν πλῆθος λέγῃ πλείω ἐνός λέγει· καὶ στρατὸν πολλοὺς ὠπλισμένους καὶ εἰς ἓν συντεταγμένους νοεῖ, καὶ πλῆθος ὃν οὐκ ἔῃ πλῆθος εἶναι· ἡ διάνοια δὴλόν που καὶ ἐνταῦθα ποιεῖ ἢ διδοῦσα τὸ ἐν, ὃ μὴ ἔχει τὸ πλῆθος, ἢ ὁξέως τὸ ἐν τὸ ἐκ τῆς τάξεως ἰδοῦσα τὴν τοῦ πολλοῦ φύσιν συνήγαγεν εἰς ἓν· οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδ' ἐνταῦθα τὸ ἐν ψεύδεται, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ οἰκίας τὸ ἐκ πολλῶν λίθων ἐν· μᾶλλον μέντοι τὸ ἐν ἐπ' οἰκίας.

Plotinus on Plato's *Timaeus* 90 a

ABSTRACT

In this paper, I endeavour to reconstruct Plotinus' reading of Plato's *Timaeus* 90 a. I argue that, in this Platonic passage, Plotinus sees his own distinction between «Intellect which makes it possible to reason», namely the Hypostasis Intellect, and “intellect which reasons”, namely our reasoning faculty. On this reading, *Timaeus* 90 a accounts for Plotinus' doctrine of the undescended Soul. Furthermore, I try to show that Plotinus interprets this passage in connection with (a) the vision of the gods' and souls' chariots contemplating the Forms in the central myth of Plato's *Phaedrus* (246 e-250 b), and (b) the soul's choice of guardian spirit (δαίμων) in *Republic* X (617 d-e). Thus, faithful to Ammonius Saccas' “philosophy without conflict”, Plotinus' interpretation harmonises Plato with Aristotle's distinction between active and passive Intellect in *De anima* Γ 5.

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TEXTS

T1 Pl. *Ti.* 90a2–b1

τὸ δὲ δὴ περὶ τοῦ κυριωτάτου παρ' ἡμῖν ψυχῆς εἶδους διανοεῖσθαι δεῖ τῆδε, ὥς ἄρα αὐτὸ δαίμονα θεὸς ἐκάστω δέδωκεν, τοῦτο ὃ δὴ φαμεν οἰκεῖν μὲν ἡμῶν ἐπ' ἄκρῳ τῷ σώματι, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἐν οὐρανῷ συγγένειαν (5) ἀπὸ γῆς ἡμᾶς αἶρειν ὥς ὄντας φυτὸν οὐκ ἔγγειον ἀλλὰ οὐράνιον, ὁρθότατα λέγοντες· ἐκεῖθεν γάρ, ὅθεν ἡ πρώτη τῆς ψυχῆς γένεσις ἔφυ, τὸ θεῖον τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ ῥίζαν ἡμῶν (b) ἀνακρεμαννὺν ὁρθοῖ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα.

And as regards the most lordly kind of our soul, we must conceive of it in this wise: we declare that God has given to each of us, as his/her *daemon*, that kind of soul which is housed in the top of our body and which raises us – seeing that we are not an earthly plant but a heavenly plant – up from earth towards our kindred in the heaven. And herein we speak most truly; for it is by suspending our head and root from that region whence our soul's generation first arose that the divine keeps upright the whole body (Trans. R. G. Bury; slightly modified).

T2 Plot. V 1, 10, 11–24

Ἔστι τοίνυν καὶ ἡ ἡμετέρα ψυχὴ θεῖον τι καὶ φύσεως ἄλλης ὅποια πᾶσα ἡ ψυχῆς φύσις· τελεία δὲ ἡ νοῦν ἔχουσα· νοῦς δὲ ὁ μὲν λογισζόμενος, ὁ δὲ λογίζεσθαι παρέχων. Τὸ δὴ λογισζόμενον τοῦτο τῆς ψυχῆς οὐδενὸς πρὸς τὸ λογίζεσθαι δεόμενον σωματικοῦ ὀργάνου, τὴν δὲ ἐνέργειαν ἑαυτοῦ ἐν καθαρῷ ἔχον, ἵνα καὶ λογίζεσθαι καθαρῶς οἷόν τε ἦ, χωριστὸν καὶ οὐ κεκραμένον σώματι ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ νοητῷ τις τιθέμενος οὐκ ἂν σφάλλοιτο. Οὐ γὰρ τόπον ζητητέον οὐδ' ἰδρύσομεν, ἀλλ' ἔξω τόπου παντὸς ποιητέον. Οὕτω γὰρ τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ ἔξω καὶ τὸ ἄυλον, ὅταν μόνον ἦ οὐδὲν ἔχον παρὰ τῆς σώματος φύσεως. Διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἔτι ἔξωθεν φησιν

Our soul then also is a divine thing and of a nature different [from the things of sense], like the universal nature of Soul; and the human soul is perfect when it has intellect; and intellect is of two kinds, the one which reasons and the one which makes it possible to reason. Now this reasoning part of the soul, which needs no bodily instrument for its reasoning, but preserves its activity in pure Intellect in order that it may be able to engage in pure reasoning, one could without mistake place, as separate and unmixed with body, in the primary intelligible realm. This is the reason why Plato says of the

ἐπὶ τοῦ παντός τὴν ψυχὴν περιέβαλεν ἐνδεικνύμενος τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ ἐν τῷ νοητῷ μένον· ἐπὶ δὲ ἡμῶν ἐπικρύπτων ἐπ’ ἄκρα εἶρηκε τῇ κεφαλῇ (my emphasis).

universe also that the Craftsman wrapped the soul round it “from outside”, indicating the part of the soul which remains in the intelligible (ἐν τῷ νοητῷ); and he said obscurely about us that the soul is “on top in the head” (my emphasis; here and in what follows: Trans. A. H. Armstrong, in some cases slightly modified).

T3 Plot. V 3, 3, 22-33

Τί οὖν κωλύει ἐν ψυχῇ νοῦν καθαρὸν εἶναι; Οὐδέν, φήσομεν· ἀλλ’ ἔτι δεῖ λέγειν ψυχῆς τοῦτο; Ἀλλ’ οὐ ψυχῆς μὲν φήσομεν, ἡμέτερον δὲ νοῦν φήσομεν, ἄλλον μὲν ὄντα τοῦ διανοουμένου καὶ ἐπάνω βεβηκότα, ὅμως δὲ ἡμέτερον, καὶ εἰ μὴ συναριθμοῖμεν τοῖς μέρεσι τῆς ψυχῆς. Ἡ ἡμέτερον καὶ οὐχ ἡμέτερον· διὸ καὶ προσχρώμεθα αὐτῷ καὶ οὐ προσχρώμεθα—διανοία δὲ αἰεὶ—καὶ ἡμέτερον μὲν χρωμένων, οὐ προσχρωμένων δὲ οὐχ ἡμέτερον. Τὸ δὴ προσχρῆσθαι τί ἐστίν; Ἀρα αὐτοὺς ἐκεῖνο γινομένους, καὶ φθεγγομένους ὡς ἐκεῖνος; Ἡ κατ’ ἐκεῖνον· οὐ γὰρ νοῦς ἡμεῖς· κατ’ ἐκεῖνο οὖν τῷ λογιστικῷ πρώτῳ δεχομένῳ.

What then prevents pure Intellect from being in soul? Nothing, we shall reply. But ought we to go on to say that it belongs to our soul? But we shall not say that it belongs to soul, but we shall say that it is our Intellect, being different from the reasoning intellect and having gone up on high, but all the same ours, although we should not count It among the parts of soul, yes, really It is ours and not ours; for this reason we use It and we do not use It – whereas we always use discursive reason – and It is ours when we use It, but not ours when we do not use It. But what is this “using”? Is it when we become It and speak like It? No, in accord with It: for we ourselves are not Intellect. We are, then, in accord with It by our rational faculty which first receives it.

T4 Plot. Plot. 1 1, 8, 1-7

Πρὸς δὲ τὸν νοῦν πῶς; Νοῦν δὲ λέγω οὐχ ἦν ἡ ψυχὴ ἔχει ἕξιν οὖσαν τῶν παρὰ τοῦ νοῦ, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸν τὸν νοῦν. Ἡ ἔχομεν καὶ τοῦτον ὑπεράνω ἡμῶν. Ἐχομεν δὲ ἢ κοινὸν ἢ ἴδιον, ἢ καὶ κοινὸν πάντων καὶ ἴδιον· κοινὸν μὲν, ὅτι ἀμέριστος καὶ εἰς καὶ πανταχοῦ ὁ αὐτός, ἴδιον δέ, ὅτι ἔχει καὶ ἕκαστος αὐτὸν ὅλον ἐν ψυχῇ τῇ πρώτῃ.

But how are we related to Intellect? I mean by “Intellect” not that disposition of the soul that is one of the things that derive from Intellect, but Intellect itself. We possess this too as something that is above us. We have it either as common to all or particular to ourselves, or both common and particular; common because it is without parts and one and everywhere the same, particular to ourselves because each has the whole of it in his higher soul.

T5 Plot. I 8, 2, 9-24

νοῦ ἐκεῖνου ὄντος οὐ κατὰ νοῦν, ὃν οἰηθείη ἂν τις κατὰ τοὺς παρ’ ἡμῖν λεγομένους νοῦς εἶναι τοὺς ἐκ προτάσεων συμπληρουμένους καὶ τῶν λεγομένων συνιέναι προτάσεων συμπληρουμένους καὶ τῶν λεγομένων συνιέναι δυναμένους λογιζομένους τε καὶ τοῦ ἀκολουθοῦ θεωρίαν ποιουμένους ὡς ἐξ ἀκολουθίας τὰ ὄντα θεωμένους ὡς πρότερον οὐκ ἔχοντας, ἀλλὰ κενούς ἔτι πρὶν μαθεῖν ὄντας, καίτοι νοῦς ὄντας. Οὐ δὴ ἐκεῖνος ὁ νοῦς τοιοῦτος, ἀλλ’ ἔχει πάντα καὶ ἔστι πάντα καὶ σύνεστιν αὐτῷ συνὼν καὶ ἔχει πάντα οὐκ ἔχων. Οὐ γὰρ ἄλλα, ὁ δὲ ἄλλος· οὐδὲ χωρὶς ἕκαστον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ· ὅλον τε γὰρ ἐστὶν ἕκαστον καὶ πανταχῇ πᾶν· καὶ οὐ συγκέχυται, ἀλλὰ αὖ χωρὶς. Τὸ γοῦν μεταλαμβάνον οὐχ ὁμοῦ πάντων, ἀλλ’ ὅτου δύναται μεταλαμβάνει. Καὶ ἔστι πρώτη ἐνέργεια ἐκεῖνου καὶ πρώτη οὐσία ἐκεῖνου μένοντος ἐν ἑαυτῷ· ἐνεργεῖ μέντοι περὶ ἐκεῖνον οἷον περὶ ἐκεῖνον ζῶν.

Intellect there is not the sort one might conceive on the analogy of our so-called intellects (which get their content from premises and are able to understand what is said, and reason discursively and observe what follows, contemplating reality as the result of a process of reasoning, since they did not have it before but were empty before they learnt, though they were intellects. Intellect there is not like this, but has all things and is all things, and is with them when it is with itself and has all things without having them. For it is not one thing and they another; nor is each individual thing in it separate; for each is the whole and in all ways all, and yet they are not confused, but each is in a different sense separate; at any rate what participates in it does not participate in everything at once, but in what it is capable of. That Intellect is the first activity of the Good and the first

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| | substance; the Good stays still in itself; but Intellect moves about it in its activity, as also it lives around it. |
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T5a Plot. IV 8, 4, 1-10; 27-32

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| <p>Τὰς δὴ κατέκαστα ψυχὰς ὁρᾷ μὲν νοεῖν χρωμέναν ἐν τῇ ἐξ οὗ ἐγένοντο πρὸς αὐτὸ ἐπιστροφῇ, δύναμιν δὲ καὶ εἰς τὸ ἐπὶ τὰδε ἐχούσας, οἷα περ φῶς ἐξηρημένον μὲν κατὰ τὰ ἄνω ἡλίου, τῷ δὲ μετ' αὐτὸ οὐ φθονοῦν τῆς χορηγίας, ἀπήμονας μὲν εἶναι μετὰ τῆς ὅλης μενούσας ἐν τῷ νοητῷ, ἐν οὐρανῷ δὲ μετὰ τῆς ὅλης συνδιοικεῖν ἐκείνῃ, οἷα οἱ βασιλεῖ τῶν πάντων κρατοῦντι συνόντες συνδιοικοῦσιν ἐκείνῳ οὐ καταβαίνοντες οὐδ' αὐτοὶ ἀπὸ τῶν βασιλείων τόπων. [...] εἴληπται οὖν πεσοῦσα καὶ πρὸς τῷ δεσμῷ οὔσα καὶ τῇ αἰσθήσει ἐνεργοῦσα διὰ τὸ κωλύεσθαι τῷ νῷ ἐνεργεῖν καταρχάς, τεθάφθαι τε λέγεται καὶ ἐν σπηλαίῳ εἶναι, ἐπιστραφεῖσα δὲ πρὸς νόησιν λύεσθαι τε ἐκ τῶν δεσμῶν καὶ ἀναβαίνειν, ὅταν ἀρχὴν λάβῃ ἐξ ἀναμνήσεως θεᾶσθαι τὰ ὄντα· ἔχει γάρ τι αἰεὶ οὐδὲν ἥττον ὑπερέχον τι.</p> | <p>The individual souls, certainly, have an intelligible desire consisting in the impulse to return to the principle from which they came into being, but they also possess a power directed to the world here below, like a light which depends from the sun in the upper world but does not grudge of its abundance to what comes after it, and they are free from sorrow if they remain with universal soul in the intelligible, but in heaven with the universal soul they can share in its government, like those who live with a universal monarch and share in the government of his empire; these also do not come down from the abode of royalty; [...] it [the individual soul] is fallen therefore, and is caught, and is engaged with its fetter, and acts by sense because its new beginning prevents it from acting by Intellect, and it is said to be buried and in a cave, but, when it turns to intelligence, to be freed from its fetters and to ascend, when it is started on the contemplation of reality by recollection; for, in spite of everything, it always has something transcendent in some way.</p> |
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T6 Plot. V 8, 3, 27-37

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| <p>Τῶν δὲ θεῶν οἱ μὲν ἐν οὐρανῷ ὄντες—σχολῇ γὰρ αὐτοῖς—θεῶνται αἰεὶ, οἷον δὲ πόρρωθεν, τὰ ἐν ἐκείνῳ αὖ τῷ οὐρανῷ ὑπεροχῇ τῇ ἑαυτῶν κεφαλῇ. Οἱ δὲ ἐν ἐκείνῳ ὄντες, ὅσοις ἢ οἴκησις ἐπ' αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ, ἐν παντὶ οἰκοῦντες τῷ ἐκεῖ οὐρανῷ—πάντα γὰρ ἐκεῖ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ γῆ οὐρανὸς καὶ θάλασσα καὶ ζῶα καὶ φυτὰ καὶ ἄνθρωποι, πᾶν οὐράνιον ἐκείνου τοῦ οὐρανοῦ—οἱ δὲ θεοὶ οἱ ἐν αὐτῷ οὐκ ἀπαξιοῦντες ἀνθρώπους οὐδ' ἄλλο τι τῶν ἐκεῖ, ὅτι τῶν ἐκεῖ, πᾶσαν μὲν διεξίασιν τὴν ἐκεῖ χώραν καὶ τὸν τόπον ἀναπαυόμενοι.</p> | <p>The gods who are in [the sensible] heaven, since they are free for contemplation, continually contemplate, but as if at a distance, the things in that higher heaven into which they raise their heads. But the gods in that higher heaven, all those who dwell upon it and in it, contemplate through their abiding in the whole of that heaven. For all things there are heaven, and earth and sea and plants and animals and mean are heaven, everything which belongs to that higher heaven is heavenly. The gods in it do not reject as unworthy men or anything else that is there; it is worthy because it is there, and they travel, always at rest, through all that higher country and region.</p> |
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T7 Pl. Phdr. 248 a

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| <p>Καὶ οὗτος μὲν θεῶν βίος· αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι ψυχαί, ἡ μὲν ἄριστα θεῷ ἐπομένη καὶ εἰκασμένη ὑπερῆρεν εἰς τὸν ἔξω τόπον τὴν τοῦ ἡνιόχου κεφαλὴν, καὶ συμπεριγνέχθη τὴν περιφορὰν, θορυβουμένη ὑπὸ τῶν ἵππων καὶ μόγις καθορῶσα τὰ ὄντα.</p> | <p>Such is the life of the gods; but of the other souls, that which best follows after God and is most like him, raises the head of the charioteer up into the outer region and is carried round in the revolution, troubled by the horses and hardly beholding the realities (Trans. H. N. Fowler).</p> |
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T8 Plot. I 8, 2, 23-26

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| <p>Ἡ δὲ ἔξωθεν περὶ τοῦτον χορεύουσα ψυχὴ ἐπὶ αὐτὸν βλέπουσα καὶ τὸ εἶσω αὐτοῦ θεωμένη τὸν θεὸν δι' αὐτοῦ βλέπει. Καὶ οὗτος θεῶν ἀπήμων καὶ μακάριος βίος.</p> | <p>And Soul dances round Intellect outside, and looks to it, and in contemplating its interior sees God through it. "This is the life of the god", without sorrow and blessed.</p> |
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T9 Plot. IV 8, 1, 1-11

Πολλάκις ἐγειρόμενος εἰς ἑμαυτὸν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος καὶ γινόμενος τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἔξω, ἑμαυτοῦ δὲ εἰσὼ, θαυμαστὸν ἡλίκον ὁρῶν κάλλος, καὶ τῆς κρείττονος μοίρας πιστεύσας τότε μάλιστα εἶναι, ζῶν τε ἀρίστην ἐνεργήσας καὶ τῷ θεῷ εἰς ταῦτὸν γεγενημένος καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ ἰδρυθείς εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἐλθὼν ἐκείνην ὑπὲρ πᾶν τὸ ἄλλο νοητὸν ἑμαυτὸν ἰδρύσας, μετὰ ταύτην τὴν ἐν τῷ θεῷ στάσιν εἰς λογισμὸν ἐκ νοῦ καταβάς ἀπορῶ, πῶς ποτε καὶ νῦν καταβαίνω, καὶ ὅπως ποτέ μοι ἔνδον ἡ ψυχὴ γεγένηται τοῦ σώματος τοῦτο οὖσα, οἷον ἐφάνη καθ' ἑαυτήν, καίπερ οὖσα ἐν σώματι.

Often I have woken up out of my body to myself and have entered into myself, going out from all other things; I have seen a beauty wonderfully great and felt assurance that then most of all I belonged to the better part; I have actually lived the best life and come to identity with the divine; and set firm in it I have come to that supreme actuality, setting myself above all else in the realm of Intellect. Then, after that rest in the divine, when I have come down from Intellect to discursive reasoning, I am puzzled how I ever came down, and how my soul has come to be in the body when it is what it has shown itself to be by itself, even when it is in the body.

T10 Plot. III 4, 5, 18-24

δαίμων οὗτος οὐ παντάπασιν ἔξω ἀλλ' οὕτως ὥς μὴ συνδεδεμένος οὐδ' ἐνεργῶν, ἡμέτερος δέ, ὥς ψυχῆς πέρι εἰπεῖν, οὐχ ὁ ἡμέτερος δέ, εἰ ὥς ἄνθρωποι τοιοῦδε τὴν ὑπ' αὐτὸν ζῶν ἔχοντες, μαρτυρεῖ τὰ ἐν τῷ *Τιμαίῳ*· ἃ εἰ μὲν οὕτω ληφθεῖν, οὐδεμίαν ἔξει μάχην σχόντα ἄν τινα ἀσυμφωνίαν, εἰ ἄλλως ὁ δαίμων ληφθεῖν (I follow P. Kalligas' Greek text).

For that this daemon is not entirely outside but only in the sense that he is not bound to us and is not active [in us], but is ours, if we speak with respect to our souls, but not ours, if we are considered as men of a particular kind who have a life which is subject to him, is shown by what is said in the *Timaeus*; if the passage is taken in this way, it will contain no contradiction, but it would have some disaccord, if the daemon were understood otherwise.

T11 Plot. I 1, 7, 14-24

Ἀπὸ δὴ τούτων τῶν εἰδῶν, ἀφ' ὧν ψυχὴ ἤδη παραδέχεται μόνη τὴν τοῦ ζῴου ἡγεμονίαν, διάνοιαι δὴ καὶ δόξαι καὶ νοήσεις· ἔνθα δὴ ἡμεῖς μάλιστα. Τὰ δὲ πρὸ τούτων ἡμέτερα, ἡμεῖς δὴ τὸ ἐντεῦθεν ἄνω ἐφεστηκότες τῷ ζῴῳ. Κωλύσει δὲ οὐδὲν τὸ σύμπαν ζῶον λέγειν, μικτὸν μὲν τὰ κάτω, τὸ δὲ ἐντεῦθεν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ὁ ἀληθὴς σχεδόν· ἐκεῖνα δὲ τὸ λεοντώδες καὶ τὸ ποικίλον ὅλως θηρίον. Συνδρόμου γὰρ ὄντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τῇ λογικῇ ψυχῇ, ὅταν λογιζώμεθα, ἡμεῖς λογιζόμεθα τῷ τοῦς λογισμοὺς ψυχῆς εἶναι ἐνεργήματα.

From these forms, from which the soul alone receives its lordship over the living being, come reasonings, and opinions and acts of intuitive intelligence; and this is precisely where "we" are. That which comes before [i.e. below] this is "ours" but "we", in our presidency over the living being, are what extends from this point upwards. But there will be no objection to calling the whole thing "living being"; the lower parts of it are something mixed, the part which begins on the level of thought is, I suppose, the true man: those lower parts are the "lion-like", and altogether "the various beast." Since man coincides with the rational soul, when we reason it is really we who reason because rational processes are activities of soul.

T12 Plot. III 4, 3, 1-10

Τίς οὖν δαίμων; ὁ καὶ ἐνταῦθα. Τίς δὲ θεός; ἢ ὁ ἐνταῦθα. Τὸ γὰρ ἐνεργῆσαν τοῦτο ἕκαστον ἄγει, ἅτε καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἡγούμενον. Ἄρ' οὖν τοῦτο ἐστὶν ὁ δαίμων, ὅσπερ ζῶντα εἰλήχει; Ἡ οὐ, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρὸ αὐτοῦ· τοῦτο γὰρ ἐφέστηκεν ἀργούν, ἐνεργεῖ δὲ τὸ μετ' αὐτόν. Καὶ εἰ μὲν τὸ ἐνεργεῖν ἢ αἰσθητικοί, καὶ ὁ δαίμων τὸ λογικόν· εἰ δὲ κατὰ τὸ λογικὸν ζῶμεν, ὁ δαίμων τὸ ὑπὲρ τοῦτο ἐφεστώς ἀργὸς συγχωρῶν τῷ ἐργαζομένῳ. Ὁρθῶς οὖν λέγεται ἡμᾶς αἰρῆσθαι. Τὸν γὰρ ὑπερκείμενον κατὰ τὴν ζωὴν αἰρούμεθα.

Who then becomes a daemon? He who was one here too. And who a god? Certainly who was one here. For what was active in a man leads him [after death], since it lead here too. Is this, then, "the daemon to whom he was allotted while he lived"? No, but that which is before what is active ; for this [i.e. the daemon] presides inactive over the man, but that which comes after it is active. If the acting principle is that by which we have sense-perception, the spirit is the rational principle; but if we live by the rational principle, the daemon is what is above this, presiding inactive and giving its consent to the

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| | principle which works. So it is rightly said that “we shall choose.” For we choose the principle which stands above us according to our choice of life. |
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T13 Pl. R. X 617 e

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| οὐχ ὑμᾶς δαίμων λήξεται, ἀλλ’ ὑμεῖς δαίμονα αἰρήσεσθε. | It will not be the daemon who will choose you, but you will choose the daemon (guardian spirit). |
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T14 Plot. III 4, 6, 1-

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| Τί οὖν ὁ σπουδαῖος; Ἡ ὁ τῷ βελτίονι ἐνεργῶν. Ἡ οὐκ ἂν ἦν σπουδαῖος συνεργοῦντα ἑαυτῷ τὸν δαίμονα ἔχων. Νοῦς γὰρ ἐνεργεῖ ἐν τούτῳ. Ἡ οὖν δαίμων αὐτὸς ἢ κατὰ δαίμονα καὶ δαίμων τούτῳ θεός. Ἄρ’ οὖν καὶ ὑπὲρ νοῦν; Εἰ τὸ ὑπὲρ νοῦν δαίμων αὐτῷ, διὰ τί οὖν οὐκ ἐξ ἀρχῆς; Ἡ διὰ τὸν θόρυβον τὸν ἐκ τῆς γενέσεως. | What, then, is the nobly good man? He is the man who acts by his better part. He would not have been a good man if he had the daemon as a partner in his own activity. Intellect, then, is active in the good man. He is, then, himself a daemon or on the level of a daemon, and his daemon is God. Is it, then, even above Intellect? If that which is above Intellect is his daemon, why, then, is he not a man of noble goodness from the beginning? It is because of the “disturbance” which comes from birth. |
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T15 Plot. V 8, 3, 18-23

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| Σεμνοὶ μὲν γὰρ πάντες θεοὶ καὶ καλοὶ καὶ τὸ κάλλος αὐτῶν ἀμήχανον· ἀλλὰ τί ἐστι δι’ ὃ τοιοῦτοί εἰσιν; Ἡ νοῦς, καὶ ὅτι μᾶλλον νοῦς ἐνεργῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς, ὥστε ὁράσθαι. Οὐ γὰρ δὴ, ὅτι αὐτῶν καλὰ τὰ σώματα. Καὶ γὰρ οἷς ἐστι σώματα, οὐ τοῦτό ἐστιν αὐτοῖς τὸ εἶναι θεοῖς, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸν νοῦν καὶ οὗτοι θεοί. | All the gods are majestic and beautiful and their beauty is overwhelming: but what is it which makes them like this? It is Intellect, and it is because Intellect is more intensely active in them, so as to be visible. They are certainly not like this because their bodies are beautiful. For even those who have bodies, it is not this that makes them gods, but these too are gods according to Intellect. |
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T16 Plot. III 4, 3, 18-21

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| Εἰ δὲ ἔπεσθαι δύναίτο τῷ δαίμονι τῷ ἄνω αὐτοῦ, ἄνω γίνεται ἐκεῖνον ζῶν καὶ ἐφ’ ὃ ἄγεται κρεῖττον μέρος αὐτοῦ ἐν προστασίᾳ θέμενος καὶ μετ’ ἐκεῖνον ἄλλον ἕως ἄνω. | But if a man is able to follow the spirit which is above him, he comes to be himself above, living that spirit’s life, and giving the pre-eminence to that better part of himself to which he is being led; and after that spirit he rises to another, until he reaches the heights. |
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T17 Porphy. VPlot. 10, 14-34

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| Ἦν γὰρ καὶ κατὰ γένεσιν πλέον τι ἔχων παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους ὁ Πλωτῖνος. Αἰγύπτιος γὰρ τις ἱερεὺς ἀνελθὼν εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην καὶ διὰ τινος φίλου αὐτῷ γνωρισθεὶς θέλων τε τῆς ἑαυτοῦ σοφίας ἀπόδειξιν δοῦναι ἠξίωσε τὸν Πλωτῖνον ἐπὶ θέαν ἀφικέσθαι τοῦ συνόντος αὐτῷ οἰκείου δαίμονος καλουμένου. Τοῦ δὲ ἐτοιμῶς ὑπακούσαντος γίνεται μὲν ἐν τῷ Ἰσίῳ ἢ κλησίῳ· μόνον γὰρ ἐκεῖνον τὸν τόπον καθαρὸν φῆσαι εὐρεῖν ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ τὸν Αἰγύπτιον. Κληθέντα δὲ εἰσαὐτοψίαν τὸν δαίμονα θεὸν ἐλθεῖν καὶ μὴ τοῦ δαιμόνων εἶναι γένους· ὅθεν τὸν Αἰγύπτιον εἶπε· «μακάριος εἰ θεὸν ἔχων τὸν δαίμονα καὶ οὐ τοῦ ὑφειμένου γένους τὸν συνόντα.» Μῆτε δὲ ἐρέσθαι τι ἐκγενέσθαι μήτε ἐπιπλέον ἰδεῖν παρόντα τοῦ συνθεωροῦντος φίλου τὰς ὁρνεῖς, ἃς κατεῖχε φυλακῆς ἕνεκα, πνίξαντος εἴτε διὰ φθόνον εἴτε καὶ διὰ φόβον τινά. Τῶν οὖν θειοτέρων δαιμόνων ἔχων τὸν συνόντα καὶ αὐτὸς διετέλει | Plotinus certainly possessed by birth something more than other men. An Egyptian priest who came to Rome and made his acquaintance through a friend wanted to give a display of his wisdom and asked Plotinus to come and see a visible manifestation of his own companion spirit (daemon) evoked. Plotinus readily consented, and the evocation took place in the temple of Isis: the Egyptian said it was the only pure spot he could find in Rome. When the spirit (daemon) was summoned to appear a god came and not being of the spirit (daemon) order, and the Egyptian said: “Blessed you are, who have a god for your daemon and not a companion of the subordinate order.” It was not however possible to ask any questions of the god or even to see him present for longer, as the friend who was taking part in the |
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| ἀνάγων αὐτοῦ τὸ θεῖον ὄμμα πρὸς ἐκεῖνον. Ἔστι γοῦν αὐτῷ ἀπὸ τῆς τοιαύτης αἰτίας καὶ βιβλίον γραφὲν <i>Περὶ τοῦ εἰληχότος ἡμᾶς δαίμονος</i> , ὅπου πειρᾶται αἰτίας φέρειν περὶ τῆς διαφορᾶς τῶν συνόντων. | manifestation strangled the birds which he was holding as a protection, either out of jealousy or because he was afraid of something. So the companion of Plotinus was a daemon of the more god-like kind, and he continually kept the divine eye of his soul fixed in this companion. It was a reason of this kind that led him to write the treatise <i>On Our Allotted Guardian Spirit</i> , in which he sets out to explain the differences between spirit-companions. |
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T18 Porph. *VPlot.* 23, 8-18

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| Οὕτως δὲ μάλιστα τούτῳ τῷ δαιμονίῳ φωτὶ πολλάκις ἐνάγοντι ἑαυτὸν εἰς τὸν πρῶτον καὶ ἐπέκεινα θεὸν ταῖς ἐννοίαις καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἐν τῷ <i>Συμποσίῳ</i> ὑφηγημένους ὁδοὺς τῷ Πλάτῳ ἐφάνη ἐκεῖνος ὁ θεὸς ὁ μήτε μορφήν μήτε τινὰ ἰδέαν ἔχων, ὑπὲρ δὲ νοῦν καὶ πᾶν τὸ νοητὸν ἰδρυμένος. Ὡς δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ Πορφύριος ἅπαξ λέγω πλησιάσαι καὶ ἐνωθῆναι ἔτος ἄγων ἐξηκοστὸν τε καὶ ὄγδοον. Ἐφάνη γοῦν τῷ Πλωτίνῳ σκοπὸς ἐγγύθι ναίων. Τέλος γὰρ αὐτῷ καὶ σκοπὸς ἦν τὸ ἐνωθῆναι καὶ πελάσαι τῷ ἐπὶ πᾶσι θεῷ. Ἐτυχε δὲ τετράκις που, ὅτε αὐτῷ συνήμην, τοῦ σκοποῦ τούτου ἐνεργεῖα ἀρρήτῳ [καὶ οὐ δυνάμει]. | So to this god-like man above all, who often raised himself, according to the way Plato teaches in the <i>Symposium</i> , to the First and Transcendent God, that God appeared who has neither shape nor any intelligible Form, but is throned above Intellect and all the intelligible. I, Porphyry, who am now in my sixty-eighth year, declare that once I drew near and was united to him. To Plotinus “the goal ever near was shown”: his end and goal was to be united to, to approach the God who is over all things. Four times while I was with him he attained that goal, in an unspeakable actuality [and not in potency]. |
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T19 Arist. *De An.* Γ 5, 14-23

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| καὶ ἔστιν ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος νοῦς τῷ πάντα γίνεσθαι, ὁ δὲ τῷ πάντα ποιεῖν, ὡς ἕξις τις, οἷον τὸ φῶς· τρόπον γὰρ τινα καὶ τὸ φῶς ποιεῖ τὰ δυνάμει ὄντα χρώματα ἐνεργεῖα χρώματα [...] καὶ οὗτος ὁ νοῦς χωριστὸς καὶ ἀπαθής καὶ ἀμιγής, τῇ οὐσίᾳ ὦν ἐνεργεῖα· [...] ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὅτε μὲν νοεῖ ὅτε δ’ οὐ νοεῖ. χωρισθεὶς δ’ ἐστὶ μόνον τοῦθ’ ὅπερ ἐστὶ, καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἀθάνατον καὶ αἰδίων. | Intellect in the passive sense is such because it becomes all things, but intellect has another aspect in that it makes all things; this is a kind of disposition, just as it happens in the case of light; for in a sense light makes potential into actual colours. [...] Intellect in this sense is separable, impassive, and unmixed, since, with respect to its essence, it is an activity. [...] It is not the case that it sometimes thinks and sometimes not. When separated it is precisely what it is, and this alone is immortal and everlasting. (W. S. Hett’s translation, modified). |
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
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Ceremony at the temple of Isis, Herculaneum, 1st c. BCE

STEPHANUS, PHILOPONUS, AND THE ACTIVE MIND

Mark Edwards (Christ Church, Oxford)

The three-book commentary on *De Anima* attributed to Ammonius is assigned by Michael Hayduck (Berlin: Reimer 1897) to his pupil Philoponus, with the reservation that book 3 (attributed in one *MS* to Stephanus) is not likely to be the work of Philoponus.

A Latin text purportedly translated from Philoponus by William of Moerbeke and edited by M. de Corte (Paris: Droz 1934) has been widely accepted as the true continuation of “Philoponus” books 1 and 2.

P. Golitsis, “John Philoponus’ Commentary on the Third Book of Aristotle’s *De Anima*, Wrongly Attributed to Stephanus”, in R. Sorabji, *Aristotle Re-Interpreted. New Findings on Seven Hundred Years of the Ancient Commentators* (London: Bloomsbury 2016), 391-412 contends that Books 1 and 2 consist of Ammonius’ lectures transcribed and annotated by Philoponus while book 3 of the Greeks is by Philoponus himself. Criteria for assigning a work to Philoponus (satisfied by Greek book 3 but not by Greek books 1 and 2 and perhaps not by the Latin) are as follows:

- a) The author of Greek book 3 contradicts Aristotle, as the genuine Philoponus does, while the author of books 1 and 2 does not.
- b) The author of books 1 and 2 assumes doctrines unpalatable to Christianity, while author of book 3 does not.
- c) The author of book 3, like the genuine Philoponus, but unlike author of books 1 and 2, feels no obligation to reconcile Plato with Aristotle.

THE GREEK OF BOOK 3

a) Criticism of Aristotle

pp. 465-466 Hayduck. “Philoponus” argues that if a sense were aware of itself, it would have the power to turn back on itself that is granted only to the eternal. Yet Aristotle denies the immortality of the rational soul. This seems to be a charge of contradiction against Aristotle,

implying that he did not believe the soul to be immortal. The author of book 1 attacks Alexander of Aphrodisias for denying that Aristotle affirmed the immortality of the soul. P

p. 492.16. Contradicting Aristotle's pronouncement that *doxa* always depends on perception, the author declares that we have *doxa* without perception in *ta theia*, or “things divine”.

b) Possible coincidence with the Christian writings of Philoponus

At 477.25, 479.22 and 484.30 “Philoponus” replaces the locution “indivisibly in time” (applied by Aristotle at *De Anima* 426a to our perception of disparate sensations) with *akchronos*, a favourite term of the genuine Philoponus in *Against Proclus on the Eternity of the World* (64.3-5; 65.19-21 etc.)..

At 527, we read that the knowledge which we abstract from our material environment is not itself intelligence but the object of intelligence; when the knowledge of oneself and from within it is intelligence, be it that of the angels, whom Aristotle admits to be minds, or of the Demiurge whom he styles mind or Nous.

At 527.24-32 Plato is wrong to imagine God to be Mind, since God is superior to Mind (Cf Origen, *Contra Celsum* 7.38).

Only of God is it true that his *energeia* is his *ousia* (538.20-21); but against Alexander (whom he accuses of identifying the active reason with God) the author says that had he been speaking of God, Aristotle would not have said that in him the potential is prior to the actual. Nor would he have likened him to the sun, which does not create colour but brings them into actuality (538.26-30; cf. 537.36-38); nor would he have said at that God always knows,¹ since the word “always” shows the subject of his discussion is not one entity but a class (539.4-8).

c) Against the harmony of Aristotle and Plato

504.5-10. Aristotle had urged, without naming his adversary, that *phantasia* cannot be a combination (*sumplokê*) of perception and *doxa* (*De Anima* 428a24). Philoponus, detecting

¹ Apparently an allusion to 429a22, although at 429a5 the reason why the mind “does not always know” (i.e. is not always cognizant of other objects) is said to require investigation.

an allusion to *Sophist* 264b, replies on behalf of Plato that the median is often said to partake of both extremes (504.5-10 Hayduck).

517.29-31: the author writes as a Platonist when he urges that the body is an impediment, not an instrument, to the soul.

Combination of (b) and (c)

518-519: rejects both the Peripatetic Alexander of Aphrodisias and the Platonist Plutarch of Athens in their explications of Aristotle's distinction between the potential *nous* and the *nous* that is activated (*kat' energeian*):

- 1) Both recognise three phases in the possession of mind: the infantile stage, the adult habitus and the exercise *kat' energeian* (518.10-32), erroneously maintaining that the mind *kat' energeian*, or in actuality, is the one that Aristotle at *Generation of Animals* 736b27-28 declares to be *thurathen*, or from without (518.32-35).
- 2) Alexander makes the additional blunder of equating the potential mind with “that which it is to be mind”, as though the “form of forms”, as Aristotle styles it at *De Anima* 423a3, were identical with its own matter.
- 3) Plutarch is guilty of superimposing Plato on Aristotle when he grants even to infants a mind *kath' hexin*, a *habitus* which encompasses the *logoi* or shaping principles of that which it perceives (519.37-520.6).
- 4) Thus, when Alexander reads at *De Anima* 429a 15 that “mind is receptive of form and potentially of the same kind, but is not this”, he wrongly infers that mind is not a form, whereas the text means that it is not in actuality the form which it receives (522.21-26). Again, when he reads that mind is unmixed with the forms that it receives (*De Anima* 429a18), he rashly concludes that it has no form of its own (523.5).
- 5) On the other hand, Alexander exaggerates the discord of Plato and Aristotle when he argues that to call the mind “unmixed” signifies only that it has never existed independently before the mixture; likewise he applies the term *apathes* or passionless not to the mind itself but to its readiness (*epitedeiotês*) for the reception of impressions (521.11-22).

THE LATIN PHILOPONUS

a) Contradiction of Aristotle

At 12.17-24 the Latin alludes to the same dissonance in Aristotle's thought which Philoponus is known to have seized as an argument for the temporality of the created order at On the Eternity of the World 9.4.11:

Quare omnius necesse, si mundus eternus, ut videtur Aristoteli, aut animam immortalem entem, non secundum primo modo dictam potentiam habere species, sed secundum secundo modo, hoc est secundum habitum, ut Platoni videtur; aut si secundum primam potentialitatem in anima sunt, necesse generabilem secundum tempus ipsam esse, et propter hoc etiam mortalem. Omne enim generabile aiunt esse corruptibile. (12.17-24).

Hence it is absolutely necessary, if the world is eternal as Aristotle supposes, that either (a) the soul, being immortal, possesses the forms not according to the first mode of potentiality but according to the second, as Plato holds; or (b) if they are present in the soul according to the first mode, the soul itself will necessarily come to be in time and for this reason will be mortal. For they say that whatever comes to be is subject to decay.

b) Christianity ?

The author is equally hostile to the theory that the active and passive are two distinct subjects, rather than the actual and potential states of the same one; he too rejects the opinion of Alexander of Aphrodisias that the active mind is extrinsic to the soul.

At p.31.36-37 he declares that to write of the *conditor intellectus*, the demiurgic intellect, is properly the task of the theologian: *theologi magis est. Conditor intellectus* is a locution that De Corte finds at 58.9 Hayduck in the first book of the Greek commentary, but nowhere in the third; he adds that it is prefigured by numerous references in the first two books to the *theios nous*, or divine mind, which is absent from the third book which survives in Greek. The same use of *theologou* in the genitive is attested in the first two books but not in the third book of the Greek commentary. *Theologos* in the sense of interpreter rather than producer of religious knowledge tends to be a Christian usage.

c) Against the harmony of Plato and Aristotle

Et ipse Plato ait potentia esse in rationali anima species, non actu sicut et Aristoteles, sed Plato quidem secundum secundario potentia, sicut sunt in dormiente geometrica theoremata et indigere ad promptum usum theorematum auferentem hoc impedimentum, Aristotelem autem secundum primo potentia, scilicet aptum natum suscipere, nondum autem habens habitum, accipit autem species ut videtur a sensibilibus. (11.4-10).

And Plato himself affirms that in the rational soul the form is present potentially rather than actually, and Aristotle says likewise. Plato, however, says that it is present according to the second mode of potentiality, as the theorems of geometry are present in one who sleeps and require the removal of this obstruction so that the theorems may be at hand for us. By contrast, Aristotle says that they are present in the first mode of potentiality, that is that the soul is naturally receptive but does not have them dispositionally; rather, as it seems, it receives the form from sensible objects.

Dico autem secundum doneitatem species intelligibilium imponit in anima, et non, ut Plato, secundum habitum. (26.20-21).

I say, however, that he holds forms to be present in the soul by receptivity, not dispositionally as Plato teaches.

Reasons for joining the Latin of book 3 to the Greek of 1 and 2.

The Latin names Alexander infrequently, and wholly ignores the other commentators who are cited in the Greek text that Golitsis ascribes to Philoponus. This is one instance of the greater coherence of the Latin with the Greek of books 1 and 2, where Plutarch is absent but Alexander is cited with disapproval, a little more often than in the Latin.

We may add this similarity to De Corte's compilation of a catalogue of words and phrases shared by the Latin text with the first two books, but not the third, of the Greek

commentary.² Most telling of all, and rightly given most weight by De Corte, are passages in the Latin which, although they have no counterpart in the Greek commentary on Book 3, are all but identical both in phrasing and in argumentative substance with passages from the first two books.³

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² De Corte , xiv-xvi notes the terms *omoousios*, *equivoco*, *dyania* (*dianoia*), *compassio*, *characterizare*, *autoenergeia*, *lykeio*, *supersaliendo*, *scriptura* (*as lexis*), *kinema*, *eikonice*, *simplices adiectiones* and *ydola* as having Greek antecedents or equivalents in the first two books, but not the third, of the Greek commentary.

³ Corte, p. xiii, compares his p. 3 with p. 159.9ff and 32ff Hayduck; p. 4 with 237.29ff Hayduck. On p. xii he notes that p. 2 refers expressly to a previous discussion which is most probably represented by 266.4ff and 39.19ff Hayduck.

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T1. Damascius, *The Philosophical History*, fr. 118 B Athanassiadi (= Damascius, *Life of Isidore*, fr. 292 Zintzen): Ammonius, who was sordidly greedy and saw everything in terms of profit of any kind, came to an agreement with the then overseer of the prevailing doctrine. (Translation by Athanassiadi.)

Ὁ δὲ Ἀμμώνιος αἰσχροκερδὴς ὢν καὶ πάντα ὀρῶν εἰς χρηματισμὸν ὄντιναοῦν, ὁμολογίας τίθεται πρὸς τὸν ἐπισκοποῦντα τὸ τηνικαῦτα τὴν κρατοῦσαν δόξαν.

T2. Damascius, *The Philosophical History*, fr. 57 B Athanassiadi (= Damascius, *Life of Isidore*, fr. 127* Zintzen): Of the sons that [Aidesia] had by Hermeias, the younger was Heliodorus and the older Ammonius. The latter was more intelligent and fond of learning, while the former was simpler and more superficial both in character and in reasoning. (Translation by Athanassiadi.)
Ταύτης δὲ παῖδες ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἑρμείου νεώτερος μὲν Ἡλιόδωρος, πρεσβύτερος δὲ Ἀμμώνιος. οὗτος μὲν οὖν εὐφυέστερος ἦν καὶ φιλομαθέστερος, ὁ δὲ ἀπλούστερος καὶ ἐπιπολαιότερος ἔν τε τοῖς ἥθεσιν ἔν τε τοῖς λόγοις.

T3a. Damascius, *The Philosophical History*, 57 C Athanassiadi, lin. 1-3 (= Damascius, *Life of Isidore*, fr. 79 Zintzen): Ammonius was an extremely hard worker (φιλοπονώτατος) who made the greatest contribution of all exegetes who ever lived. He practised more (μᾶλλον) the exegesis of Aristotle [that is, rather than the exegesis of Plato].

Ὅτι ὁ Ἀμμώνιος φιλοπονώτατος¹ γέγονε, καὶ πλεῖστον [Athanassiadi cum Guida : πλείστους Photius Zintzen] ὠφέλησε τῶν πώποτε γεγεννημένων ἐξηγητῶν· μᾶλλον δὲ τὰ Ἀριστοτέλους ἐξήσκητο.

T3b. Damascius, *The Philosophical History*, 37 D Athanassiadi, lin. 1-3 (= Damascius, *Life of Isidore*, fr. 79 Zintzen): Καὶ μὴν ἐν ταῖς ἐξηγήσεσιν ἐνδεέστερος τῷ λόγῳ ἢ ὥστε ἐρμηνεύειν τὰ δοκοῦντα ἀποchrώντως. οὐ μὴν οὐδ' ἐνταῦθα ἀβοήθητος ἦν ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως καὶ τῆς ἄλλης μελέτης, ἀλλὰ κατεβάλλετο μὲν σπουδὴν πρὸς τὴν σαφήνειαν [...]

T4. Damascius, *The Philosophical History*, 57 C Athanassiadi, lin. 1-4 (= Damascius, *Life of Isidore*, fr. 85, lin. 2-4 Zintzen): In geometry and astronomy [Ammonius] distinguished himself among not only his contemporaries but also his seniors in Proclus' classes; indeed, I would almost say that in these subjects he surpassed the men of all ages. (Translation by Athanassiadi.)

Ἔτι δὲ διήνεγκεν οὐ τῶν καθ' ἑαυτὸν μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων τοῦ Πρόκλου ἐταίρων, ὀλίγου δὲ ἀποδέω καὶ τῶν πώποτε γεγεννημένων εἰπεῖν, τὰ ἀμφὶ γεωμετρίαν τε καὶ ἀστρονομίαν.

T5a. Photius, *Bibliotheca*, cod. 181 ("On the life of the philosopher Isidore"), 126b 40-127a 10 (= Test. III Athanassiadi, lin. 81-91 = Fr. 241 Zintzen): Damascius studied the art of rhetoric under Theo for three whole years, and taught rhetoric for nine years. In geometry, arithmetic and the other sciences he was taught in Athens by Marinus, the successor of Proclus; in philosophy Zenodotus (also a successor of Proclus, second to Marinus) was his master in Athens, and Ammonius, son of Hermeias, in Alexandria, who, he says, greatly surpassed all his contemporaries in philosophy and especially in the sciences. **Damascius mentions him as the**

¹ Compare with Damascius' own πόνου in philosophy, as recounted by Simplicius, *In Phys.*, 625.1: πολλοὺς πόνους εἰσαγαγὼν [sc. ὁ Δαμάσκιος] φιλοσοφίᾳ.

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man who taught him the Platonic writings and Ptolemy's astronomical syntax. (Translation by Athanassiadi, slightly modified.)

Ὁ δὲ Δαμάσκιος τὴν τε ῥητορεύουσιν τέχνην ὑπὸ Θέωνι τρία ἔτη ὅλα διεπόνθησε καὶ προὔστη διατριβῶν ῥητορικῶν ἐπὶ ἔτη θ'. Γεωμετρίας δὲ καὶ ἀριθμητικῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων μαθημάτων Μαρτῖνον τὸν διάδοχον Πρόκλου ἐν Ἀθήναις ἔσχε διδάσκαλον. Τῆς τε φιλοσόφου θεωρίας ὃ τε Ζηνόδοτος αὐτῷ καθηγεμῶν Ἀθήνησι καὶ αὐτὸς ἐγεγόνει (διάδοχος δὲ καὶ οὗτος Πρόκλου, τὰ δεύτερα Μαρτίνου φέρων) καὶ Ἀμμώνιος ἐν Ἀλεξανδρείᾳ ὁ Ἑρμείου, ὃν οὐ μικρῷ μέτρῳ τῶν καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίᾳ φησὶ διαφέρειν, καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς μαθήμασι. Τοῦτον καὶ τῶν Πλατωνικῶν ἐξηγητὴν αὐτῷ γενεῆσθαι Δαμάσκιος ἀναγράφει, καὶ τῆς συντάξεως τῶν ἀστρονομικῶν Πτολεμαίου βιβλίων.

T5b. Photius, *Bibliotheca*, cod. 181 ("On the life of the philosopher Isidore"), 127a 10-14 (= Test. III Athanassiadi, lin. 91-95 = Fr. 241 Zintzen): He claims that he acquired his strength in the practice of dialectic from his conservations with Isidore, whom he declares to have eclipsed in the power of his discourse all men born in that generation. (Translation by Athanassiadi.)

Τῆς μέντοι διαλεκτικῆς τριβῆς τὰς Ἰσιδώρου συνουσίας τὴν ἰσχὺν αὐτῷ διατείνεται παρασχεῖν, ὃν καὶ ἐπὶ τῇ τοιαύτῃ τῶν λόγων δυνάμει πάντας ἀνθρώπους, ὅσους ὁ κατ' ἐκείνην τὴν γενεὰν ἦνεγκε χρόνος, ἀποκρύψασθαι φησιν.

T6. Damascius, *The Philosophical History*, fr. 34C Athanassiadi (= *Life of Isidore*, fr. 35 Zintzen): [Isidore] spent little time on rhetorical and poetical erudition, throwing himself into **the more divine philosophy of Aristotle**. (Translation by Athanassiadi.)

Ῥητορικῆς καὶ ποιητικῆς πολυμαθίας μικρὰ ἤψατο, εἰς δὲ τὴν θειοτέραν φιλοσοφίαν ἐξώρμησε τὴν Ἀριστοτέλους.

T7. Damascius, *In Philebum*, §233: "Ὅτι καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης ἄλλο μὲν τὸ ἄθροισμα ποιεῖ τῶν στοιχείων, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ ἐπιγινώμενον εἶδος· οἷον τὸ τῆς σαρκὸς ἄλλο παρὰ τὰ στοιχεῖα. ὥστε συμφωνοῦσι κατὰ τὴν μίξιν Πλάτων καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης.

T8a. Damascius *apud Simplicium*, *In Phys.*, 774.35-775.9: Time is the measure of the flow of being, and by 'being' I mean not only the being according to essence but also the being according to activity. Aristotle admirably saw the nature of time and made it clear (θαυμαστῶς ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης εἶδε τε τοῦ χρόνου τὴν φύσιν καὶ ἐξέφηεν), saying that both for motion and "for other things this is to be in time, that their being is measured by time".² Just as motion does not take place according to the indivisibles (for it is not composed of divisions of changes; for neither the line is composed of points, but the limits of both the line and the motion are indivisible, whereas the parts of them of which they are composed, being continuous, are not indivisible but divisible), so in the same way the limits of time, the 'nows', are indivisible, whereas its parts are not. For, since time is continuous, it too has parts that are infinitely indivisible [i.e. in thought].

Ἔστιν οὖν ὁ χρόνος μέτρον τῆς τοῦ εἶναι ῥοῆς, εἶναι δὲ λέγω οὐ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν. καὶ θαυμαστῶς ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης εἶδε τε τοῦ χρόνου τὴν φύσιν καὶ ἐξέφηεν, εἰπὼν ὅτι καὶ τῇ κινήσει «καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ ἐν χρόνῳ εἶναι τὸ μετρεῖσθαι αὐτῶν τὸ εἶναι ὑπὸ τοῦ χρόνου». ὥσπερ δὲ ἡ κίνησις οὐ κατὰ τὰ ἀμερῆ γίνεται (οὐδὲ γὰρ σύγκειται ἐκ κινήματων· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ γραμμὴ ἐκ στιγμῶν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν πέρατα καὶ τῆς

² Aristotle, *Phys.*, IV 12, 221a 8.

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γραμμαῖς καὶ τῆς κινήσεως ἀμερῆς ἐστὶ, τὰ δὲ μέρη αὐτῶν ἐξ ὧν σύγκειται συνεχῆ ὄντα οὐκ ἔστιν ἀμερῆ ἀλλὰ μεριστά), οὕτω δὲ καὶ τοῦ χρόνου τὰ μὲν ὡς πέρατα τὰ νῦν ἀμερῆ ἐστὶ, τὰ δὲ ὡς μέρη οὐκέτι· συνεχῆς γὰρ ὧν ὁ χρόνος διαιρούμενα ἔχει καὶ αὐτὸς τὰ μέρη εἰς ἀεὶ διαιρετά.³

T8b. Proclus, *In Timaeum*, III, 20.15-22: And when they say that time is the cause of corruption rather than genesis, or the cause of oblivion rather than preservation, or that it is [a cause of these things] incidentally and not *per se*, then these people are like those who are entirely asleep and who can therefore neither consider what psychic and corporeal benefits result from time, nor calculate the extent to which the entire heaven and all generation is afforded good things throughout itself due to time and time's agency. (Translation by Baltzly.)

Ὅταν δὲ καὶ φθορᾶς αὐτὸν αἵτιον εἶναι λέγωσι μᾶλλον ἢ γενέσεως, καὶ λήθης μᾶλλον ἢ σωτηρίας, καὶ τούτων κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς καὶ οὐ καθ' αὐτό, κομιδῇ τότε τοῖς καθεύδουσιν εἰκόσιν καὶ μήθ' ὅσα αὐτοὶ κατὰ τε σῶμα καὶ ψυχὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ χρόνου <ῶφελεῖσθαι> ἐπισκεπτομένοις, μήθ' ὅσα ὁ σύμπας οὐρανὸς καθ' ὅλον ἑαυτὸν καὶ πᾶσα ἡ γένεσις ἀγαθὰ παρὰ τοῦ χρόνου καὶ διὰ τοῦ χρόνου κομίζονται λογίζεσθαι δυναμένοις.

T8c. Proclus, *In Timaeum*, III, 21.5-6: Therefore, we must not follow those who posit time as a bare conception or make of it an incidental property.

Οὐκ ἄρα ἀκολουθητέον τοῖς ἐν ψυλαῖς ἐπινοίαις αὐτὸν ἰσθᾶσιν ἢ συμβεβηκὸς τι ποιοῦσιν.

T9. Damascius, *In Parmenidem.*, III, 192.4-5: And it is called 'now' not in the sense of being a limit of time but in the sense of being a time that is creatively indivisible.

Καὶ νῦν καλεῖσθαι οὐχ ὡς πέρας χρόνου ἀλλ' ὡς χρόνον ἀμέριστον δημιουργικῶς.

T10. Damascius *apud Simplicium*, *In Phys.*, 796.326-797.13: I am astonished at how those who say that only the indivisible 'now' exists solve Zeno's argument by claiming that motion is not accomplished according to something indivisible, but rather progresses in a whole stride at once, and that it does not always [cover] the half before the whole, but sometimes, as it were, leaps over whole and part, but did not realise the same thing happening in the case of time: for time always coexists with motion and, as it were, runs along with it, so that it strides along together with [motion] in a whole continuous jump and does not infinitely traverse a [series of] now[s]. And [they do not realise] this, while on the one hand motion is evident in things and on the other hand Aristotle has clearly shown that nothing moves or changes at the now but only has moved or has changed at it,⁴ whereas, no doubt, things are changing and are moving in time. At any rate, the leap of motion, being a part of motion which occurs in the course of moving,⁵ will not be moving at the now, nor will that which is present occur in a time that is not present. So that in which the present motion occurs, this is the present time, and it is infinitely divisible, just as motion; for each is continuous. And everything continuous is infinitely divisible. Θαυμάζω δὲ ἔγωγε πῶς τὸν μὲν Ζήνωνος ἐπιλύονται λόγον, ὡς οὐ κατὰ τι ἀδιαίρετον τῆς κινήσεως ἐπιτελουμένης, ἀλλὰ καθ' ὅλον βῆμα προκοπτοῦσης ἀθροῦστερον, καὶ οὐκ ἀεὶ τὸ

³ Cf. Aristotle, *Phys.*, VI 2, 232b 24-25: Λέγω δὲ συνεχὲς τὸ διαιρετὸν εἰς ἀεὶ διαιρετά.

⁴ Cf. Aristotle, *Phys.*, VI 6, 237a 14-15: Ἐν δὲ τῷ νῦν οὐκ ἔστιν μεταβάλλειν, ἀνάγκη μεταβεβηκέναι καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν νῦν.

⁵ ἐν τῷ κινεῖσθαι: Damascius has here in mind Aristotle's distinction between (accomplished) motion, which is numbered, and the being of motion, which is measured; cf. Aristotle, *Phys.* IV 12, 220b 33-221a 1: Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ὁ χρόνος μέτρον κινήσεως καὶ τοῦ κινεῖσθαι...

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ἡμισυ πρὸ τοῦ ὅλου, ἀλλὰ ποτὲ καὶ ὅλον καὶ μέρος οἷον ὑπεραλλομένης, οὐ συνενόησαν δὲ οἱ τὸ ἀδιαίρετον μόνον νῦν εἶναι λέγοντες τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ χρόνου συμβαῖνον ἅτε συνόντος ἀεὶ τῇ κινήσει καὶ οἷον συμπαραθέοντος, ὥστε καὶ συμβηματίζοντος ὅλῳ πηδήματι συνεχεῖ καὶ οὐ κατὰ <τὸ> νῦν διεξιόντος ἐπ’ ἄπειρον, καὶ ταῦτα κινήσεως μὲν οὔσης ἐναργοῦς ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι, τοῦ δ’ Ἀριστοτέλους οὕτω δεικνύντος λαμπρῶς, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἐν τῷ νῦν κινεῖται οὐδὲ μεταβάλλεται, ἀλλ’ ἐν τούτῳ μὲν κεκίνηται καὶ μεταβέβληται, μεταβάλλεται δὲ καὶ κινεῖται πάντως ἐν χρόνῳ. τὸ γοῦν ἄλμα τῆς κινήσεως μέρος ὃν κινήσεως τὸ ἐν τῷ κινεῖσθαι, οὐκ ἐν τῷ νῦν ἔσται κινούμενον, οὐδὲ ἐν μὴ ἐνεστῶτι χρόνῳ τό γε ἐνεστῶς. ὥστε ἐν ᾧ κίνησις ἢ ἐνεστῶσα, χρόνος οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ ἐνεστῶς ἄπειρος ὢν τῇ διαιρέσει ἀπείρου οὔσης· ἐκότερον γὰρ συνεχές, πᾶν δὲ συνεχές ἐπ’ ἄπειρον διαιρετόν.

T11a. Damascius, *De primis principiis*, I, 34.9-14: It is therefore necessary that prior to this principle [i.e. the rational soul] too, there should be another [principle], the principle that is in every point immutable according to essence, life and knowledge, as well as according to all powers and activities. Such is the principle about which we say that it is unmoved and eternal, that is, the highly honoured *Nous*, to whom also Aristotle has ascended, thinking that he has discovered in him the First principle.

Δεῖ ἄρα καὶ πρὸ ταύτης εἶναι ἑτέραν, τὴν πανταχῇ ἀμετάβλητον κατὰ τε οὐσίαν καὶ ζωὴν καὶ γνῶσιν, κατὰ τε πάσας δυνάμεις καὶ ἐνεργείας, οἷαν τὴν ἀκίνητον καὶ αἰώνιον εἶναι φάμεν, αὐτὸν τὸν πολυτίμητον νοῦν, ἐφ’ ὃν καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης ἀναβάς ὡμήθη τὴν πρώτην ἀρχὴν εὐρηκέναι.

T11b. Asclepius, *On Aristotle’s Metaphysics* 105.30-35: The philosopher [i.e. Ammonius] objects also to this, saying to Aristotle: ‘As you say that the single principle of all things is unmoved and that the soul proceeds from it, and that the bodies are moved by the soul through its appetitive power, so they [i.e. the Platonists] say that the demiurgic reasons are unmoved and become the causes of the motion here below.

Οὐδὲν δὲ ἥττον καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο ἐνίσταται ὁ φιλόσοφος πρὸς αὐτὸν λέγων ὡς περ σὺ λέγεις τὴν μίαν τῶν πάντων ἀρχὴν ἀκίνητον εἶναι καὶ ἐξ αὐτῆς προαχθῆναι τὴν ψυχὴν, καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς κινεῖσθαι τὰ σώματα διὰ τῆς ὀρεκτικῆς δυνάμεως, οὕτως καὶ αὐτοὶ φασὶ τοὺς λόγους τοὺς δημιουργικοὺς ἀκινήτους εἶναι καὶ γίνεσθαι αἰτίους κινήσεως τῆς ἐνθάδε.

T12. Proclus, *In Timaeum*, I, 2.19-29: Καὶ γὰρ εἴ που καὶ τῆς ποιητικῆς αἰτίας διαμνημονεύουσιν, ὥστε ὅταν τὴν φύσιν ἀρχὴν κινήσεως λέγωσιν, ἀλλ’ ἀφαιροῦσιν αὐτῆς τὸ δραστήριον καὶ τὸ κυρίως ποιητικόν, λόγους ἐν αὐτῇ μὴ συγχωροῦντες εἶναι τῶν παρ’ αὐτῆς ποιουμένων, ἀλλὰ πολλὰ καὶ αὐτομάτως γίνεσθαι διδόντες, πρὸς τῷ μηδὲ πάντων ἀπλῶς τῶν φυσικῶν ποιητικὴν αἰτίαν ὁμολογεῖν προῦφεσθάναι, μόνων δὲ τῶν ἐν γενέσει φερομένων· ἐπεὶ τῶν γε ἀϊδίων οὐδὲν ποιητικὸν εἶναι φασὶ διαρρήδην· ὅπου καὶ λανθάνουσιν ἢ τὸν ὅλον οὐρανὸν ἀπὸ ταύτομάτου συνιστάντες, ἢ τὸ σωματικὸν αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ παρακτικὸν ἀποφαινόμενοι.

“[...] moreover, they do not acknowledge that there is a preexisting efficient cause of all natural things at once, and not only of those that are bundled around in generation. For they openly affirm that there is no efficient cause of everlasting things.⁶ Here they fail to notice that they are either attributing the complete heavens to spontaneous generation, or declaring that something bodily can be self-productive.” (Translation by Tarrant, slightly modified.)

⁶ Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Z 17, 1041a 27-32.

T13a. Asclepius (“from the voice of Ammonius”), *In Metaph.*, 151.16-27: That there is a transcendent efficient cause is obvious from this: if we suppose several [efficient] causes, it remains obscure what is the principle of these causes, since they will be all equal in honor. One of these causes, therefore, should be transcendent in substance with regard to all the others, so that it becomes in this way productive of the others. Further, it is impossible that there are many first [principles]; this is why Aristotle says: “The government of many is not good”.⁷ This first principle, therefore, is the efficient cause of the unmoved [substances, i.e. the unmoved movers] not in that they come to be [by it], but in that they are [because of it]. Conversely, it is also a final cause, since all things are reversed to it insofar as they participate in its goodness, proceed from it and acquire from it their existence. So the same thing is both a final and an efficient [cause], but it is efficient insofar as it makes [the other things] proceed, whereas it is final insofar as it reverses them and calls them to itself. Therefore, with regard to the first [principle], the efficient and the final cause are identical in number, while they differ in relation [to the other things].

“Ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ ποιητικὸν αἴτιον φανερόν ἐντεῦθεν ἐξηρημένον· εἰ γὰρ ὑποθώμεθα πολλὰ αἴτια, ἄδηλον ποία ἐστὶν αὐτῶν ἀρχή, εἴ γε πάντα ὁμότιμα ὑπάρχουσι. δεῖ οὖν τὸ ἐν ἐξηρησθαι τὸ κατ’ οὐσίαν πάντων, ἵνα καὶ οὕτως γένοιτο προαγωγὸν τῶν ἄλλων. ἔπειτα δὲ πολλὰ πρῶτα εἶναι οὐ δύναται· διὸ φησιν “οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκοιρανίη”. ποιητικὸν οὖν ἐστὶν αἴτιον οὐχ ὡς γινομένων τῶν ἀκινήτων ἀλλ’ ὡς ὄντων. πάλιν δὲ καὶ τελικὸν ἐστὶν αἴτιον, εἴ γε πάντα ἐπέστραπται πρὸς αὐτὸ ὡς μετέχοντα τῆς αὐτοῦ ἀγαθότητος, καὶ ἐκεῖθεν προελθόντα καὶ ἔχοντα τὴν ὑπόστασιν. καὶ ἔστι τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ τελικὸν καὶ ποιητικόν, ἀλλ’ ὡς μὲν προαγωγὸν ποιητικόν, ὡς δὲ ἐπιστρέφον καὶ καλοῦν πρὸς ἑαυτὸ τελικόν· ὥστε τῷ μὲν ἀριθμῷ ἡ ταυτότης ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τοῦ πρώτου τῷ ποιητικῷ καὶ τῷ τελικῷ, τῇ δὲ σχέσει διαφέρει.

T13b. Damascius, *In Phaedonem* (versio 1), §416: “Ὅτι ῥᾶον καὶ ἀπλούστερον ὑποθέσθαι καὶ θέσθαι τὰ παραδείγματα ὡς αἴτια τῶν αἰσθητῶν καὶ τίνα ταῦτα ἐννοῆσαι ἀπὸ τῶν εἰκόνων, ὅτι τοιαῦτα ἕτερα ἀληθῆ καὶ μονοειδῆ καὶ αἰεὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντα ἅτε προϋπάρχοντα τῶν εἰκόνων, ἥπερ τὸ τελικόν. τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ [ὡς] ἄρρητον ὡς ἀληθῶς καὶ τῶν φαινομένων εἰκόνων ὑπερανέχον (οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ εἰκόνων) καὶ ἔτι μέντοι ἐν τῇ γενέσει ἀφανιζόμενον διὰ τὴν αὐτῆς ἀοριστίαν σύμφυτον, δι’ ἣν καὶ τοῦ κακοῦ πολλοῦ ἀναπέπλησται. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἥπερ τὸ ποιητικόν, πρῶτον μὲν διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸ τελικόν συμπλοκὴν, ὡς δέδεικται· δεύτερον δὲ διὰ τὴν πολλαχοῦ τῶν εἰκόνων μεταβολὴν ἀναινομένην τὸ τοῦ νοῦ ποιητικὸν ἀκίνητον, **διὸ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης τοῖς οὐρανίοις ζώοις περιτίθεται τὴν ποίησιν ὅλην**· τρίτον δὲ αὖ διὰ τὸ προφαίνεσθαι τὰ μερικὰ αἴτια καὶ αἰσθητὰ σχεδὸν ἀρκοῦντα πρὸς τὴν γένεσιν· πᾶν γὰρ εἶδος εἶναι δοκεῖ τοῦ ὁμοίου γεννητικόν. τὰ τοίνυν παραδείγματα ὡς μὲν εἶδη εὐληπτότερα τοῦ τελικοῦ, ὡς δὲ ἐφ’ ἑαυτῶν ἐστῶτα οὐδὲ ἀπτόμενα τῆς γενέσεως οὐδὲ ποιητικῶς, ἅτε ὑπὲρ τὸν ποιητὴν ὄντα, ἀπλούστερον λαμβάνεται. διὸ καὶ θάπτον ἀτιμάζεται, ὡς οὐ ποιοῦντα, μόνον δὲ ὄντα· ἀρκεῖν δὲ ὄντα εἶναι τὰ αἰσθητά.

⁷ Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Λ 10, 1076a 4.