

Proclus lays out the arrangement of the cosmos in six successive stages (100.3-28):

1. Necessity and the Fates
2. The Sirens
3. Visible gods (planets and stars)
4. Leaders of the souls: angels and daemons
5. Judges of human lives
6. Those who punish the incurably wicked

A. Proclus, *In Rep.* II.97.13-18

Those who have arranged the constitution in themselves by means of /15/ every virtue and especially by means of justice reap the rewards at the hands of their superiors [i.e., the gods], just as also those possessing the opposite disposition in their soul, injustice, [reap] punishments opposed to these rewards, as many as it is necessary to endure. (καὶ οὓς καρποῦται μισθοὺς παρὰ τῶν κρειττόνων ὁ τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ πολιτείαν κατακοσμήσας διὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς συμπάσης καὶ τῆς δικαιοσύνης διαφερόντως, ὡσπερ δὴ καὶ τὰς ἐναντίας τοῖς καρποῖς τούτοις τιμωρίας, ὅσας ὑπομένειν ἀνάγκη τὸν τὴν ἐναντίαν ἔξιν τὴν ἄδικον ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ κεκτημένον.)

B. Proclus, *In Rep.* II.98.5-11

. . . after Plato had proposed in this myth to give a thorough account of the souls outside of their bodies, he has instructed us not only about the rewards allotted them but also about the complete constitution in heaven, which is the paradigm of the best constitution, as Socrates had said before, meaning that it exists in heaven even if it does not exist among human beings. (περὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς τοῦ σώματος ἐν τῷδε τῷ μύθῳ διελθεῖν προθέμενος οὐ τοὺς μισθοὺς μόνον τοὺς ἐν ταῖς λήξεσιν ἡμᾶς ἀνεδίδαξεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἐν οὐρανῷ πᾶσαν πολιτείαν παράδειγμα τῆς ἀρίστης οὖσαν, ὡς καὶ τούτῳ προείρηκεν ὁ Σωκράτης ἐν οὐρανῷ λέγων αὐτὴν εἶναι, καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀνυπόστατος ἦ.)

C. Proclus, *In Rep.* II. 98.18-99.1

The relationship (*logos*) of justice to injustice becomes altogether clear, but to a greater degree from the constitution in the cosmos, in which [constitution] the gods are truly the guardians and rulers of the cosmic laws that Necessity and her children ordain for the universe. The daemons who are in charge of souls and the interpreters [who are in charge] of the laws of destiny are allotted the rank of auxiliaries, some of whom before the souls were generated determine the measures of their lots and others of whom govern their lives after they are generated. By “souls that live for a day” (*Rep.* 617d6-7), the interpreter means those that belong to the class of thetes, which is analogous to the servants (*thētoi*) who minister to the last <99> providential activity of their superiors. (Καὶ πανταχοῦ μὲν ὁ τῆς δικαιοσύνης πρὸς τὴν ἀδικίαν λόγος γίνεται καταφανῆς, μειζόνως δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ πολιτείας· ἐν ᾧ θεοὶ μὲν εἰσὶ φύλακες ὡς ἀληθῶς καὶ ἄρχοντες τῶν κοσμικῶν νόμων, οὓς ἡ τε Ἀνάγκη καὶ αἱ ταύτης παῖδες εἰς τὸ πᾶν διαθεσμοθετοῦσι· δαίμονες δὲ οἱ ἐπιτεταγμένοι ταῖς ψυχαῖς καὶ οἱ προφῆται τῶν μοιραίων κανόνων τὴν ἐπικούρων εἰλήχασι τάξιν, οἱ μὲν πρὸ τῆς γενέσεως ἀφορίζοντες τὰ μέτρα τῶν κλήρων αὐταῖς, οἱ δὲ τοὺς γενεσιουργοὺς βίους κυβερνῶντες· ψυχαὶ δὲ ἐφήμεροι, φησὶν ὁ προφήτης [p. 617d], εἰς τὸ θητῶν συντελοῦσαι γένος ἀνάλογον τοῖς θησίν ὑπηρετοῦσι ταῖς ἐσχάταις τῶν κρειττόνων προνοίαις.)

D. Proclus, *In Rep.* II. 99.10-18

Thus, I think, all that has been said under the guise of this myth clearly reveals the paradigm of the Socratic constitution in the cosmos, showing that the guardians, auxiliaries, and thetes are the gods, daemons, and souls. He not only teaches what the fruits of justice and injustice are for the souls that depart from here, but he also reveals the form of the whole constitution that pre-exists in the universe for all the classes in the universe. (Ταῦτα δ' οὖν πάντα σαφῶς οἷματι παρίστησιν ὑπὸ τοῦδε τοῦ μύθου λεγόμενα τὸ παράδειγμα τῆς Σωκρατικῆς πολιτείας ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ, δεικνύντα τοὺς φύλακας, τοὺς ἐπικούρους, τοὺς θῆτας τοὺς θεούς, τοὺς δαίμονας, τὰς ψυχάς· καὶ οὐ μόνον τοὺς τῆς δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀδικίας ἀναδιδάσκει μισθοὺς οἵτινές εἰσιν ἀπελθούσαις ἐνθένδε ταῖς ψυχαῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς πολιτείας ὅλης τὸ εἶδος ἐν τῷ παντὶ προάρχον ἀποφαίνει καὶ τοῖς ἐν τῷ παντὶ γένεσιν πρώτοις μέσοις τελευταίοις.)

E. Proclus, *In Rep.* II.100.6-8

. . . the hypercosmic causes of the whole arrangement: the Monad and the Triad. I mean the Fates and Necessity, from which all the cosmic laws arise. (. . . τὰς ὑπερκοσμίους τῆς τάξεως αἰτίας πάσης τὴν τε μονάδα καὶ τὴν τριάδα· τὰς Μοίρας λέγω καὶ τὴν Ἀνάγκην, ἀφ' ὧν οἱ νόμοι πάντες οἱ κοσμικοί)

F. Proclus, *In Rep. II. 208.15-25*

If it is necessary that I speak my own [opinion], after [Plato] had made the whole account concerning the constitution, he disclosed in the myth the paradigm of the cosmic constitution through this Monad. Because of this [Monad], the Demiurge of the constituted cosmos is also associated with Themis. Timaeus says (*Ti. 30a6-7*) that for this [Demiurge] “it is not lawful (θέμις) to do anything except what is best.” Thus, we say that the goddess Necessity is the cause of the arrangement in the universe and of the living things that have been so arranged, that through her children [i.e., the Fates] she is the leader of every sort of motion and orbit that has been determined in accordance with a single intellective power, and that she accomplishes jointly with them every revolution in the engendered divine [cosmos]. (καὶ γὰρ εἴ με δεῖ τούμὸν εἰπεῖν, περὶ πολιτείας τὸν σύμπαντα λόγον πουησάμενος τοῦδε τοῦ μόνου τῆς κοσμικῆς πολιτείας τὸ παράδειγμα διὰ ταύτης ἐξέφθεν τῆς μονάδος· δι' ἣν καὶ ὁ δημιουργὸς πολιτικός ἔστιν τῇ Θέμιδι συνών, ὃ μὴ θέμις δρᾶν ἄλλο τι πλὴν τὸ κάλλιστον, φησὶν ὁ Τίμαιος. τὴν μὲν οὖν Ἀνάγκην θεὸν αἰτίαν τῆς ἐν τῷ παντὶ τάξεως εἶναι φαμεν καὶ ζωῶν τῶν τεταγμένων καὶ διὰ τῶν παίδων κινήσεων ἡγεμόνα παντοίων καὶ περιόδων ώρισμένων κατὰ μίαν νοεράν δύναμιν, τὴν συμπεράίνουσαν ἀπ[ασ]αν τὴν τοῦ θείου γενητοῦ περίοδον.)

G. Proclus, *In Tim. I. 396.29-397.1 and 397.9-13*

Themis is rightly received among the principles of the demiurgy, for she is the cause of the demiurgic laws, and from her the arrangement of the cosmos was indissolubly established . . . Thus she is the Monad of all the cosmic arrangement, because of which Socrates called her “Necessity” in the *Republic*, was shown in those [commentaries of ours], and she revolves the cosmos on her knees, always preserving the arrangement unchanged and unshaken. (Ἡ Θέμις εἰκότως ἐν ἀρχαῖς παραλαμβάνεται τῆς δημιουργίας· αὕτη γάρ ἔστιν ἡ τὸν δημιουργικῶν θεσμῶν αἰτία, καὶ ἀπὸ ταύτης ἀδιαλύτως ἡ τάξις συνέστη τοῦ παντός . . . πάσης οὖν ἐστι τῆς τάξεως τῆς κοσμικῆς μονάς, δι' ἣν καὶ ὁ ἐν Πολιτείᾳ Σωκράτης Ἀνάγκην αὐτὴν προστηγόρευσεν, ὡς δέδεικται ἐν ἑκείνοις, καὶ ἐν τοῖς γόνασιν αὐτῆς ἀνεκύκλει τὸν κόσμον, ἀτρεπτὸν καὶ ἀσάλευτον τὴν τάξιν ἀεὶ διατηρούστης.)

H. Plato, *Rep. 617c5-d1*

Clotho, grasping the outside circle of the spindle, turns it with her right hand from time to time, and Atropos turns the inner circle in the same way with her left hand, and Lachesis alternately grasps each with each hand. (καὶ τὴν μὲν Κλωθῷ τῇ δεξιᾷ χειρὶ ἐφαπτομένην συνεπιστρέφειν τοῦ ἀτράκτου τὴν ἐξω περιφοράν, διαλείπουσαν χρόνον, τὴν δὲ Ἀτροπὸν τῇ ἀριστερᾷ τὰς ἐντὸς αὖ ὡσαύτως τὴν δὲ Λάχεσιν ἐν μέρει ἐκατέρας ἐκατέρα τῇ χειρὶ ἐφάπτεσθαι.)

I. Proclus, *In Rep. 245.20-28*

Here also therefore the Monad precedes and transcends the encosmic entities in every way and is whole and one, but its triad is attached to [the encosmic entities], divided around the turning of the spindle, and leading the providence of the Monad into the open. Hence they themselves are also able to be called by the name “Fates,” not only because they apportion what is owed to all generated things but also because they were apportioned the unified creative power of their mother. While Necessity holds power over all things firmly and inescapably, these [Fates] hold power over them in a divided manner. (κάνταῦθα τοίνυν προηγεῖται μὲν ἡ μονάς καὶ ἐξήρηται πάντῃ τῶν ἐγκοσμίων καὶ ἔστιν ὅλη καὶ μία, ταύτης δὲ ἡ τριάς ἀνηπταὶ, μεριζομένη περὶ τὴν τοῦ ἀτράκτου περιφορὰν καὶ προάγουσα εἰς ἐμφανές τὴν τῆς μονάδος πρόνοιαν. ὅθεν καὶ Μοῖραι τὴν φήμην ἔσχον αὔται καλεῖσθαι, οὐ μόνον ὡς μεριζούσαι τὰ ὄφειλόμενα τοῖς γιγνομένοις πᾶσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς μερισάμεναι τὴν τῆς μητρὸς ἡνωμένην ποίησιν· ἐκείνη δὲ Ἀνάγκη, ὡς κρατοῦσα πάντων ἀραρότως καὶ ἀναποδράστως, ὃν αὔται διηρημένως.)

J. Proclus, *In Rep. 266.28-267.14*

. . . it remains to consider completely how [Plato] says that the lots and the paradigms of lives are on the knees of Lachesis. It is easy to understand the reason that these were not placed on Necessity. Necessity was not moving the whorl, even if it was in motion on her knees. Since the rotation (περιφορά) assigns the lots, [Plato] has rightly not given them to her [i.e., to Necessity] /5/ but to the one who moves the whole [whorl] with her hands [i.e., to Lachesis], and not to Clotho (for the lot and the life are not from the non-wandering sphere [of the stars] alone) or to Atropos (for they are not from the wandering sphere [of the planets] alone). Since they [i.e., the lot and life] have been assigned from both [spheres], he gave them to the one who moves both [spheres], Lachesis. Necessity is the cause of the eternal arrangement of it; the Fates of it being always one way at one time and another at another, as a result of which the lots are always different. It does, however, arise from the entire heaven and not from one or the other of the two revolutions. It is necessary therefore that Lachesis embrace the causes of [both] these. (. . . ἐκεῖνο πάντως ὑπόλοιπον ιδεῖν, πῶς ἐν τοῖς γόνασι τῆς Λαχέσεως εἶναι φησιν τούς τε κλήρους καὶ τὰ παραδείγματα τῶν βίων διότι μὲν οὖν ἐν τῇ Ἀνάγκῃ ταῦτα ἔθετο, ράδιον τὴν αἰτίαν συνιδεῖν. οὐ γάρ ἐκίνει τὸν σφόνδυλον Ἀνάγκη, εἰ καὶ ἐν τοῖς γόνασιν αὐτῆς ἐκινεῖτο. τῆς οὖν περιφορᾶς τοὺς κλήρους νεμούσης εἰκότως οὐκ εἰς ἐκείνην

αὐτοὺς ἀνήγαγεν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ὄλον αὐτὸν κινοῦσαν ταῖν χεροῖν, καὶ οὕτε εἰς τὴν Κλωθό (οὐ γάρ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀπλανοῦς μόνης ὁ κλῆρος καὶ ὁ βίος) οὕτε εἰς τὴν "Ἄτροπον· οὐ γάρ ἀπὸ τῆς πλανωμένης μόνης· ἀπ' ἀμφοτέρων οὖν ἡμῖν ἀπονεμούμενους εἰς τὴν ἀμφοτέρων ἀνήγαγεν κινητικὴν τὴν Λάχεσιν. καὶ γάρ τοῦ μὲν ἀεὶ τὴν τάξιν εἶναι ἡ Ἀνάγκη αἰτία, τοῦ δὲ ἄλλην καὶ ἄλλην ἀεὶ αἱ Μοῖραι, <ἀφ' ὅν> οἱ κλῆροι ἀεὶ ἄλλοι καὶ ἄλλοι· ὅλλα μὴν καὶ ἀπὸ παντὸς τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καὶ οὐκ ἐκ τῆς ἑτέρας ταῖν περιόδοιν· δεῖ ἄρα τὴν Λάχεσιν αὐτῶν περιειληφέναι τὰς αἰτίας.)

K. Proclus, *In Rep.* 100.9-12

. . . the Sirens who preserve the harmony of the universe, in order that also there the constitution is truly composed through music and, since this [harmony] always remains, the arrangement remains as well. If it didn't remain, the form of the constitution would be destroyed, as the Muses say. (τὰς τὴν ἀρμονιὰν συνεχούσας τοῦ παντὸς Σειρῆνας, ἵνα κάνταῦθα διὰ μουσικῆς ἡ πολιτεία συνεστῶσα φαίνηται καὶ ταύτης ἀεὶ μενούσης μένη καὶ ἡ τάξις· ἡς μὴ μενούσης ἔλυτο τῆς πολιτείας τὸ εἶδος, ως αἱ Μοῦσαι λέγουσιν.)

L. Proclus, *In Rep.* 239.30-240.11

You see how the Fates are inferior to their mother Necessity and are placed above the Sirens. Hence the thrones were described in the myth for the Fates just as they were for Necessity, for [the myth] will mention the throne of Necessity in what follows. They are said to sit on it, just as their mother does, but not to be carried around together with its rotations, as the Sirens are. [Necessity], however, does not touch the spindle with her hands, but it lies on her knees since she is stably seated upon it, but [the Fates] use their hands and move [the spindle] by means of them since they would be closer to what is being moved, while the Sirens, since they are outside the orbits and seated on them as they move, are mounted on the orbits and are carried around with them. (καὶ ὥρᾶς πῶς καὶ τῆς Ἀνάγκης ὑφεῖνται τῆς ἑαυτῶν μητρὸς αἱ Μοῖραι καὶ τῶν Σειρήνων ὑπερκάθηνται· θρόνοι μὲν γάρ ἀποδέδονται παρὰ τοῦ μόθου καὶ αὐταῖς, ὥσπερ τῇ Ἀνάγκῃ· καὶ γὰρ τοῦ τῆς Ἀνάγκης θρόνου μεμνήσεται διὰ τῶν ἐπομένων· καὶ καθῆσθαι λέγονται καθάπερ ἡ μήτηρ, ἀλλ' οὐ συμπεριφέρεσθαι τοῖς κύκλοις, ὥσπερ αἱ Σειρῆνες. ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν οὐκ ἐφάπτεται τοῦ ἀτράκτου ταῖς χερσὶν, ἀλλ' ἔγκειται τοῖς γόνασιν αὐτῆς ὡς ἡδρασμένος ἐν αὐτῇ μονίμως, αἱ δὲ χρῶνται ταῖς χερσὶν καὶ κινοῦσι διὰ τούτων, ως ἀν προσεχέστεραι τοῖς κινουμένοις· καὶ αὗται μὲν ἔξω τῶν κύκλων οὖσαι καὶ ἡδρασμέναι κινοῦσιν· αἱ δὲ Σειρῆνες ἐπιβεβηκυῖαι τῶν κύκλων καὶ συμπεριφέρομεναι αὐτοῖς.)

M. Proclus, *In Rep.* 240.12-22

Necessity provides motion from the orbits to the bodies that are moved in a straight line, for all these [bodies] are subject to the orbits of those [gods that revolve in their orbits]. And thus the whole cosmos is subject to Fate, and so the motions that have less authority are dependent upon those that have more, while these [with more authority] are dependent on the Fates. The Fates move in accordance with the will of their mother, and as much as she provides in essence, they provide in activity to the universe. It is clear, however, that the Fates through these orbits guide everything in the cosmos, distributing what belongs to each—to souls, animals, and plants—and spinning the fate that is due to them. (ἡ δὲ ἐκ τῶν περι[φορῶν] εἰς τὰ ἐπ' εὐθείας κινούμενα· ταῦτα γάρ πάντα δουλεύει ταῖς ἐκείνων περιόδοις. καὶ οὕτως ὁ κόσμος ἀπας ἐστὶν Μοιραῖος, τῶν μὲν ἀκυροτέρων κινήσεων εἰς τὰς κυριωτέρας ἀνηρτημένων, τούτων δὲ εἰς τὰς Μοίρας· τῶν δὲ Μοιρῶν κατὰ τὴν βιούλησιν τῆς μητρὸς κινουσῶν, καὶ ὅσον ἐκείνη τῷ εἶναι, τοσοῦτον τῷ ἐνεργεῖν τούτων εἰς τὸ πᾶν παρεχουσῶν. ἀλλ' ὅτι μὲν αἱ Μοῖραι διὰ τῶν περιόδων τούτων πάντα τὰ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ κατευθύνουσι, δῆλον, ἐκάστοις ἀπομερίζουσαι τὸ προστκόν, καὶ ψυχαῖς καὶ ζώοις καὶ φυτοῖς, καὶ ἐπικλώθουσαι τὴν ὄφειλομένην μοῖραν.)

N. Proclus, *In Rep.* 100.16-19

. . . the rulers (ἄρχοντες), whether they be angels or daemons, arranged over the souls, as leaders of their lives, who bring to order their unstable motion that arises from their independent impulse and who do not allow them to overstep the boundaries of Providence or justice. (. . . τοὺς ἐπὶ ταῖς ψυχαῖς τεταγμένους ἄρχοντας εἴτε ἀγγέλους εἴτε δαίμονας τῶν βίων ἡγεμόνας, τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτεξουσίου φορᾶς ἀστάθμητον αὐτῶν κίνησιν τάττοντας καὶ οὐκ ἔῶντας παρεκβαίνειν τοὺς ὄρους τῆς προνοίας ἢ τῆς δίκης.)

O. Proclus, *In Rep.* 100.20-23

. . . the judges of those who live well or badly, who return those breaking the laws back to the universal arrangement and who assure through their rewards that those that hold to [that arrangement] cling to it steadfastly. (. . . τοὺς δικαστὰς τῶν εὗ ἡ κακῶς βιούντων, τοὺς ἀποφοιτῶντας ἀπὸ τῶν νόμων ἐπιστρέφοντας αὐθίς εἰς τὴν ὄλην τάξιν καὶ τοὺς ἐκείνης ἔξεχομένους διὰ τῶν τιμῶν ἀκλινῶς αὐτῆς ἔχεσθαι παρασκευάζοντας.)

P. Proclus, *In Rep.* 141.29-142.11

Moreover [Plato] himself offers us a starting point for such deeper meanings when he said that "those standing" near


the opening leading up from the earth “understand the voice”¹ and that when [the mouth] bellows they hold back the souls eager to ascend from those places of punishment before the appropriate time. It were as though that [mouth] were conscious of what the souls deserve and as though those standing there near the souls who would ascend from there were clearly daemons and were either sending them or hindering them in obedience to that [mouth], using the sound of that [mouth] as a sign of what the souls deserve. So perhaps concerning all [four openings] in common one must say that they are ranks (*taxis*) of daemons classified into four types. For this reason the middle space, which is common to the four openings, is called “daemonic.” (ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτὸς παρέχει τῶν τοιούτων ὑπονοιῶν ἡμῖν ἀφορμὴν εἰπὼν τῷ ἀπὸ γῆς ἀνάγοντι χάσματι παρεστῶτας τὸ φθέγμα καταμανθάνειν καὶ μυκωμένου κατέχειν ἔτι τὰς ἀνίεναι πρὸ τοῦ καιροῦ σπευδούσας ἀπὸ τῶν δικαιωτηρίων ἐκείνων ψυχάς, ὡς ἂν κάκείνου συναίσθησιν ἔχοντος τῆς ἀξίας τῶν ψυχῶν, καὶ τῶν αὐτόθεν ἐφεστώτων ταῖς ἀνιούσαις ἐκεῖθεν δαιμόνων ὄντων δηλονότι, καὶ ἡ ἀφιέντων ἡ κωλυσόντων ἐκείνῳ συνεπομένων καὶ τῷ ἐκείνου φθέγματι συνθήματι τῆς ἀξίας χρωμένων. μήποτε οὖν περὶ πάντων κοινῇ λεκτέον δαιμονίας εἶναι τάξεις τὰ χάσματα τετραχῇ διατεταγμένας (διὸ καὶ ὁ τόπος ὁ μέσος, ὁ κοινὸς τῶν χασμάτων, καλεῖται δαιμόνιος).

Q. Proclus, In Rep. 100.124-128

. . . the cosmic officers, who being harsh and implacable seize and punish those who live their lives in a tyrannical manner. Subject to them are the prisons of punishment and Tartarus, the final most horrible home and correction chamber for souls. (. . . τοὺς δημίους τοὺς κοσμικούς, οἵ τοὺς τυραννικῶς βεβιωκότας ἄγριοι τίνες ὄντες καὶ ἀπαραίτητοι κολάζουσιν διαλαμβάνοντες· οἵς ὑπέστρωται τὰ τῆς τίσεως δεσμωτήρια καὶ τὸ ἔσχατον καὶ φρικωδέστατον τῶν ψυχῶν οἰκητήριον καὶ κολαστήριον ὁ Τάρταρος.)

R. Proclus, In Rep. 100.28-101.4

When you have grasped the whole co-arrangement, you will see how nothing can flee the complete providence of the gods, and having seen the heavenly paradigm of the Socratic constitution, you will discover it existing, and having discovered it, you will have firmly established the most perfect aim (*skopos*) of this myth. (Ταύτην δὲ πᾶσαν τὴν σύνταξιν νοήσας ὅψει πᾶς οὐδὲν διαφυγεῖν δυνατὸν τὴν ὅλην πρόνοιαν τῶν θεῶν, καὶ ίδων τὸ παράδειγμα τῆς Σωκρατικῆς πολιτείας οὐράνιον ὑπάρχον εὑρήσεις καὶ τοῦτο εύρων τὸν σκοπὸν τῆς μυθολογίας ταύτης καταδήσει τὸν τελεώτατον.)



¹ παρεστῶτας τὸ φθέγμα καταμανθάνειν, 142.1-2: see *Rep.* 615e5, παρεστῶτες καὶ καταμανθάνοντες τὸ φθέγμα. See also *In Rep.* II.181.14-15.

Triades chaldéennes dans la doctrine proclienne des intellects

Correspondance des systèmes théologiques :

PROCLUS	ORACLES CHALDAÏQUES	RHAPSODIES ORPHIQUES	
	UN		
1) Le premier dieu : l'Un	1) Principe unique (...)	1) Chronos	Kronos
	INTELLIGIBLE-INTELLECT		Rhéa
2) Les hénades	2) (...)	2) ? - Éther, Chaos	Zeus
3) Les dieux intelligibles qui comprennent trois triades : celles de l'Être, de la Puissance et de l'Acte	3) L'Abîme paternel composé de trois triades qui ont pour premier membre : l'Un, l'Aïon et le Vivant-en-soi	3) Les dieux intelligibles qui sont : l'Œuf pri-mordial, l'Œuf conçu et Phanès	= III =
4) Les dieux intelligibles-intellectifs qui comprennent aussi trois triades : de l'Être, de la Puissance, de l'Acte	4) Triades intelligibles et intellectives qui comprennent trois triades : celle des Lynges, celles des Assembleurs et celles des Téletarques	4) Dieux intelligibles-intellectifs qui comprennent : les trois Nuits, les trois parties d'Ouranos et les trois dieux de la classe perfectrice	Sis & πατερές ΕΠΕΙΚΕΙΝΔ
5) Les dieux intellectifs	5) Les dieux intellectifs	5) Les dieux intellectifs	Hécate
5. 1) La triade des parents : l'intellect pur, la vie, l'intellect démiurgique	5. 1) Trois Pères Sourc-es : Kronos, Hécate et Zeus	5. 1) Triade des parents : Kronos, Rhéa, Zeus	
5. 2) La triade des dieux immaculés	5. 2) Trois implacables	5. 2) Trois dieux imma-culés	
5. 3) Une monade qui maintient séparée cette classe des dieux du monde	5. 3) Le diaphragme	5. 3) Castration d'Ouranos par Kronos	

L. Brisson, « La place des Oracles chaldéens dans la Théologie Platonicienne »

dans A.-Ph. Segonds et C. Steel (éd.)

Proclus et la Théologie Platonicienne

Leuven - Paris 2000 p. 109 - 162 (p. 161)

H. Lewy, Chaldaean Oracles and Theurgy, Le Caire 1956 (3^e-ed. Paris 2011)

THE PLATONIC SYSTEM
THE ALLEGORICAL SYSTEM

THE CHALDAEAN SYSTEM

TÒ ÉN (ÁPPHITON KAI ÁGNOΣTÓN)	XRÓΝΟΣ	TÒ ÁPPHITON ÉN	3. τρέπται τρέπεις	3. τρέπται τρέλε-
ÉNÁDEΣ ΤΠΕΡΟΤΣΙΟΙ			oi τεκνογράφοι γοι τεληρρου- ρητικοι θεοί	(a) v. s. (b) v. s. (c) v. s.
TÒ NOHTÓN	'Ο KRÝFIOS ΔΙΛΚΟΣΜΟΣ	'Ο ΠΑΤΡΙΚΟΣ ΒΘΕΩΣ		
(τὸ ἐν ὅν ὁ ἀρχόντος διάκοσμος) τρεῖς τριάδες				
1. ἡ οὐράνια τριάς :	a. οὐρανία μονή b. ἀπειρού c. μυκτόνι στροφή	aθήνη-χάρος - ώδη 1. πατρική (vel a). πατρική πατρικός διά- b. δύναμις c. νοῦς	1. καθαρός, ἀκηρατός, ορθός νοῦς, αὐτόνοις.	1. Κρόνος v. s.
(= ἡ μονή, ἡ οὐρανία, τὸ οὐρανόν, ἀξέδον)				
2. ἡ δευτερεραία νοντρί ζωῆι vel τὸ κύριον (*) - ποντρή τριάς : (a) v. s. (b) v. s. (c) v. s.	aἰών τρένη - νεφέλη λη	2. αἰώνιον vel δύναμις (a) v. s. (b) v. s. (c) v. s.	2. οὐρανοί επέκεινα νοῦς πατρικός χός νοῦς ὁ ορθός πατρική	1. οὐρανός επέκεινα νοῦς πατρικός χός νοῦς ὁ ορθός πατρική
(= ἡ πρώτος, δύτικης, κέντρου τῶν νοντρῶν, στερεού, σοφού)				
3. ἡ τρίτη νο- ητρή τριάς	νοῦς νοντρός (a) v. s. (b) v. s. (c) v. s.	3. νοῦς δημητριών, απλάκης νοῦς.	2. Πέτα νος παντήν vel ὁ τίτος δεύτερος πατρική νοῦς πατρική	2. Εύαρην vel ζωογό- νος παντήν vel ὁ τίτος δεύτερος πατρική νοῦς πατρική
(= ἡ πατρική, πέρας τῶν νοντρῶν, μητρώον, καλόν)				
TÒ NOHTÓN KAI NOEPÓN	H NOHTH KAI NOEPÀ MÌTE	3. Ζεύς	3. οὐρανός περέκεινα vel οὐρανός	3. οὐρανός περέκεινα vel οὐρανός
(οὐρανός διάκοσμος)		4. οἱ τρεῖς	4. οἱ τρεῖς	4. οἱ τρεῖς
τρεῖς τριάδες		5. ἀκρατοι	5. οἱ τρεῖς	5. οἱ τρεῖς
1. ἡ οὐράνια τριάς οὐρανία πασι, τρεῖς τριάδες	οὐρανία πασι, τρεῖς τριάδες	6. Σεοί	6. οἱ τρεῖς αἰτιάτοι	6. οἱ τρεῖς αἰτιάτοι
2. δευτερεραία τριάς οὐρανία περι- άσις τριάδες	οὐρανία περι- άσις τριάδες	7. ἡ διακρίσεως ανηγή vel η ἐπεροτης	7. οἱ τριάδες	7. οἱ τριάδες
(= ἡ πατρική, πέρας τῶν νοντρῶν, μητρώον, καλόν)				

(*) From the *ποντρίας* as a whole issue : (1) ανγαί, (2) ἀρχατί, (4) ἀρχαγγελοι, (5) ἀγγελοι, (6) ἀξων, (7) ζων. After them comes the *ἀπλάκης κόστος* and *αι ἵπτα σοφίαι*.

Trois degrés d'intelligibles viennent donc de se révéler de nouveau à nous d'après l'enseignement du Timée : le Vivant-en-soi, l'éternité, l'un. Ainsi, à cause de cet un-là et de son installation stable en lui, l'éternité a fixé le royaume intellible, et, à cause de l'éternité, le Vivant-en-soi délimite éternellement de la même façon la limite inférieure² des dieux intelligibles. Et le Vivant-en-soi, qui a procédé sous quatre formes, dépend de la dyade qui est dans l'éternité (car l'éternité est le 'toujours', accompagné de l'"être"³), tandis que la dyade qui est dans l'éternité participe de la monade intelligible, que Timée a appelée *un un*, précisément pour cette raison qu'elle est monade et principe de tout le plan intellible. Et de fait, d'un autre point de vue, Timée a eu raison d'appeler *un* la première triade qui est essentiellement caractérisée par le limitant, en la dénommant d'un nom qu'il tire de l'idée de limitant ; il a eu raison d'appeler la triade intermédiaire *éternité*, nom qui exprime la dualité par une combinaison de mots, parce que cette triade est déterminée par la puissance intellible ; quant à la troisième, il a eu raison de l'appeler *Vivant-en-soi*, transférant ainsi à la triade tout entière le nom du terme inférieur¹.

Or donc, la première triade est l'unité de tous les intelligibles, d'une certaine manière coordonnée avec eux (car, autre est l'unité imparticipable et qui transcende les intelligibles), et elle est dispensatrice d'une puissance stable. C'est par elle, en effet, que sont établies toutes choses ; or, ce qui existe et est établi à titre premier, c'est l'éternité : par conséquent, nous dirois que la toute première triade est cause finale de la permanence de l'univers, tandis que la deuxième en est la cause efficiente². En effet, l'installation stable des êtres se fait par cette deuxième triade, mais en vue de la première.

Quant à la deuxième triade, elle est la mesure directe de tous les êtres, et elle est coordonnée avec ce qu'elle mesure. En elle, il existe à la fois du limitant et de l'illimité, en tant qu'elle mesure les intelligibles, du limitant, mais en tant qu'elle est cause de la sempiternité, c'est-à-dire du «toujours», de l'illimité. En effet, l'éternité est <cause> de vie inépuisable, de puissance infatigable et d'activité incessante, comme le disent les *Oracles*³. Cependant, l'éternité est plutôt caractérisée par l'illimité : en effet, elle enveloppe en elle le temps infini.

(3) Trois degrés d'intelligibles viennent donc de se révéler de nouveau à nous d'après l'enseignement du Timée : le Vivant-en-soi, l'éternité, l'un. Ainsi, à cause de cet un-là et de son installation stable en lui, l'éternité a fixé le royaume intellible, et, à cause de l'éternité, le Vivant-en-soi délimite éternellement de la même façon la limite inférieure² des dieux intelligibles. Et le Vivant-en-soi, qui a procédé sous quatre formes, dépend de la dyade qui est dans l'éternité (car l'éternité est le 'toujours', accompagné de l'"être"³), tandis que la dyade qui est dans l'éternité participe de la monade intelligible, que Timée a appelée *un un*, précisément pour cette raison qu'elle est monade et principe de tout le plan intellible. Et de fait, d'un autre point de

vue, Timée a eu raison d'appeler *un* la première triade qui est essentiellement caractérisée par le limitant, en la dénommant d'un nom qu'il tire de l'idée de limitant ; il a eu raison d'appeler la triade intermédiaire *éternité*, nom qui exprime la dualité par une combinaison de mots, parce que cette triade est déterminée par la puissance intellible ; quant à la troisième, il a eu raison de l'appeler *Vivant-en-soi*, transférant ainsi à la triade tout entière le nom du terme inférieur¹.

Or donc, la première triade est l'unité de tous les intelligibles, d'une certaine manière coordonnée avec eux (car, autre est l'unité imparticipable et qui transcende les intelligibles), et elle est dispensatrice d'une puissance stable. C'est par elle, en effet, que sont établies toutes choses ; or, ce qui existe et est établi à titre premier, c'est l'éternité : par conséquent, nous dirois que la toute première triade est cause finale de la permanence de l'univers, tandis que la deuxième en est la cause efficiente². En effet, l'installation stable des êtres se fait par cette deuxième triade, mais en vue de la première.

Quant à la deuxième triade, elle est la mesure directe de tous les êtres, et elle est coordonnée avec ce qu'elle mesure. En elle, il existe à la fois du limitant et de l'illimité, en tant qu'elle mesure les intelligibles, du limitant, mais en tant qu'elle est cause de la sempiternité, c'est-à-dire du «toujours», de l'illimité. En effet, l'éternité est <cause> de vie inépuisable, de puissance infatigable et d'activité incessante, comme le disent les *Oracles*³. Cependant, l'éternité est plutôt caractérisée par l'illimité : en effet, elle enveloppe en elle le temps infini.

Τρεῖς οὖν ἡμῖν πάλιν πεφίγαστ τῶν νοητῶν τάξεις κατὰ τὴν τοῦ Τυμάου διδασκαλίαν, τὸ αὐτοῦ διόν, ὁ αἰών, τὸ εἶν. Καὶ διὰ μὲν τὸ ἐν τοῦτο καὶ τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ σταθεράν 15 ἔρουσιν ὁ αἰών τὴν νοητὴν ἐπικόστα βασιλείαν. Διὰ δὲ τὸν αἰώνα τὸ αὐτοῦ φῶν ἀεὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ὅσαύτως ἀδο-ρίζει τὸ πέρας τῶν νοητῶν θεῶν. Καὶ τὸ μὲν αὐτοῦ διόν τεραδικῶς προεληθυθὸς τῆς ἐν τῷ αἰώνι διάδος ἐξήρηται (τὸ γὰρ ἀεὶ μετὰ τοῦ ὄντος ὁ αἰών)· ἡ δὲ ἐν τῷ αἰώνι 20 διὰς τῆς μονάδος μετέχει τῆς νοητῆς, ἥν καὶ διὰ τοῦτο προσηγόρευεν ὁ Τίμαιος εὖ, ὡς παντὸς τοῦ νοητοῦ πλάνους μονάδα καὶ ἀρχήν. Ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄλλως τὴν μὲν

πρότινην τριάδα, κατὰ τὸ πέρας διαφερόντως χαρακτη-ριζομένην, εἰκότως προσείρηκεν εὖ, ἀπὸ τοῦ πέρατος αὐτῆν ἐπονούμενον· τὴν δὲ μέσην διαδικαθεῖ αἰώνα, τὰ δύναματα συμπλέκων, διότι κατὰ τὴν δύναμαν ἡ τριάς αὕτη τὴν νοητὴν ἀφορισται· τὴν δὲ τρίτην αὐτοῦ διόν, ἀπὸ 5 τοῦ τῆς τριάδος ἐσχάτου μεταφέρων ἐπὶ τὴν διληνή τὴν προσηγορίαν. |

Η μὲν οὖν πρώτη τριάς ἔνωσίς ἐστι πάντων τῶν νοητῶν καὶ ἀμεθέκτος ἔνωσις) καὶ ἔστι μονίμου δυνάμεως 10 χορηγός. Δι' αὐτὴν γὰρ ἐδράζεται τὰ πάντα, τὸ δὲ πρώτως δὲν καὶ ἐδραζόμενον ὁ αἰών. Ὅστε τῆς μονῆς τῶν διλων τὸ μὲν δι' ὃ τὴν πρωτιστην τριάδα φέρεται, τὸ δὲ ὑψόν τὸ τὴν διεπέραν. Κατὰ ταύτην μὲν γάρ, ἀλλὰ δι' ἐκείνην, ἡ σταθερὰ τῶν ὄντων ἰδουσται.

Η δέ γε δευτέρα τριάς μέτρου ἐστὶ τῶν δύνατων προσεχές καὶ συντεταγμένον τοῖς μετρουμένοις. Καὶ 15 ἔστιν ἄμα πέρας ἐν αὐτῇ καὶ ἀπειρον, ὡς μὲν μετρούση τὰ νοητὰ τὸ πέρας, ὡς δὲ ἀμβιότητος καὶ τοῦ ἀεὶ αἵρετη τὸ ἀπειρον. Τῆς γὰρ ἀνεκλείστου λόγης καὶ τῆς ἀπρύτου 20 δυνάμεως καὶ τῆς ἀόκνου κατὰ τὸ λόγιον ἐνεργείας ὁ αἰών (αἴρος). Μᾶλλον μὴν κατὰ τὸ ἀπειρον ὁ αἰών χαρακτηρίζεται· καὶ γὰρ τὸν ἀπειρον χρόνον ἐν ἔστιν περίεχει.

Άλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἡ τρίτη τριάς πεπλήρωται μὲν ζωῆς νοητῆς καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ζῷόν ἐστι νοητὸν καὶ πρώτιστον ζῷον. Πρώτως γάρ αὐτὸς μετέχει τῆς σλης φύσεως, ἐν ἔαυτῷ δὲ ἐκφαίνει τὰ πρώτιστα τῶν εἰδῶν, πρὸς ἂν καὶ δημιουργικὸς νοῦς ἀνατεινόμενος τὸν δλον ὑφίστησι 5 κόσμον· καὶ ἔστιν αὐτὸς τὸ νοητὸν πᾶν, ὡς ὁ φαινόμενος κόσμος τὸ αἰσθητόν, διὸ καὶ ὁ Πλάτων παντελὲς ἐπονομάζει τὸ αὐτοῦ ζῷον. Μᾶλλον δὲ οὕτως, εἰ δοκεῖ, λέγωμεν· ἐν τῇ τοίτη ταίτη τοιάδι καὶ πέος ἐστὶ καὶ ἀπειρον καὶ

Théâtre Plat.

IV

[Deuxième partie: les dieux intelligibles-intellectifs dans]

[Le Phèdre, lieu théologique des dieux intelligibles-[intellectifs]]

Les trois triades intelligibles-intellectives ont donc été engendrées de la façon que l'on vient de dire, et telle est la différence qu'elles ont reçue par rapport aux triades intelligibles². Maintenant, revenons de nouveau à Platon et suivons-le dans son cheminement, en montrant que la science relative à chacune de ces triades préexiste chez lui⁴. Et d'abord prenons ce qui est écrit dans le *Phèdre* et considérons à partir des paroles mêmes de Socrate comment il nous révèle tout ce monde divin et les différences qu'il contient.

Il est donc dit dans le *Phèdre*¹ que douze dieux-chefs président à l'univers, et qu'ils guident tous les dieux encosmiques et toutes les troupes de démons dans leur ascension vers la nature intelligible. A la tête de ces douze dieux se trouve *Zeus*, qui conduit son *char ailé* et qui met en ordre et veille sur toutes choses, et il fait monter toute l'*armée* qui est à sa suite, d'abord dans les hau-teurs qui sont à l'*intérieur du ciel* et jusqu'à *aux visions bienheureuses et aux évolutions* à travers les objets d'intellection, qui se trouvent là-bas; ensuite il les fait monter jusqu'à la *voute subcéleste* qui ceint immédiatement par en dessous² le ciel et qui est contenue en lui; après cette volte, il les élève jusqu'au ciel lui-même et au *dos du ciel*, sur lequel les âmes divines se tiennent debout et sont entraînées dans le mouvement du ciel en contemplant tout l'être qui est au-delà. Il y a au-dessus du ciel le lieu appelé *supracélestie*, dans lequel se trouvent l'*être véritable, la plaine de vérité et la prairie*, le royaume d'*Adrastée* ainsi que le cœur divin des vertus; et *nouvelles* par l'intellection de ces monades, les âmes connaissent le bonheur en suivant le mouvement circulaire du ciel.

↓
ciel
sous
astra -
célesté

δ'

15

=
Platon,
Phèdre,
246 Ε 4 - 247 Δ 5

Αἱ μὲν οὖν τρεῖς νοηταὶ καὶ νοεραὶ τριάδες οὔτες ἀπεγεννήθησαν καὶ τοιαύτην ἔλαχον πρὸς τὰς νοητὰς διαφορὰν. Ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν Πλάτωνα πάλιν ἐπανελθόντες συνοδεύσασιν ἐκένθη καὶ τὴν περὶ ἑκάστης τῶν τριάδων τούτων ἐπιστήμην παρ' αὐτῷ προϋπάρχουσαν ἐπιδείξω-
μεν· καὶ πρῶτον λαβόμεθα τῶν ἐν Φαιδρῷ γεγραμμένων καὶ θεωρησαμεν μάτ' αὐτῶν τῶν τοῦ Σωκράτους ἥματων ὅπως ἡμῖν τὴν διακόσμησιν πᾶσαν ἐκφάνει καὶ τὰς ἐν αὐτῇ διαφοράς.

Λέγοντας τούτουν ἐν τῷ Φαιδρῷ δύωδεκα τῶν διῶν ἡγεμόνες προεστάναι, πάντας μὲν τοὺς ἐγκοσμίους θεούς, πάσας δὲ τὰς τῶν διαιρένων ἀγέλας ποδιηγεούντες καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν νοητὴν οἵμενον φύσιν. Τούτων δὲ τῶν διώδεκα θεῶν ἡγεμόνθαι πάντων τὰν Δία, πρητὸν δρυμα ἐλαύνοντα καὶ διαικοσμοῦντα πάντα καὶ ἐπιμελούμενον, καὶ ἀνάγεν πᾶσαν τὴν ἐπομένην αὐτῷ στρατίαν, πρωτὸν εἰς τὴν ἐντὸς οὐρανοῦ περιπλατὴν καὶ τὰς μακαρίας τῶν ἐκεīνοις νοομένων θέας τε καὶ διεξόδους· ἔπειτα εἰς τὴν ὄπουράνιον ἀκύδα προσεχόντας ὑπερζωκύαν τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ περιεχομένην· καὶ μετὰ ταύτην εἰς αὐτὸν τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὸ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ νῶτρον, οὐ δὴ καὶ ἴστρασθαι τὰς θείας ψυχὰς καὶ συμπεριφερομένας τῷ οὐρανῷ θεωρεῖν τὴν ἐπέκεινα πᾶσαν οὐσίαν. Εἶναν δὲ πρὸ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ τὸν μπροστράγονον καλούμενον τόπον, ἐν δὲ καὶ ἡ οὐσία ἡ ὄντως καὶ τὸ τῆς ἀληθείας πεδίον καὶ ὁ λειμῶν καὶ ἡ τῆς Ἀδραστείας βασιλεία καὶ ὁ θεῖος τῶν ἀρετῶν Χορός· καὶ διὰ τῆς νοήσεως τῶν μονάδων τούτων τρεφομένας τὰς ψυχὰς εὐπαθεῖν, τῇ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ περιφορᾷ συνεπομένας.

θ'

5

[Accord de Platon et des Oracles Chaldaiques]

A l'adresse de celui qui soulève une difficulté au sujet de ces noms, voilà donc la réponse brève, comme je le disais, que nous ferons. Ici encore, il vaut la peine d'admirer la science divinement inspirée³ de Platon, car il a enseigné le mode de la remontée de tous les êtres vers l'intelligible en accord avec ceux qui tiennent le rang le plus élevé dans la célébration des mystères⁴.

Πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὸν ἀποροῦντα περὶ τῶν διαιρέτων διατούτων ἀποκρινούμεθα συντόμως, ὄπως περὶ ζῆτην. Τοῦ δὲ Πλάτωνος κάνγαλοῦ τὴν ἔνθεον ἐπιστήμην ἀξιονθαύμασιν, ὅτι κατὰ τοὺς ἀκροτάτους τῶν τελεστῶν τοῦ τῆς ἀνόδου τρόπον ὑπηγήσατο τῶν διῶν ἐπὶ τὸ νοητόν. 10

Théologie platonicienne

γ

Théologie platonicienne

V.3

Voilà ce qu'il faut assumer au préalable au sujet de la division de ces dieux intellectifs. L'étape suivante consiste à faire correspondre la doctrine de Platon à cette classe de dieux et à montrer qu'elle n'est en défaut par rapport à aucune doctrine des théologiens, relative à cet ordre des dieux intellectifs⁴.

Puis donc que, d'une part, nous avons démontré que la classe de dieux célestes, que nous avons trouvée parfaitement célébrée dans le *Cratyle* et le *Phèdre*, contient le lien intermédiaire des dieux intelligibles intellectifs, et que d'autre part nous avons eu soin de ne pas séparer du ciel l'autre ordre de dieux immédiatement rangé en dessous de celui-là, comme Socrate l'a montré dans le *Phâdre*, et qui est appelé *la volonté subtileste*, on peut se demander quel est l'ordre de dieux qui s'est séparé lui-même du royaume d'Ouranos pour prendre la tête de la classe intellective des dieux et être à titre premier le dispensateur de l'intellect, selon l'enseignement même de Platon ? Socrate dans le *Cratyle* <dit que ce n'est personne d'autre > que le très grand Cronos : car c'est cet intellect-là qu'il appelle *l'intellect tout premier et le plus pur*. Donc ce qu'il y a de plus élevé dans l'intellect divin et, comme il dit lui-même, ce qu'il y a de plus pur, voilà quel est le dieu qui se détache lui-même de la classe ouranienne, et qui règne sur tous les dieux intellectifs, parce qu'il est entièrement rempli d'intellect, et qui plus est, de l'intellect pur et du degré d'être intellectif tendu vers son plus haut sommet⁵.

Voilà pourquoi il est aussi Père du très grand Zeus, et Père purement et simplement; car le Père du père de tous les êtres a reçu à bien plus forte raison, je pense, la dignité paternelle³. C'est donc Cronos qui est l'intellect premier, mais le très grand Zeus est aussi intellect, lui qui a une âme royale et un intellect royal, comme dit Socrate dans le *Philebe*; et par conséquent ce sont deux pères intellectifs, qui sont, parmi les intellectifs, l'un, intellectif, l'autre, intelligible.

(..)

Il est donc évident que de la reine Rhéa³, qui est mère de Zeus et inférieure à Cronos, parce qu'il est père, nous dirons qu'elle constitue ce degré intermédiaire, puisqu'elle est le monde qui donne la vie et qu'elle a préétabli en elle-même les causes de la vie universelle. Voilà donc trois degrés paternels qui se montrent à nous dans les intellectifs : le premier constitue l'intelligible des intellectifs, le deuxième, la vie divine et intellective, le troisième, l'intellect intellectif⁴. De fait, la classe intermédiaire, nous la célebrons, prise en elle-même, comme mère du déniurge et donc de tous les

Ταῦτα καὶ περὶ τῆς διαιρέσεως προειλήφθια τῶν νοερῶν τούτων θεῶν. Ἐχόμενον δέ ἐστι τὴν τὸν Πλάτωνος θεώριαν ἔφαρμόσι τῇ τάξει ταῦτη καὶ δεῖξαν μηδενὸς αὐτὴν ἀπολεπτομένην τὸν θεολογικῶν περὶ τῆς νοερᾶς διαιρέσεως ταύτης δογμάτων.

Ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν τὴν μὲν οὐρανίαν τάξιν, τὴν ἐν Κρατύλῳ καὶ Φαῖδρῳ τελέως ὑμουρμένην ἀνέψυρομεν, τὸν μέσον σύνδεσμον κατέχειν τὸν νοερῶν μέρα καὶ νοητῶν θεῶν ἀπεδείξαμεν, ὡπό δὲ ταύτην εὖθες διαιρόστησον ἀλλαγὴ θεῶν ταύτης δογμάτων.

Ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν τὴν μὲν οὐρανίαν τάξιν, τὴν ἐν Κρατύλῳ καὶ Φαῖδρῳ τελέως Σωκράτης ἁνεδίκυντο, τὴν οὐρανὸν ἄψιχα καλουμένην, ἀδιάβροτον πρὸς τὸν οὐρανὸν ἐφύλαστρομεν, τὸς ἡ διελούσα αύτην ἀπὸ τῆς Οὐρανοῦ βασιλείας, ἥγουμένη δὲ τῆς νοερᾶς πάξεως τῶν θεῶν καὶ τοῦ νοῦ πρώτως Χορηγὸς· καὶ αὐτὴν τὴν τοῦ 5 Πλάτωνος ὑφήγησον ; *** ὁ ἐν τῷ Κρατύλῳ Σωκράτης ἢ τὸν μέγιστον Κρόνον· τοῦτον γὰρ δὴ νοῦν τὸν πρώτιον καὶ καθαρώτατον ἀποκαλεῖ. Τὸ τοινύν ἀκρότατον τοῦ νοῦ θείου καὶ ὡς αὔτος φησι, τὸ καθαρώτατον, οὗτος ἐστιν ὁ θεός, διακρίνων μὲν ἑαυτὸν 10 τοῦ οὐρανίου διαιρέσμου, πάντων δὲ τῶν νοερῶν θεῶν βασιλεύων, διότι δὴ νοῦ μέν ἐστι διαιρότας, ἀλλὰ τοῦ καθαροῦ νοῦ καὶ τῆς εἰς ἄκρον ἀνατενομένης νοερᾶς ὑποστάσεως [θεός].

Διὸ δὴ καὶ πατέρης ἐστι τοῦ μεγάστου Διός, καὶ ἀπλῶς 15 πατέρης ὁ γὰρ τοῦ πάντων πατρὸς πατέρων διάτροπος εὐλαβέ τὴν πατρικὴν ἀξίαν. Νοῦς ἐν οὖν οὖτος πρῶτος, νοῦς δὲ καὶ ὁ μέγιστος Ζεύς, βασιλικὴν μὲν ἔχων ψυχήν, βασιλικὸν δὲ νοῦν, ὡς ὁ ἐν τῷ Φιλίβῳ Σωκράτης· καὶ δύο νόες οὗτοι καὶ πατέρες νοεροί, δὲ μὲν νοερὸς δῶν ἐν τοῖς νοεροῖς, δὲ δὲ νοητοῖς.

Δῆλον δὴ οὖν ὅτι τὴν βασιλείαν 'Ρέαν, μητρά μὲν οὖσαν τοῦ Διός, τοῦ δὲ Κρόνου πατρὸς ὄντος [τὴν] δευτέραν, τὴν μεσότητα ταύτην συμπληρώοντον φύσισμεν, κόσμον λωργονικὸν ὑπάρχουσαν καὶ τὰς τῆς δόλιας αἴτιας ἐν εαυτῇ προστησαμένην. Τρεῖς οὖν αὐταὶ πατρικαὶ τάξεις ἡμῶν προφήνασσιν ἐν τοῖς νοεροῖς, δὲ κατὰ τὸ νοητὸν τῶν νοερῶν, δὲ κατὰ τὴν λόγων τὴν θείαν καὶ νοεράν, δὲ κατὰ τὸν νοῦν τὸν νοερόν. Καὶ γὰρ τὴν μέσην θεῶν αὐτὴν καθ' ἑαυτὴν μητρέα καὶ αὐτὴν τοῦ δημιουργοῦ καὶ τῶν ὅλων ἀνυπούμεν.

la triade paternelle

vontos

Zeus (démirage)

voueos

Rhêa viē

Zeus (démirage)

voueos

57

Les dieux paternels sont donc au nombre de trois et les dieux immaculés sont aussi au nombre de trois, il reste donc à poursuivre notre examen et à parler de la septième monade. Si donc nous considérons les mutilations racontées dans les mythes, aussi bien celle de Cronos que celle d'Ouranos, dont Platon lui aussi fait mémoire quelque part, en estimant toujours qu'il faut tenir cachés dans le silence les mythes de cette sorte et chercher leur vérité indicible, et si nous considérons que ces mythes indiquent d'une manière cachée des pensées mystérieuses (raison pour laquelle ils ne sont pas faits pour être entendus par les jeunes gens), à partir de là nous pourrions comprendre quelle est la divinité séparatrice, celle qui accomplit les divisions et sépare les classes de dieux croniens de celles des dieux ouraniens, et celles des dieux joviens de celles des dieux croniers, celle qui distingue tout l'ordre-intellectif des dieux par rapport à ceux qui, le précèdent et ceux qui le suivent, détache les unes des autres les différentes causes qui sont en lui et toujours procure aux degrés inférieurs les mesures inférieures de la royauté.

Τρεῖς οὖν οἱ πατρικοὶ θεοὶ καὶ τρεῖς οἱ ἄχραιγοτοί· λει-
πεται οὖν καὶ τὴν ἐβδόμην μονάδα θεωρήσαντας ἐπεῖν,
| Εἰ τοίνυν τὰς μυθικὰς ἐννοήσαμεν ἐκτομάς, τὰς τε 10
Κρονίας καὶ τὰς Οὐρανίας, διν καὶ δι Πλάτων που διαμνη-
μονεύει τιγῆ τὰ τουάτα κρύπτειν διοικάζων δὲι καὶ τὴν
ἀπόρρητον αὔτων ἀλήθειαν ὅραν, καὶ ὅπι μυστικῶν ἔστι
νοητῶν ἐνδεκτικά, διότι καὶ νέοις ἀνεπτυγμέναια τοιαῦτα
ἀκούειν, ἔχοντες ἀντίτοπαν τοιαῦταν τίς ἔστιν ή διακριτική 15
θεότητος ή· καὶ τὰς διαιρέσεis ἀποτελουσσα καὶ χωρίζουσσα
τὰ μὲν Κρόνια γένη τῶν Οὐρανίων, τὰ δὲ Διάτα τῶν Κρονίων,
ὅλον δὲ τὸν νοερὸν διάκοσμον τῶν τε πρὸ αὔτοῦ καὶ τῶν
μετ' αὐτὸν διακρίνουσσα καὶ τὰς ἐν αὐτῷ διαδόρους αἵρετας
ἀπ' ἀλλήλων διυστάσσα, καὶ τοῖς διευρέσοις δὲι τὰ δεύτερα 20
μέτρα τῆς βασιλείας παρεχομένη.

3 dieux paternels
3 immatériaux (δι Χρήστον)
1 monade séparatrice

hebdomade des intellectifs

πολλάς εν τῷ κόσμῳ. δι' αἵτίας πολλάς, η̄ διὰ πτεροεόρπων η̄ διὰ
βούλησον πατοῦσθαι.

Ζεξέαντοι δὲ τοὺς οὐδέπου ἀδύοι καὶ τὰς τῶν ἔτερων περιβόλους, τὸν δὲ
ζῆν πολλαῖς καταψεύσαντο, καὶ τοὺς μὲν αὐτοὺς θεοὺς διηγείσαντον
ἀρχηγὸν τῆς περιόρπων Αἴτεων, τῷ δὲ τῷ νῦν σελήνην τόπον θέμην φασι,
1155 τὸν δὲ | τὴν μεσότηγα τοῦ αἰγείοντος κόδουν καὶ τοῦ ὑδατοῦ, τῷν δὲ τῷ
ἄλλορον φυγῆρι, καὶ τιθεσσαν ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ Λευκείᾳ, οὖν οὐτανθάδε, ἀλλὰ
αγρειών, οταν συμπατῶσι. Εἳνι τοῦδε αὐτῷ καὶ προφάσιῃ τὴν μεγάλων
λόγων. Ιδέας δὲ νομίζουται τῷ μὲν τὰς τοῦ πατρὸς ἐνωπότας, τῷ δὲ τοῦς
πατρὸς λόγους, φυτικοὺς καὶ φυγικοὺς καὶ ποτούς, τῷν δὲ τὰς ξενισμέ-
νας τῷ πρώτῳ ὑπάρχεσσι. τοὺς δὲ τοῖς μαρτιών λόγοντος συναντῶσιν. Αὗτοί τε
ἀργοτάτων τούτων διηγέρουν ἀπὸ τῆς περιγέλαιαν ὑλῶν. συμπατῆθή δε τὰ ἄρτον
τοῦς νέατος φασὶ καὶ μάλιστα τὰ μέσα τηληρήπη. μετοκαθιστώμενοι δέ τοις ψυχάς
μετὰ τῶν λεγόμενον θεάτρων κατὰ τὰ μέρη τῶν οἰκείων παθόδεσσον ἔχ-
οντας ταῖς τοῦ κόσμου μερέστον. τρίτος δὲ μαίαντες τῶν μάρτιουν διαβρέζουν οὐκ
καὶ μέτας αὐτὸς διορίσσονται τῶν τε ἀμερίστων καὶ μεγιστῶν φύσεον.

Τούτων δὲ τῶν διηγέρων τὰ πέλεω καὶ Αἰτοτοκέντος καὶ Πλάτων
εἰδέχαστο, οἱ δὲ τοσοὶ Πλιθωτῶν καὶ Κάρπηλον Ποσειθεύν τε καὶ Περδικῶν
πάτερ, πατερικούσσων καὶ ὃς θελει παντὸς ἀνθρώπου τοις τοῖς πατερούσσοις

49

Π. 73 Ψευδον ονομάτων κεφαλαιώδης τῶν παρὰ Χαλδαίων αρχαίων δογμάτων 20
Κτ.
Σήμερον δοι τῶν Χαλδαϊκῶν δογμάτων ποιοῦμενος ἔχθρον, παρότι
ἐγ γενέσθης γεράπετος, αὐτὸς τοῦ μέρητον κατ' εἰκόναντος τοῦ τιθέμενος καὶ
αὗτὸς τὴν ἀρχήν. Μηδ' ὁ παρεκτὸν τινὰ ληστοῖς βροῦται τούτῳ τεράνῳ

συγχεινον, ἐκάστης ἔγοντος ματέρα μὲν ποδόν, δείχεσθαι δὲ δύναμιν,
 τοῖον δὲ νῦν, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα φασιν εἶναι ποντάς τε καὶ νοσός, ὡς
 ποντόν μὲν εἶναι τὴν ἵππην, μεθ' ἣν τρεῖς ἑτέρας πατροῖς καὶ νοντάς
 καὶ αὐτόντος, διαφερόντας τοῦς μόνους τεττήν κατὰ τὸ διατάξιον καὶ
 τὸ αἰθέλιον καὶ τὸ ὄβλαιον. μετὰ δὲ τὰς ἵππας προσθεῖται, φασι, οἱ
 συνορεῖς· καὶ οἱ μὲν ὄντες τὰς ἀρδεγάτους αὐτοῖς ἐνώπιοι τῶν πλευτῶν
 ψήσταντον, οἱ δὲ συνορεῖς τὰς ποδόδους τοῦ πληθύοντος τῶν ἔντερων
 πετατὸν τῶν νοντῶν καὶ τῶν νοερῶν κέντρον τῆς μηροπέρεων ποντωποιας εἴ-
 δαντοις πλέξαντον. προσθεῖται δὲ τοῖς συνορεῖσι τοῦς τετέρας τοῦθεν εἰσιν
 10 τοσεῖς καὶ αὐτοῖς δύτας· τὸν δὲ μὲν ἐμπειρόνος, οὐ δὲ αἴθερόνος, οὐ δὲ θλάσσης. p. 74
 εἰσὶ δὲ αἱ μὲν ὄντες ποντές μάνον, οἱ δὲ συνορεῖς ποντές ηδὲ πο-
 ραβούσαι τὸ πλήριον, οἱ δὲ τετάρτους ποντές ἀποτημένοι λόγοσται τὸ
 πλήριον. μετά δὲ τούτους τοῦς τετάρτους ποντές ποντάς δοξάζονται ήτος τοὺς
 κοσμήσαντος· ὅν πρῶτος ὁ ἄντας λεγόμενος, μεθ' ἣν (ἢ) Εὐάντην διερχό-
 ον ταῖς μέσον, τοτες δὲ διὰ διεστάτητα μεγάλης οὐσίας ἀπειλεῖσθαι καὶ ἐθρόμος
 διετελώτεροι. έστι δὲ διὰ ταῦτα ἐπικεντρωτικός δοξάζως διεπόστατος ποντάς,
 πατροῖο δὲ τῶν νοερῶν ἀπότατον. η δὲ Εὐάντην νοεροῦ φωτὸς καὶ ζωῆς πάντα
 πάντοιο, καλούσθαι διη στρατόν πατέρων καὶ νοσηταριού δις προσεσκεψώς ἐπιβιβάπο-
 τες τοῖς καρδιοῖς. έστι δὲ τοιούτοις ἡ Εὐάντην πορφύρας διατετάρτην φύσεων.
 20 ταῦτα δὲ κατὰ τὴν ζωτικήν πομπὴν η μὲν φύσις τῷ τετέρῳ συμπεριεῖται τετρά-
 της Εὐάντης νότιων ἀπαναγουσιέν· τὸν δὲ διὰ τῆς λεγόντοις πομπῆς η μὲν ταῦ-
 ποτροῦτον έστι δεξιά, η δὲ τὸν δεστρὸν ἐν λαοῖς. δὲ διὰς ἐπιτελείσθαι τάξει μὲν
 εἰλαχεῖ τὰς τριταῖς δημιουρογενεῖς, διόπερ τοιούτοις ΗΕὐάντην αὗτος γαλο-
 ποδοπήγης τὸν τῶν Ιδεῶν τίτανον τῷ πόδικρι πολεῖται δὲ διὰς ἐπιτελείσθαι, οὐτι
 25 διαδεικνύεις έστι, ηδὲ μὲν πατέρεαν τὰ ποντά, αἰθέρην δὲ ἐπιταγὴν τοῦς
 πατέρων· δὲ διὰς ἐπιτελείσθαι λέγεται, οὐτε συναρτησίαν
 ἐπιτελείσθαι, οἱ δὲ ἀμειλίστοι πανοδεύμενοι τὴν ποντοπέρεων τῶν συνορεῖσιν
 δύστατην φρονοῦσσι τὰς ὑπάρχεις ἀποθέτειν τῷ πάτερεσσον καὶ τὰς πορπατα-
 σιντεῦν ἐνεργείας σήμερόν τοις φυλάσσοντας· η δὲ τῶν ἀνεξωκότων πορπη-
 τῶν ποντοπέρεων έστιν αἵτια τῆς νοερᾶς διατελέσθαις. έστι δὲ καὶ πιγμάτια τριών

48

Ex-E. des Places (cuf)

40

DU MÊME PSELLIUS.
ESQUISSE SOMMAIRE

DES ANCIENNES CROYANCES DES CHALDÉENS

1. Pour exposer brièvement les doctrines des Chaldéens, sur lesquelles tu m'as demandé de t'écrire, je commencerai moi aussi par leur Un ineffable. 2. Après lui, ils imaginent une sorte d'abîme paternel, composé de trois triades qui ont chacune pour premier membre le Père, pour deuxième la Puissance, pour troisième l'Intellect. [3]. Après cela, ils disent qu'il y a des (triades) intelligibles et intellectuelles, dont la première est l'Iyngé, après laquelle viennent trois autres (Iynges) paternelles, intelligibles et inexprimables, qui divisent les mondes en trois régions : empyrée, éther, matière. 4. Immédiatement après les Iynges suivent, disent-ils, les assemblées ; les Iynges créent pour eux les unions inexprimables de toutes choses ; les assemblées unifient les processions de la pluralité des êtres, fixant en eux-mêmes, entre les intelligibles et les intellectuels, le centre de la communauté des deux. 5. Immédiatement après les assemblées ils mettent les télestarques¹, qui sont trois eux aussi et dominent l'un sur l'empyrée, le second sur l'éther, le troisième sur la matière. Les Iynges sont monades pures ; les assemblées des monades qui déjà laissent apparaître la pluralité² ; les télestarques, des monades qui ont la pluralité divisée. 6. Après ceux-ci, ils croient aux pères-sources, c'est-à-dire aux meneurs de mondes, dont le premier est celui qu'on appelle le descendant talement Un ; puis vient Héate, au second rang et au milieu ; le troisième est le transcendantalement Deux ; suivent les trois implacables et, en septième lieu, celui qui s'est sauté d'une ceinture. 7. Le transcendantalement Un

1. Litéralement : « maîtres de l'initiation » ; cf. ci-dessus, fr. 86,
n. 1.
2. Ce « déjà » insiste sur la « dégradation » que constitue l'appari-
tion de la pluralité (cf. *Eza. chald.*, p. 194, 24). On peut en suivre la
trace depuis l'*Epiphonies*, 985 a, 5, où « les démons sont déjà accesi-
bles à la douleur », (cf. R. E. G., L, 1987, p. 323-324), jusqu'à Jam-

Τοῦ αὐτοῦ Ψελλοῦ
ἀποτύπωσις κεφαλαιώδης τῶν παρὰ Χαλδαίοις
ἀρχαῖων δογμάτων

(f. 197 r)
P. 73 K.

1. Σύντομόν σοι τῶν Χαλδαιῶν δογμάτων ποιού-
μενος ἔκθεσην, περὶ διν ἐδεῖθης γράψαι σοι, ἀπὸ τοῦ
ἀρρήτου κατ' ἐκείνους ἑνὸς τιθεμαι καὶ αὐτὸς τὴν ἀρχήν.
2. Μεθ' ὅ πατρικόν τινα ληρούσιν βιθὸν ἐκ τριῶν τριάδων
5 συγκεκέμενον, ἐκάστης ἔχοντος πατέρα μὲν πρῶτον, δεύ-
τερον δὲ διναῦμαν, τρίτον δὲ νοῦν. 3. Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα
φασιν εἶναι νοητά τε καὶ νοεῖσθαι, διν πρώτην μὲν εἰναι
τὴν ἕννγξ, μεθ' ἥν τρίτης ἐπέρας πατρικὰς καὶ νοητὰς
καὶ ἀφθέγκτους, διαιρούσας τοὺς κοσμούς τριχῇ κατά⁴
10 τὰ ἡμιπύριον καὶ τὸ ὑλαῖον. 4. Μετὰ δὲ
τὰς ἕννγξ προσχεῖς, φασίν, οἱ συνοχεῖς· καὶ αἱ μὲν
τιναὶ τὰς ἀφθέγκτους αὐτοῖς ἑνάσθεται τῶν πάντων
ὑφιεστάσιν, οἱ δὲ συνοχεῖς τὰς προάδους τοῦ πλήθους
τῶν διηγῶν ἐνίζουσι, μεταξὺ τῶν νοητῶν καὶ τῶν νοερῶν
15 κέντρον τῆς ἀμφιστέρων κοινωνίας ἐν ἑαυτοῖς παρέχουσιν.
5. Προσχεῖς δὲ τοῖς συνοχεῦσι τοὺς τελετάρχας πιθασί⁵
(p. 74) τρεῖς καὶ | αὐτοῖς διηγάσται· διν δὲ μὲν ἐμπύριος, δὲ αἰθέ-
ριος, δὲ ὁ ὑπάρχης. Εἰτοί δὲ αἱ μὲν ἕννγες μονάδες μόνον,
οἱ δὲ συνοχεῖς μονάδες ἥδη προφανίουσι τὸ πλήθος,
οἱ δὲ τελετάρχαι μονάδες διηγημένον ἔχουσαι τὸ πλήθος.
5 6. Μετὰ δὲ τούτους τοὺς πηγαίους πατέρας δοξάζουσιν
ἥγουν τοὺς κοσμαγούς· διν πρῶτος μὲν ὁ ἄπαξ λεγόμε-
νος, μεθ' ὃν <ἥ>⁶ Εκάτη δευτέρα καὶ μέση, τρίτος δὲ ὁ δι-
έπεκενα· μεθ' οὖς <οἵ> τρεῖς ἀμείλικτοι καὶ τερβισμός δι πε-

73, 4 6 L. δι U 5 μὲν L : κατ U 7 φασιν L : φασιν U || νοεράς L :
νοερός U || 74, 6 ἕγουν L : εἴται U : εἴται καὶ Thillet || μὲν ομ. U ||
7 ἦ add. cij. Kroll || Εκάτη L : ξαστην U || δευτέρα καὶ μέση L : δευ-
τέρους καὶ μέσους (sic); leg. μέσους || 8 of. add. cij. Kroll.

Simplicius on the *Timaeus*:
Explaining Plato in an Aristotelian Commentary (*In de Caelo*)

Handout

1. Aristotle, *De caelo* 3.2, 300b17–25

The same difficulty is involved even if it is supposed, as we read in the *Timaeus*, that before the ordered world was made the elements moved without order. Their movement must have been due either to constraint or to their nature. And if their movement was natural, a moment's consideration shows that there was already an ordered world. For the prime mover must cause motion in virtue of its own natural movement, and the other bodies, moving without constraint, as they came to rest in their proper places, would fall into the order in which they now stand, the heavy bodies moving towards the center and the light bodies away from it. But that is the order of their distribution in our world (tr. Stocks).

2. Aristotle, *De anima* 1.3, 406b26–407a5

In the same way, *Timaeus* offers a physical account of how the soul moves the body; by being in motion itself, the soul moves the body because of its being entangled with it. For having constituted the soul out of the elements and having divided it in accordance with the harmonic numbers so that it might have an innate perception of harmony and so that the whole universe might be borne in harmonious orbits, he bent the straight into a circle. And having divided the one circle into two circles intersecting at two points, he again divided one of them into seven circles, so that the orbits of heaven were the motions of the soul. First, then, it is not right to say that the soul is a magnitude. For it is clear that he wishes this sort of soul, the soul of the universe to be what is sometimes called reason (*nous*), since it is at any rate surely neither such as to be perceptual nor such as to be appetitive. (tr. Shields)

3. Simplicius, *In DC* 1.3.17-22

[Aristotle in the *De caelo*] does not teach about the world, as Plato does in the *Timaeus*, who investigates the principles of physics, matter and form and change and time, and he teaches about the common constitution of the world and especially about the heavenly bodies and the things in the sublunar realm, while he also handles astronomical phenomena, the metals in the earth, the plants, the animals and even the human constitution and the human parts. (tr. Mueller)

4. Simplicius, *In DC* 1.103.1-104.19

But since this is enough of these matters, let us next see in what sense of ‘comes to be’ [τοῦ γενητοῦ σημαίνομενον] Aristotle denies that heaven comes to be and tries to demonstrate that it does not come to be, and in what sense Plato says that both heaven and the whole cosmos come to be. Now it is clear that Aristotle calls only one thing coming to be: the change in time from not being into being, a change which is always followed by perishing. On this basis he will demonstrate that heaven not only does not come to be but also does not perish, and <that this is his idea of coming to be> is even clearer when he clearly demonstrates that what comes to be always perishes and what perishes comes to be. For it is clear that he takes as coming to be and perishing those cases which occur in a segment of time and attach to sublunar things. And so, having demonstrated that there is a fifth heavenly body, which is prior to them in nature and more perfect, just as he denies that the fifth substance has weight or lightness or moves in a straight line (these being propria of sublunar things), so too he denies that it comes to be or

perishes <as they do>. I think this is indisputable both because he says that coming to be and perishing are a sort of change with one thing coming to be and perishing after another and because, speaking against those who say that the cosmos comes to be but does not perish, he proves that what comes to be always perishes as well. And it is not at all surprising that Aristotle, who always wants to take as assumptions things which are immediately clear to everyone, says that what comes to be is what shares in all coming to be and is seen clearly to come to be and perish in a segment of time.

Plato, too, certainly knows this kind of coming to be of sublunary things which is the opposite of perishing, since in the tenth book of the *Laws* he writes... [there follows *Laws* 894a1-8]

However, Plato also knows the other kind of coming to be in which what has moved down into corporeal extension and is not further able to give itself existence but is only given existence by some other cause is said to come to be as distinguished from that which genuinely is and which is its immediate cause. For it is necessary that what comes to be and gets its existence from elsewhere get its existence from Being, which is self-substantiating; otherwise one proceeds to infinity, always positing one thing which comes to be prior to another. Having defined this kind of coming to be after this kind of Being in the *Timaeus*, Plato says that the cosmos comes to be in this sense. And the definition of both, which is based on our cognitive powers, is something like this:

“What is it which always is but does not come to be, and what is it which comes to be but never is? The one is grasped by thought with reason and is always the same, but the other is opined by opinion with irrational perception and it comes to be and is destroyed, but does not ever genuinely exist.” (*Tim.* 27d)

And Plato says that the cosmos also comes to be in this sense of ‘come to be’, being given existence directly by the god who genuinely is. He writes the following about the cosmos:

“Was it always without having any starting point of coming to be or did it come to be? It has come to be, since it is visible and tangible, and it has a body. But everything of this sort has obviously come to be and does come to be. For what is self-substantiating must have no parts and be coincident with itself as a whole. But what is extended and has parts cannot be coincident with itself as a whole, and consequently, since it is not self-substantiating, it always gets its existence by the action of something else and is therefore said to come to be.” (*Tim.* 28b)

However, some people interpret the term ‘is destroyed’ [$\alpha\piολλύμενον$] in the definition of ‘come to be’ carelessly and think that Plato obviously sentenced the cosmos and heaven to perishing. Therefore it is necessary to say what this term ‘is destroyed’ means. (trans. I. Mueller)

5. Simplicius, *In DC* 1.107.19-26

I myself am not unaware that saying this much might be thought to go beyond the measure with respect to explaining what Aristotle says <in *De Caelo*>, but because I proposed to dissolve the objections of those who dispute the view that heaven does not come to be or perish and bring forward Plato as someone who provides support for them against Aristotle, I think it is not unsuitable to have recorded Plato’s views on these matters. But we should return to Aristotle’s words. (trans. I. Mueller).

6. Simplicius, *In DC* 1.12.26-13.3

So, according to Plato the dodecahedron was also the shape of a simple body, that of heaven, which he calls aether. But if he says that heaven is made of fire, he means that it is made of light, since he also says that light is a form of fire. But the stars are made of the four <elements>, not the ones involved in coming to be, but of fire insofar as they shine, of earth insofar as they have resistance to sensation, and of the intermediaries insofar as they have intermediate <properties>. So if Aristotle also agrees that they are visible and tangible, he too does not decline to construct the heavenly things from those highest forms <of the four elements>, in which the perfection of the elements also is; for he thinks that heaven completely transcends [ἐξηρῆσθαι] the four sublunar elements, which move in a straight line and are imperfect. Similarly, if he also says it is simple, it is reasonable for him to deny that it is a composite of those sublunar elements. We will learn that he says it is a living thing with soul and he things that living things have composite bodies (trans. Mueller)

7. Simplicius, *In DC* 1.84.10-84.22

The views of Plato seem to appeal to this person. I don't know how, since, as they say, he has found no teachers in these matters, and he has not sought to find out Plato's views in an intellectually serious way [*philomathōs*]. As a result he sometimes thinks that Plato's views harmonise with his own imaginings and sometime that they contradict Aristotle's. So let us now watch him as he sets out some of Plato's views

Then he quotes Philoponus (fr. 56 Wildberg)

Plato hypothesized that the heavenly bodies are not composed of just fire, but above all share most in that sort of fire which also makes the mixture of the other elements more temperate. And he thinks that for the composition of the heavenly bodies there was chosen from all the elements the whole of the most pure substance, and the one which has fine parts and which has the role of form in relation to the other <species of the element>, and that the more material and, so to speak, sludgy portions of these things exist in this world. And Plato also thinks that the stars and the sun are made from that sort of fire. (trans. Mueller)

8. Simplicius, *In DC* 1.84.30-85.15,

Plato says the following things. The whole cosmos is composed from the four elements: visibility coming from fire, tangibility from earth, the intermediate elements having come into being for binding the extremes in a harmonious way. But heaven is composed of the purest <kind> of the elements, which also has the role of form, and it possesses the highest kind of corporeal nature. Therefore, it is both everlasting and divine, because the highest kinds of all things are everlasting and divine, since they are dedicated to the gods, the highest of all things; and accordingly the first minds are divine, and so are the first souls, and so too are the first bodies.³³⁹ And consequently, change of place being the first <kind of change>, heaven was assigned the first motion, circular motion, and came to be the cause of change in other things. And Plato says that heaven is composed mainly of fire because, there being, according to him, three kinds of fire, coals, flame, and light, heaven is mostly composed of the purest and brightest light; for just as each of the so-called sublunar elements is composed of the four simple elements, which are truly elements, but they are given substance and characterised and named by reference to the predominance of one of the four, so too heaven, which is composed of the highest forms of the four elements, is given substance by the best of the highest forms, having been brought to completion as brightest and shining everywhere, and is therefore proclaimed as Olympus. (trans. Mueller)

9. Simplicius, *In DC* 1.85.31-86.12

But in what way does this person think that Aristotle has a position contrary to Plato on the substance of the heavenly body and does not accept either that the heavenly body is composite or that it is simple in the way that fire and any other of the four so-called elements are? Perhaps Aristotle foresaw the gigantesque rebellion of these impious humanoids [*anthropiskoi*] against heavenly things and therefore, since he wanted people to recognize the complete transcendence of heaven over sublunar things and its divine superiority to them, he refrained from the words of those who try to drag heaven down into similarity <with sublunar things>, and so placed heaven above both the composite and the simple things in our world. Moreover, it is possible to see that in these ideas Aristotle is not in disagreement with Plato, if one recognizes that <Aristotle> would readily accept that heaven is completely visible and tangible, since it is immediately clear to those of us who value vision that heaven is visible, and it is also immediately clear that the heavenly bodies touch one another. (trans. Mueller)

10. Simplicius, *In DC* 1.78.16-24

He proves with many arguments, which are, he says, in agreement with Plato, that the circular motion of heaven is both natural and bestowed by soul, because heaven is a living thing; and I think that he has spoken correctly, albeit longer than necessary. But he censures Aristotle for what he believes is his denial in the second book of this treatise that the circular motion is caused by soul, as Plato thought it is, and for saying that if it were caused by soul it would be unnatural and <heaven> would need rest and pressure, like other living things. (trans. Mueller)

11. Simplicius, *In DC* 1.79.14-26

we should attend to the text of Aristotle in relation to which this person has written all these things. It goes as follows (*DC* 1, 284a27-32): Nor is it reasonable that heaven remains fixed forever because of some soul which constrains it, since it is not possible for this kind of life to be painless and blessed for a soul; for it is necessary that the motion involve force – since it moves the first body in a way different from its natural motion and moves it continuously – and that the soul be without leisure and deprived of all mental freedom. Who, hearing Aristotle say that the motion in a circle is natural and also that heaven has a soul would not recognize that he is directing these words against those who say that motion in a circle is only due to soul without also factoring in that it is natural? For in the *Timaeus* Plato at least first assigns circular motion to heaven as natural and then says it involves soul. (trans. Mueller)

12. Simplicius, *In DC* 1.80.13-20

This person is remarkably full of the writings of Plato, just as he is full of those of Aristotle. For although Plato gave heaven its circular motion before adding a soul to it, this person still defends Plato as if he says that the motion were only due to soul. He says that its circular motion is not unnatural for the body <of heaven>, since it does not have any other motion naturally, just as no motion is unnatural for the whole cosmos, since it doesn't move naturally either. (trans. Mueller)

Select literature

Balthussen, H., *Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius. The Methodology of a Commentator*, London 2008

Hoffmann, P., “Simplicius’ Polemics”, in R. Sorabji (ed.), *Philoponus and the Rejection of Aristotelian Science*, London 1987, 57-83

Gavray, M.A., “L’harmonie des doctrines dans le néoplatonisme tardif. Platon et Aristote chez Simplicius”, *Annuaire de l’ école pratique des hautes études (EPHE), Section des sciences religieuses*, 120 (2011-12), 82-89

- Gavray, M.A., “Reconciling Plato’s and Aristotle’s Cosmologies. Attempts at Harmonization in Simplicius”, in B. Strobel (ed.), *Die Kunst der philosophischen Exegese bei den spätantiken Platon- und Aristoteles-Kommentatoren*, Berlin/Boston 2018, 101-125
- Golitsis, P., *Les commentaires de Simplicius et de Jean Philopon à la Physique d’Aristote. Tradition et innovation*, Berlin/N. York 2008
- Karamanolis, G., “Porphyry, the first Platonist Commentator of Aristotle”, in: P. Adamson, H. Baltussen, M. Stone (ed.), *Science and Exegesis in Greek, Arabic and Latin*, London 2004 (Supplement to the Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies, vol. 83.1-2), vol. 1, 79-113
- Karamanolis, G., “Why did Porphyry write Aristotelian Commentaries?”, in: B. Strobel (ed.), *Die Kunst der philosophischen Exegese bei den spätantiken Platon- und Aristoteles-Kommentatoren*, Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 2018, 9-44
- Wildberg, C., *John Philoponus ‘Criticism of Aristotle’s Theory of Aether*, Berlin/N. York 1988

Damascius on the Sudden ($\tauὸ\; ἐξαίφνιος$) and the Now ($\tauὸ\; νῦν$)

Spyridon Rangos

“Intellect and Soul in Athenian Neoplatonism”

Alexandria, 19 September 2022


[1.] S. Rangos, “Plato on the Nature of the Sudden Moment, and the Asymmetry of the Second Part of the *Parmenides*”, *Dialogue* 53 (2014), 538-574.

[2.] The introduction of the third deduction in Plato’s *Parmenides* (155e)

- Ἐτι δὴ τὸ τρίτον λέγωμεν. τὸ ἐν εἰ ἔστιν οἷον διεληλύθαμεν, ἃρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη αὐτό, ἐν τε ὅν καὶ πολλὰ καὶ μήτε ἐν μήτε πολλὰ καὶ μετέχον χρόνου, ὅτι μὲν ἔστιν ἐν, οὐσίας μετέχειν ποτέ, ὅτι δ' οὐκ ἔστι, μὴ μετέχειν αὖ ποτε οὐσίας;

Let’s speak of it yet a third time. If the one is as we have described it – being both one and many and neither one nor many, and partaking of time – must it not, because it is one, sometimes partake of being, and in turn because it is not, sometimes not partake of being? (tr. M.L. Gill & P. Ryan)

[3.] The role of the third deduction in the overall structure of the second part of Plato’s *Parmenides*, according to Damascius (diagrams by J. Combès, Dam. *In Parm. I: xix, Princ. I: lxxi*)



[4.] The *exaiphnes* in Plato's *Parmenides* (156d-e)

—Ἄρ' οὖν ἔστι τὸ ἄτοπον τοῦτο, ἐν ᾧ τότ' ἀν εἴη, ὅτε μεταβάλλει; —Τὸ ποῖον δή;
Τὸ ἔξαιφνης. τὸ γάρ ἔξαιφνης τοιόνδε τι ἔσικε σημαίνειν, ως ἔξ ἐκείνου μεταβάλλον
εἰς ἑκάτερον. οὐ γάρ ἔκ γε τοῦ ἔσταναι ἔστωτος ἔτι μεταβάλλει, οὐδ' ἐκ τῆς κινήσεως
κινούμενης ἔτι μεταβάλλει· ἀλλὰ ἡ ἔξαιφνης αὕτη φύσις ἄτοπός τις ἐγκάθηται μεταξὺ¹
τῆς κινήσεως τε καὶ στάσεως, ἐν χρόνῳ οὐδὲν οὔσᾳ, καὶ εἰς ταύτην δὴ καὶ ἐκ ταύτης
τὸ τε κινούμενον μεταβάλλει ἐπὶ τὸ ἔσταναι καὶ τὸ ἔστος ἐπὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι.
— Κινδυνεύει.

— “Is there, then, *this queer thing* in which it might be, just when it changes?” — “What queer thing?” — “The instant. The instant seems to signify something such that changing occurs from it to each of the two states. For a thing doesn't change from rest while rest continues, or from motion while motion continues. Rather, *this queer creature*, the instant, lurks between motion and rest — *being in no time at all* — and to it and from it the moving thing changes to resting and the resting thing changes to moving.” — “It looks that way.” (tr. M.L. Gill & P. Ryan)

[5.] The eighth aporia and its solution

Dam. *In Parm. IV.2.1-9 Westerink-Combès*

- Ὅγδοον, τίς ἡ ἔξαιφνης αὕτη φύσις, καὶ πότερον ἐν μέσῳ δύο κινήσεών ἔστιν
ἡ δύο στάσεων, ἡ στάσεως καὶ κινήσεως, ὃ συνάγει ὁ Παρμενίδης· ἔτι δὲ εἰ
ἄχρονος τῷ ὄντι, καὶ εἰ ταῖς ἐνεργείαις ὄρᾶται μεταβαλλομένη, ἡ οὐσία ἔστιν
τῆς ψυχῆς· καὶ ἔτι πῶς τὸ ἔξαιφνης πανταχοῦ πάρεστιν τῇ ψυχῇ· καὶ γάρ ἐν τῇ
ἐσχάτῃ γενέσει οὔσα κινεῖται καὶ ἔστηκεν, ὥστε καὶ [ἐν] τὸ ἔξαιφνης ἐν μέσῳ
φανεῖται· καὶ πῶς ἄχρονος ἔσται αὐτῆς ἐνέργεια ἐν τῇ γενέσει.

Eighth aporia: what is this nature of the sudden? Is it between two movement or two rests or, as Parmenides concludes, between a movement and a rest? Moreover, we must inquire whether the essence of the soul is truly timeless, even if it obviously changes in its activities. Furthermore, how is the sudden everywhere present in the soul? For even when the soul is in ultimate becoming it moves and stays put, so that the sudden, too, will be found between movement and rest. And how will the soul's activity be timeless in the domain of becoming?

Dam. *In Parm. IV.29.1-30.17, 31.12-16 Westerink-Combès*

(i) Questions and answers from Proclus' perspective

- Τί οὖν τοῦτό ἔστι τὸ ἔξαιφνης, καὶ τί τὸ ἄχρονον, ὅπερ ὅγδοον ἦν; Ἄρα τὸ
αἰώνιον τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τὸ ὄν αὐτό, ὡς φησιν; Καὶ πῶς μέσον τῶν κινήσεων καὶ
τῶν στάσεων ἀναφαίνεται; “Ἡ ως πρὸ ἀμφοῦν· ἀπ' αὐτοῦ γοῦν, φησίν, καὶ περὶ²
αὐτὸν ἡ γένεσις. Καὶ πῶς πανταχοῦ κατ' αὐτὸν ἐνεργεῖ ἡ ψυχή; Οὔτω γάρ ἔσται
καὶ ἐν τῷ αἰώνιῳ τῆς ζωῆς εἶδει, καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐσχάτης εἰ ἀναστρέφοι κακίας.
Πῶς δὲ τὸ ἔξαιφνης ὄρᾶται καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐνεργείαις, εἰ μόνη ἔστιν ἡ οὐσία κατ'
αὐτὸν αἰώνιος; Ἡ πρὸς μὲν τοῦτο εἴποι τις ἀν διειδωλον τοῦτο ἐκείνου, εἰς
τὰς [ιστάς] ἐνεργείας πρόεισιν ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰώνιου· καὶ γάρ ἐν τοῖς σώμασι τὸ

νῦν εἰδωλον αἰώνιος. Πρὸς δὲ τὸ πρότερον, ὅτι πανταχοῦ ἡ αὐτὴ οὐσία πάρεστιν, αἰώνιος οὖσα καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐσχάτοις.

What is this sudden, and what the timeless element (which was the subject of the eight aporia)? Is it the eternal element of the soul and its being itself, as Proclus says? And how does it manifest itself between the movements and the rests? His answer: because it is prior to both; well, becoming, he says, proceeds from and around it. And how does the soul everywhere act in accordance with it? For in this way the soul will be present also in the eternal Form of life, even if it reverses from the ultimate degree of baseness. And how is the sudden also seen in the activities, if only the essence is, according to him [Proclus], eternal? To the latter one might say that the sudden proceeds to the activities from the eternal element as an image of that; for in bodies, too, *the now is an image of eternity*. To the former one might say that the same essence is present everywhere, being eternal even in the lowest regions.

(ii) Objections to Proclus' view

- οὗτοι μὲν ἂν τις πιθανολογοῖτο, εἰ περὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας ὄρφῳ τὴν γένεσιν· εἰ δὲ περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ ταύτην, πῶς τὸ ἔξαιφνης αὐτῷ προβήσεται καὶ τὸ ἄχρονον; Ἄρα οἷον κέντρον εἴη ἂν τῆς γενέσεως τοῦτο περὶ αὐτὸ κυκλουμένης; καὶ πῶς ἔσται ποτὲ ἐν τῇ ἐσχάτῃ ζωῇ κατὰ τὸ κέντρον ἀπογυμνωθεῖσα τῆς γενέσεως; Πῶς δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ μέσῳ τῶν γιγνομένων κινήσεων καὶ στάσεων τὸ ἔξαιφνης συνίσταται; τούτων γὰρ ὑπερανέχει τὸ ἄχρονον, κέντρον γε ὅν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν τῇ περιφερείᾳ τεταγμένον. Πῶς δὲ οὐ διασπάσομεν τὴν ψυχὴν εἰς ὅν καὶ γιγνόμενον, ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο μόριον; Τί δὲ ἔσται τὸ αὐτοκίνητον; εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ γιγνόμενον, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ ὅν αὐτῆς αὐτοκίνητον, ἀλλ' ἀκίνητον· εἰ δὲ τὸ ὅν, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ γιγνόμενον, ἀλλ' ἑτεροκίνητον. Καὶ τί ἂν εἴη τὸ ἔξαιφνης ἄλλο παρὰ τὸ αἰώνιον <ἢ> ἔγχρονον καὶ ὅν ἢ γιγνόμενον;

One might plausibly argue along these lines if one sees becoming only in the activities of the soul; but if one sees becoming also in its essence, how will, then, the sudden and the timeless turn out to be? Would this be like a centre of becoming around which becoming revolves? And how will, then, the soul be in the lowest kind of life if it is stripped, in its centre, of becoming? And how does the sudden get involved in the middle of movements and rests subjected to becoming? For the timeless, being a centre not placed in the periphery, rises above them. And how will we not break the soul into a part that is and a part that becomes, the one being different from the other? And which will the self-moving element be? If it is the part that becomes, the part of the soul that is will not be self-moving but unmoved; and if it is the part that is, the part of the soul that becomes will not be self-moving but moved-by-another. And what could the sudden be other than the eternal or the temporal element, i.e., the part that is or the part that becomes?

(iii) Damascius' view

- Μήποτε οὖν ἀσφαλέστατον μῆξαι τῷ ἐτέρῳ ἐκάτερον· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καθαρὸν καὶ ἄκρατον· ἀμέλει καὶ τὸ μεριστὸν αὐτῆς ἀμέριστόν ἔστιν, καὶ τὸ ἀμέριστον μεριστόν. Καὶ τὸ ὅν ἄρα γιγνόμενον, καὶ τὸ γιγνόμενον αὖ πάλιν ὅν· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ποτὲ μὲν οὐσίαν αὐτὴν καλεῖ, ποτὲ δὲ γένεσιν ὁ Πλάτων.

- Οὕτως ἄρα οὔτε ἄχρονον πάντη, οὔτε ἔγχρονον, ἀλλ' ὁμοῦ καὶ τὸ ἄχρονον ἔγχρονον, καὶ τὸ ἔγχρονον ἄχρονον.
- Άλλ' ἐπειδὴ μετέχει ἀλλήλων ἐν τῇ συγκράσει, τό τε ἔγχρονον αἰώνιζεται πως καὶ οὐσίωται τὸ γενητόν· καὶ αὖτε τὸ αἰώνιον χρονίζεται, καὶ τὸ ὃν τῇ γενέσει συμπλέκεται· καὶ ἔστι μὲν ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ συναμφότερον.

Perhaps *the safest course is to blend the one with the other*; for nothing in the soul is pure and unmixed; certainly, the divisible element of it is also indivisible and the indivisible also divisible. Hence, the part that is also becomes and, conversely, the part that becomes also is; and for this reason Plato calls the soul now ‘essence’ and then ‘becoming’. Thus, it follows that *the soul is something neither timeless nor temporal absolutely, but its timeless element is at once temporal and its temporal element timeless*. [...] But since the two elements [sc. the eternal and the temporal] participate in one another in the mixture, the temporal turns, in a sense, eternal and the generated becomes essence, while, on the other hand, the eternal turns temporal and being is interwoven with becoming; *and the soul is both together*.

[6.] Damascius’ original idea: the human soul undergoes a substantial change

Dam. *In Parm.* IV.13.1-2 Westerink-Combès

- Μήποτε οὖν τολμητέον ὁ πάλαι ὠδίνομεν νῦν ἐξειπεῖν· μήποτε γάρ ἔστι τις μεταβολὴ περὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν οὐσίαν.

Perphahs we must now dare to say what we have been labouring painfully for long: perhaps *there is some change with respect to our essence*.

[7.] The eleventh aporia and its solutions

Dam. *In Parm.* IV.2.16-19 Westerink-Combès

- Ἐνδέκατον, τίνι διαφέρει τοῦτο τὸ ἐξαίφνις τοῦ ἐν τῇ δευτέρᾳ ὑποθέσει νῦν, ὃ ἐντυγχάνουσα ἡ γένεσις παύεται γιγνομένῃ· καὶ διὰ τί τὸ νῦν ἐκεῖνο οὐκ ἐκάλει ἐξαίφνις, ἢ τοῦτο οὐ κέκληκεν νῦν.

Eleventh aporia: in what does this sudden differ from the now of the second deduction, upon meeting which becoming ceases to become? And why didn’t he [sc. Parmenides] call that now ‘sudden’, or hasn’t he called this sudden ‘now’?

Dam. *In Parm.* IV.33.10-20 Westerink-Combès

- Άλλὰ μὴν καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἐνδέκατον τοῦτο μὲν τὸ ἐξαίφνις ἀμερές ἔστι τῇ ιδιότητι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἄχρονον, ἐκεῖνο δὲ χρόνου μέτρον ἦν καὶ διάστημα ὡς ἐδείκνυμεν, καὶ ἐκεῖνο μὲν ἐκάλει νῦν, ἵνα τὸν ἐνεστῶτα δηλώσῃ χρόνον, τοῦτο δὲ ἐξαίφνις ὠνόμασεν ὡς ἐκ τῶν ἀφανῶν καὶ ἐξηρημένων αἰτίων ἦκον εἰς τὴν ψυχήν.
- Εἰ δέ ἄρα καὶ ἐκεῖ τὸ νῦν ἀμερῶς ἀκούοιμεν, εἴη ἀν καὶ αὐτὸ σωματικὸν ἐξαίφνις, τοῦτο δὲ ψυχικόν: καὶ διὰ τοῦτο, τοῦτο μὲν ἐξαίφνις, ὅτι νοητὸν τρόπον τινὰ καὶ αἰώνιον, ἐκεῖνο δὲ νῦν, ὡς χρόνου πέρας τοῦ μετροῦντος τὴν σωματοειδῆ γένεσιν.

- (i) Now, about the eleventh aporia we say that this sudden is, in its proper nature, partless and for this reason timeless, whereas that thing was a measure and interval of time, as we have demonstrated. And he [sc. Parmenides] called that thing ‘now’ in order to signify the present/standing time, while he named this thing ‘sudden’ because it comes to the soul from the unseen and transcendent causes [i.e., *exaiphnes < ex aphanon*].
- (ii) If, on the other hand, we interpret the now there [sc. in the second deduction] in a partless sense, *it would also be a sudden, a corporeal sudden, while this would be a psychic sudden*; and for this reason this thing is sudden, since it is in a way intelligible and eternal, whereas that thing is now, since it is a limit of the time that measures body-like becoming.

[8.] Time progresses by “leaps” and is composed of measures

Dam. *In Parm.* III.183.3-10 Westerink-Combès

- Άλλ' ὥσπερ ή κίνησις προκόπτει διαστηματικῶς, ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ σημεῖον, ἀλλ' οἶον κατὰ ἄλματα, ὡς ἔλεγε καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης, οὕτως ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸν χρόνον κατὰ μέτρα ὅλα προβαίνειν ἢ μετρητικὰ τῶν ἀλμάτων γίγνεται τῆς κινήσεως. Οὕτως ἄρα ἐκ μέτρων ὁ χρόνος: ἀλλὰ μέτρων πέρασι διειλημμένων καὶ διωρισμένων. Διὸ καὶ ὁ Παρμενίδης τὸν χρόνον παρήγαγεν μετὰ τὸ συνεχὲς πηλίκον καὶ τὸ διωρισμένον πλῆθος, ὅτι καὶ αὐτὸς ὡς ἐκ μέτρων τε καὶ μερῶν, συνεχῆς τέ ἐστι καὶ διωρισμένος.

But as movement progresses by intervals and not by points but by jumps, as it were, as Aristotle also said, so it is necessary for time to progress in whole measures which become appropriate to measure the jumps of movement. In this way, therefore, time consists of measures; but of measures contained and determined by limits. For this reason, too, Parmenides introduced time after continuous magnitude and discrete multitude; for time, *qua* consisting of measures and parts, is both continuous and discrete.

[9.] On the “now” of the second deduction

Dam. *In Parm.* III.184.12-20 Westerink-Combès

- “Ἡ καὶ τὸ διάστημα ἔκαστον τοῦ χρόνου “νῦν” καλεῖται, ὡς ἐνεστὼς χρόνος, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς τὸ τοῦ χρόνου πέρας: ἐστι γάρ τι διάστημα χρόνου ὃ ἐνέστηκεν ὅλον ὁμοῦ, οὐ παρὰ τὰ δύο νῦν. Καὶ ὅτι τοῦτο τὸ διάστημα κέκληκεν “νῦν” ὁ Παρμενίδης ἐδήλωσεν “χρόνον” αὐτὸν ὀνομάσας: λέγει γάρ: “ἄρα οὐχ ὅταν κατὰ τὸν νῦν χρόνον ἦ γιγνόμενον τὸν μεταξὺ τοῦ ἦν τε καὶ ἔσται;” Καὶ ὅτι πλάτος ἔχει τοῦτο τὸ νῦν, καὶ ὅλον τί ἔστι καὶ μέρη ἔχει, σαφέστατα παρέστησεν ἐπαγγαγών”

Each interval of time is also called “now” in the sense of present/standing time but not in the sense of time’s limit; for there is some interval of time which stands together as a whole and not beside the two limits. And that it is this *interval* that Parmenides has called “now” he made it clear by naming it “time”; for he says “when in becoming it gets to the now time, between ‘was’ and ‘will be?’” And that this now has width and is a certain whole and has parts, he most clearly showed by adding: ...

[10.] The indivisible “nows” are determined by demiurgic cuts

Dam. *In Parm.* III.192.1-9 Westerink-Combès

- Ταῦτα δ' οὖν τὰ ἄλματα, μέτρα ὄντα χρονικὰ δημιουργικαῖς τομαῖς διωρισμένα καὶ ταύτη γε ἀμέριστα, καὶ ὅλον ὄμοῦ ἔκαστον τὴν ἐπίσχεσιν τοῦ πορευομένου χρόνου φατέον ἐνδείκνυσθαι, καὶ “νῦν” καλεῖσθαι, οὐχ ὡς πέρας χρόνου, ἀλλ' ὡς χρόνον ἀμέριστον δημιουργικῶς, εἰ καὶ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ ἐπινοίᾳ διαιρετόν, καὶ τοῦτο ἐπ' ἄπειρον. Ἐπεὶ καὶ πᾶν σῶμα ἐπ' ἄπειρον διαιρετόν, ἀλλ' εἰσὶν ἀμέριστοι δημιουργικαὶ τομαὶ τῶν σωμάτων.

Since these jumps are temporal measures determined by demiurgic cuts and are in this very sense indivisible, we must also say that each one of them as a whole at once indicates the arrest of progressing time and is called “now” *not as a limit of time but as time which is indivisible in its demiurgic nature, although it is divisible in our own thoughts, and this ad infinitum*. For every body also is infinitely divisible; however, there are indivisible demiurgic sections of bodies.

[11.] The *exaiphnes* as the most well-founded part of the soul

Dam. *In Parm.* IV.39.2-4 Westerink-Combès

- τὸ μάλιστα ἰδρυμένον τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ σταθερὸν καὶ συνεκτικὸν τοῦτο [sc. τὸ ἔξαίφνης] ἐστιν.

The most well-founded and stable and cohesive part of the soul is this [sc. the sudden].

[12.] The analogy “becoming / being = time / now [=? sudden / eternity]”

Dam. *In Parm.* III.189.18-20 Westerink-Combès

- Γένεσις οὐδεμίᾳ αὐτοκρατής ἐστιν εἰ μὴ ἔχοι τι ὄν, τὸ διακρατοῦν αὐτῆς τὸν σκορπισμόν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ τοῦ χρόνου συνεχὲς τὸ νῦν, ὃ ἐστιν ἴχνος αἰώνιον.

No becoming is self-sustained unless it possesses some being which holds together its dispersive tendency, much as the now, which is a trace of eternity, is the continuity of time.

Temps et Éternité de Porphyre à Proclus / Time and Eternity from Porphyry to Proclus

Irini-Fotini Viltanioti
Université de Crète & IMS-FORTH

I. Introduction

II. De Proclus à Plotin

T1-T5

III. L'Éternité

T6-T9

IV. Le Temps

T6-T7

V. En guise de conclusion : des triades chaldaïques à Proclus

T10-T11

TEXTES

T1 Procl. in *Ti. III 15, 14-22 Diehl*

εοικεν τὴν μονάδα τοῦ ὄντος πρὸ αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ ἐν ὄν καὶ
μένειν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ ἐνί, ὡς ὥστο περὶ τούτου τοῦ ἐνὸς καὶ (15)
ό ήμετερος καθηγεμών, ἵνα καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν ᾧ πρὸ τῆς
δυάδος, ἀτε τοῦ ἐνὸς μὴ ἀφιστάμενος, καὶ ή μὲν ἐν αὐτῷ
προεμφαίνουσα τὸ πλήθος δυάς ἐνίζηται τῷ ἐνὶ ὄντι, ἐνῷ
μένει ὁ αἰών, τὸ δὲ πλήθος τῶν νοητῶν αὐτῷ τῷ αἰώνι
περιέχοντι αὐτῶν καὶ συνέχοντι πάσας ἐξηρημένως καὶ ἐν- (20)
αίως τὰς ἀκρότητας.

Il semble bien qu'il existe avant elle [l'Éternité] la monade de l'Être et l'Être Un et qu'elle demeure dans cet Un-ci, comme le pensait notre maître [Syrianus] à propos de l'Un, pour que l'Éternité, avant que d'être dualité, soit chose une, en tant que ne s'éloignant pas de l'unité. La dualité qui, dans l'Éternité, montre les caractères du multiple est unifiée par l'Être Un dans lequel l'Éternité demeure, et la multiplicité des Intelligibles est à son tour unifiée par l'Éternité elle-même, qui embrasse et lie ensemble transcendamment et unitivement tous les sommets des Intelligibles.

(trad. A.-J. Festugière, légèrement modifiée)

T2 Procl. in *Ti. III 27, 19-24 Diehl*

εὶ δὲ καὶ νοῦς μὲν αἰῶνος δεύτερος, ψυχὴ δὲ
νοῦ μίμημα, πῶς οὐχὶ ὁ χρόνος αἰῶνος ὡν εἰκὼν κρείττον
τι καὶ αὐτῆς <ἀν> εἴη τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ οὐσιωδέστερον; ὡς (20)
γὰρ νοῦς πρὸς ψυχήν, οὕτως αἰών ἔσται πρὸς χρόνον, καὶ
ἐναλλάξ· ὥστε χρόνος πρὸς ψυχής, ὡς πρὸς νοῦ αἰών, καὶ
μετέχοιτο μὲν <ἀν> ύπ’ αὐτῆς, οὐ μετέχοι δ’ ἀν αὐτῆς, ὡς
οὐδὲ τοῦ νοῦ ὁ αἰών, ἀλλ’ ἔμπαλιν.

Et si, d'autre part, l'Intellect est inférieur à l'Éternité, l'Âme une imitation de l'Intellect, comment le Temps, étant une copie de l'Éternité, ne serait-il pas aussi quelque chose de supérieur à l'Âme même et de plus proche de l'essence ? Car ce qu'est l'Intellect eu égard à l'Âme, l'Éternité le sera au Temps, et inversement : en sorte que le Temps passe avant l'Âme, comme l'Éternité avant l'Intellect, et il doit être participé par l'Âme, mais non participer à l'Âme, comme l'Éternité non plus ne participe pas à l'Intellect, mais inversement.

(trad. A.-J. Festugière)

T3 Simpl. in *Phys. 794, 27 – 795, 7 Diels = Jamb. Fr. 68 Dillon*

λέγει τοίνυν περὶ τούτων
καὶ ἄλλην ἀπόδειξιν τοιαύτην. “τὸ μὲν γὰρ δὴ παράδειγμα πάντα αἰῶνά

Il [Jamblique] donne encore sur ce point cette autre démonstration : « Le modèle est

ἐστιν, ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς διὰ τέλους τὸν ἄπαντα χρόνον γέγονεν, ὥστε καὶ ὡν καὶ ἐσόμενος. ὁ τοίνυν ἐστὶν ὡς παράδειγμα ἐν τῷ νοητῷ, τοῦτο ὡς εἰκὼν (30) ἐστιν ἐν τῷ γενητῷ. καὶ ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἐκεῖ κατ' αἰῶνα, τοῦτο ἐνταῦθα κατὰ χρόνον. καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ νοητῷ κατὰ τὸ εἶναι νῦν ἡδη παρόν, τοῦτο ἐν τοῖς τῇδε κατὰ συνέχειαν διὰ τέλους παραγίνεται. καὶ τὸ ὃν ὡσαύτως τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ γεγονός τε καὶ ὃν καὶ ἐσόμενον κατὰ τοὺς τῇδε τόπους ἐκφαίνεται. καὶ τὸ ἀδιάστατον ἐκεῖ διεστηκός ἐνταῦθα καθορᾶται. καὶ νῦν δὴ τοῦ (35) χρόνου γέγονε κατάδηλος ἡ μέση διπλῆ φύσις, μέση μὲν αἰῶνός τε καὶ οὐρανοῦ, διπλή δὲ καθόσον συνυφίσταται μὲν πρὸς τὸν κόσμον, συντάττεται (795) δὲ πρὸς τὸν αἰῶνα, καὶ τοῦ μὲν ἡγεῖται, τῷ δὲ ἀφομοιοῦται.” τοιαύτη μέν τις ἐστιν ἡ τῶν προκειμένων λέξεων τοῦ Τιμαίου σαφήνεια κατὰ τὸν θεῖον Ιάμβλιχον.

Αλλὰ καὶ Πρόκλος ὁ ἐκ τῆς Λυκίας φιλόσοφος ὁ τῶν ἡμετέρων διδασκάλων καθηγεμών περὶ μὲν τοῦ χωριστοῦ χρόνου τὰ αὐτά πως τῷ Ιαμβίχῳ φιλοσοφεῖ καὶ οὐ μόνον νοῦν, ἀλλὰ καὶ θεὸν αὐτὸν ἀποδεικνύναι πειρᾶται, ὡς καὶ εἰς αὐτοψίαν ὑπὸ τῶν θεουργῶν κληθῆναι.

Cf. Procl. *In Ti.* IV 3, 51, 21-25 : πῶς οὖν, εἴπερ ἡ τοῦ χρόνου φύσις, ὡς φησι καὶ ὁ θεῖος Ιάμβλιχος καὶ γάρ πείθομαι, μέση ἐστὶν αἰῶνος καὶ οὐρανοῦ καὶ τοῦ μὲν ἡγεῖται, τῷ δὲ ἀφομοιοῦται, χρόνος οὐρανοῦ χάριν ὑπέστη;

de toute éternité, tandis que l'autre [l'univers sensible] vient constamment de devenir durant le temps tout entier, de sorte qu'il est et sera. Ce qui donc se trouve comme modèle dans l'intelligible, se trouve comme image dans le devenir. Et ce qui là existe selon l'éternité, ici existe selon le temps. Et ce qui dans l'intelligible est maintenant déjà actuel selon l'être, dans les choses d'ici survient constamment selon la continuité. Et l'étant immuable se manifeste dans les lieux d'ici comme ce qui est né dans le temps, ce qui est et ce qui sera. Et l'inétabli là-bas se montre ici étendu. À présent apparaît clairement la double nature intermédiaire du temps : intermédiaire entre l'éternité et l'univers, double dans la mesure où elle existe avec le monde mais est coordonnée avec l'éternité, et où elle dirige celui-là et s'assimile à celle-ci ». Telle est donc la clarification des passages cités du *Timée* selon le divin Jamblique.

Cependant, Proclus aussi, le philosophe de Lycie, chef de file de nos enseignants, pense à peu près les mêmes choses que Jamblique sur le temps séparé, et tente de montrer qu'il est non seulement Intellect mais aussi dieu, au point d'être appelé à apparaître par les théurgies.

(trad. A. Stevens, légèrement modifiée)

T4 Procl. *In Ti.* III 21, 6-13 Diehl

Αλλ' οὐδὲ εἴ τινες ἔτι τούτων σεμνότεροι καὶ τῆς τῶν πραγμάτων ἐγγυτέρω χωροῦντες ἴδιότητος ἐκ τῆς ὅλης ψυχῆς γεννᾶσθαι φασι τὸν χρόνον μεταβατικῶς ἐνεργούσης [[ἢ]] αὐτῆς μὲν ἀθρόως καὶ ἀμεταστάτως, μετρούσης δὲ τῷ χρόνῳ τάς τε οὐρανίας (10) περιφορὰς καὶ τὰς περιόδους τῶν ἄλλων ψυχῶν, οὐδὲ τούτοις τό γε ἡμέτερον ἐπιτρέψει, καίπερ οὐ πόρρω τῆς ἀληθείας κατηντηκόσι.

Mais, non plus, si d'autres savants plus sérieux que ceux-ci et qui s'approchent davantage du caractère propre de la chose prétendent que le Temps est un produit issu de l'Âme universelle dans son activité métabatique, c'est à savoir de l'Âme qui, tout en agissant elle-même par des intuitions unifiées et sans passage, n'en mesure pas moins, par le Temps, et les révolutions célestes et les périodes des autres âmes, nous ne leur ferons pas, quant à nous du moins, cette concession, bien que finalement ils ne soient allés assez de l'avant à la rencontre de la vérité.

(trad. A.-J. Festugière)

T5 Procl. *In Ti.* III 33, 31-33 Diehl = Porphy. *In Ti.* fr. 78, p. 66, 14-67, 2 Sodano

εἰ μὲν γάρ, ὡς ὕετο Πορφύριος καὶ τινες ἄλλοι Πλατωνικοί, μόνα μετεῖχε τῶν ὄντων ὄντων τὰ αἰσθητά, ἐν αὐτοῖς μόνοις ἀν ἐζητοῦμεν τὰς εἰκόνας.

Si, en effet, comme le pensaient Porphyre et certains autres Platoniciens, seuls les sensibles participaient aux Êtres véritablement êtres, c'est parmi les sensibles seulement que nous chercherions les images.

(trad. A.-J. Festugière)

T6 Porph. Sent. 44, 17-68 Lamberz

Οὐδὲ ἀφιστάμενος οὖν τοῦδε ἐπὶ τόδε μεταβαίνει· ἀφ' οὐ γὰρ ἀφίσταται μὴ νοῶν ἐκεῖνο, ἀνόητος κατ' ἐκεῖνο γίνεται. εἰ δὲ μὴ τόδε μετὰ τόδε ἐπ' αὐτοῦ γίνεται, ἄμα πάντα νοεῖ· ἐπεὶ οὖν πάντα ἄμα καὶ οὐ τὸ μὲν νῦν, τὸ δὲ (20) αὐθις, πάντα ἄμα νῦν καὶ ἀεί. εἰ οὖν ἐπ' αὐτοῦ τὸ νῦν, ἀνήρηται δὲ ἐπ' αὐτοῦ τὸ παρεληλυθός καὶ τὸ μέλλον, ἐν ἀδιαστάτῳ τῷ νῦν ἀχρόνῳ παραστήματι, ὥστε τὸ ὄμοι κατά τε τὸ πλῆθος κατά τε τὸ χρονικὸν διάστημα ἐπ' αὐτοῦ· διὸ καθ' ἐν πάντα ἐν ἑνὶ καὶ ἀδιαστάτῳ καὶ ἀχρόνῳ. (25) εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐδὲ τὸ ποθέν ποι ἐν τῷ νῷ οὐδὲ κίνησις ἄρα, ἀλλὰ ἐνέργεια καθ' ἐν ἑνὶ αὔξησι τε ἀφηγημένη καὶ μεταβολῆς καὶ διεξόδου πάσης. εἰ δὲ τὸ πλῆθος καθ' ἐν καὶ ἄμα ἡ ἐνέργεια καὶ ἀχρονος, ἀνάγκη παρυποστῆναι τῇ τοιαύτῃ οὐσίᾳ τὸ ἀεὶ ἐν ἑνὶ ὅν· τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν αἰών. (30) παρουπέστη ἄρα νῷ ὁ αἰών.

Τῷ δὲ μὴ καθ' ἐν ἑνὶ νοοῦντι, ἀλλὰ μεταβατικῶς καὶ ἐν κινήσει καὶ ἐν τῷ τὸ μὲν καταλείπειν, τὸ δὲ ἐπιλαμβάνειν καὶ μεριζειν καὶ διεξοδεύειν παρουπέστη χρόνος· τῇ γὰρ τοιαύτῃ κινήσει παρουφίσταται τὸ μέλλειν καὶ παρεληλυ- (35) θέναι. ψυχὴ δὲ μεταβαίνει ἀπ' ἄλλου εἰς ἄλλο ἐπαμείβουσα τὰ νοήματα, οὐκ ἐξισταμένων τῶν προτέρων οὐδέ ποθεν ἄλλοθεν ἐπεισιόντων τῶν δευτέρων, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ὥσπερ παρελήλυθε καίπερ μένοντα ἐν αὐτῇ, τὰ δ' ὥσπερ ἀλλαχόθεν ἐπεισιν, ἀφίκετο δ' οὐκ ἀλλαχόθεν, ἀλλὰ παρ' (40) αὐτῆς καὶ αὐτόθεν εἰς ἔαυτὴν κινουμένης καὶ τὸ ὅμμα φερούσης εἰς ἀ ἔχει κατὰ μέρος· πηγὴ γὰρ ἔοικεν οὐκ ἀπορρύτω, ἀλλὰ κύκλῳ εἰς ἔαυτὴν ἀναβλυζούσῃ ἀ ἔχει.

Τῇ μὲν οὖν ταύτης κινήσει παρουφίσταται χρόνος, τῇ δὲ (45) τοῦ μονῆ τῇ ἐν ἔαυτῷ ὁ αἰών, οὐ διηγημένος ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ὥσπερ <οὐδέ> ὁ χρόνος ἐκ ψυχῆς¹, ὅτι καὶ αἱ παρυποστάσεις ἦνανται ἐκεῖ. διαψεύδεται δὲ τὸ κινούμενον <πρὸς τὸ μένον> αἰώνα ἔαυτοῦ, τὸ ἀμετρον τῆς κινήσεως εἰς ἔννοιαν λαμβανόμενον αἰώνος, καὶ τὸ μένον πρὸς τὸ (50) κινούμενον χρόνον ἔαυτοῦ, ὥσπερ τὸ νῦν αὐτοῦ καὶ διεξοδεύον καὶ πολλαπλασιάζον κατὰ πάροδον τοῦ χρόνου. διὸ καὶ ἐν στάσει τὸν χρόνον τινὲς οὐχ ἥττον ἢ ἐν κινήσει θεωρεῖσθαι ὑπελάμβανον καὶ τὸν αἰώνα, ὡς ἔφαμεν, τὸν ἀπειρον χρόνον, ἔκατέρου τὰ πάθη τὰ ἔαυτοῦ τῷ ἐτέρῳ (55) προστιθέντος, τοῦ μὲν κινουμένου ἀεὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐστώτος κατὰ ταυτότητα τῷ ἀεὶ τῷ ἔαυτοῦ τὸν αἰώνα ἀπεικονίζοντος, καὶ τοῦ ἐστώτος ἐν ταυτότητι ἐνεργείας τὸν χρόνον τῇ ἔαυτοῦ μονῇ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐνεργείας προσάπτοντος.

Λοιπὸν δὲ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ὁ διηγημένος χρόνος ἄλλος (60) ἄλλου, οἷον ἄλλος ἡλίου, ἄλλος σελήνης, ἄλλος ἑωσφόρου, καὶ ἐφ' ἐκάστου ἄλλος. διὸ καὶ ἄλλου ἐνιαυτὸς ἄλλος· καὶ

L'Intellect inétendu dans le temps et l'espace.
Son éternité

Il n'est donc pas vrai non plus que, quittant cela, il [l'Intellect] passe à ceci ; car, n'intelligeant pas cela qu'il quitte, il devient inintelligent touchant cela. Mais si pour lui ceci ne vient pas après cela, c'est qu'il intellige toutes choses en même temps, et non pas l'une maintenant et l'autre ensuite, c'est toutes choses en même temps maintenant et toujours. Si donc pour lui il y a le « maintenant », et qu'aient disparu pour lui le passé et l'avenir, le voici dans une condition inétendue du fait de ce « maintenant » intemporel, en sorte que c'est le mot « ensemble », à la fois sous de la pluralité et sous l'angle de l'étendue temporelle, qui s'applique à lui ; aussi intellige-t-il toutes choses sous le mode de l'unité dans une unité à la fois inétendue et intemporelle. Mais si c'est cela, il n'y a pas dans l'Intellect le passage d'un point de vue à un autre, ni par conséquent mouvement, mais une activité sur le mode de l'unité dans l'unité, soustraite à toute croissance, tout changement, tout parcours. Si d'autre part la pluralité est sur le mode de l'unité et qu'en même temps l'activité le soit aussi et qu'elle le soit en outre intemporelle, il est nécessaire que subsiste en dépendance de l'essence de cette nature ce qui est toujours dans l'unité ; or cela, c'est l'éternité ; l'éternité subsiste donc en dépendance de l'Intellect.

Le mouvement de l'âme
dans le temps

Quant à ce qui intellige, non sur le mode de l'unité dans l'unité, mais par déplacement, dans le mouvement, en abandonnant cela et en saisissant ceci, en y distinguant des parties, en le parcourant, ce qui subsiste en dépendance de cette réalité est le temps ; car c'est en dépendance du mouvement de cette nature que subsistent « être à venir » et « être passé ». C'est l'âme qui passe d'une chose à l'autre, échangeant pour d'autres ses pensées, non que les premiers s'écartent ni que les seconds s'introduisent de quelque autre côté, mais les uns semblent avoir passé bien qu'ils démeurent en elle, les autres leur succèdent comme s'ils venaient d'ailleurs, alors qu'ils sont arrivés non pas d'ailleurs, mais de l'âme quand elle se meut de soi-même vers soi-même et porte son œil sur ce qu'elle possède tour à tour ; car elle ressemble à une source qui ne se déverse pas, mais fait refluer circulairement vers soi-même ce qu'elle possède.

L'évidence
et la manipulation
des concepts

Ainsi donc, c'est en dépendance du mouvement de l'âme que subsiste le temps, en dépendance de la

¹ <οὐδέ> add. Lamberz duce Lévéque.

ο τούτους περιέχων ἐνιαυτὸς κεφαλαιούμενος εἰς τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς κίνησιν· ἡς κατὰ μίμησιν κινουμένων τούτων, ἀλλοίας δὲ τῆς ἐκείνης κινήσεως οὔσης καὶ ἀλλοίας τῆς τούτων, ἀλλοῖος καὶ ὁ χρόνος ἐκείνης τοῦ τούτων. διαστηματικὸς μὲν οὗτος καὶ ταῖς κατὰ τόπον κινήσεσι καὶ μεταβάσεσι **

permanence en soi-même de l'Intellect que subsiste l'éternité, laquelle n'est pas divisée par lui comme le temps l'est certainement par l'âme, puisque même les Parhypostases sont unies là-haut. Mais ce qui est en mouvement <face à ce qui est en repos> usurpe une éternité qui lui appartient, - l'absence de mesure propre à ce mouvement étant prise pour former le concept d'éternité, - et ce qui est en repos, face à ce qui est en mouvement, usurpe un temps qui lui appartient, comme s'il s'agissait de parcourir et de multiplier son « maintenant » selon le cheminement du temps. Aussi certains supposent-ils à la fois que le temps se laisse considérer dans le repos non moins que dans le mouvement, et que l'éternité, comme nous l'avons dit, est le temps infini, chacun des deux attribuant à l'autre ses propres qualités, puisque ce qui est toujours en mouvement figurera l'éternité à partir de l'immobile en vertu de l'identité de celui-ci à ce « toujours » qui lui est propre, et que l'immobile dans l'identité de son activité rattacherait, à partir de cette activité, le temps à sa propre permanence.

**Le mouvement des astres
dans le temps et l'espace**

Dans les sensibles enfin, le temps divisé est différent selon ce dont il est le temps, ainsi autre le temps du soleil, autre celui de la lune, autre celui de l'étoile du matin, et autre pour chaque astre. Aussi y a-t-il de chacun une année différente ; et l'année qui enveloppe ces années se ramène au mouvement de l'âme ; bien que ces astres se meuvent à l'imitation de ce mouvement, comme le mouvement de celle-ci est d'une qualité autre par rapport à celui des astres, le temps de l'âme est aussi d'une qualité autre par rapport à leur temps. Ce dernier est de l'ordre de l'étendue [dimensionnel], et par leurs mouvements et déplacements locaux...**

(trad. L. Brisson et al. légèrement modifiée)

T7 Porph. Phil. Hist. Fr. 223 Smith = Cyril. Contra Iul. I 32cd, 552 B 1 – C 8

Φησὶ γὰρ ὁ Πορφύριος ἐν τετάρτῳ βιβλίῳ 'Φιλοσόφου ἱστορίας' – ως εἰπόντος Πλάτωνος περὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ οὗτως· «ἀπὸ δὲ τούτου τρόπου τινὰ ἀνθρώποις ἀνεπινόητον νοῦν γενέσθαι τε ὅλον καὶ καθ' ἔαυτὸν ὑφεστῶτα, ἐν φῷ δὴ τὰ ὄντας ὄντα καὶ ἡ πᾶσα οὐσία τῶν ὄντων· ὁ δὴ καὶ πρώτως καλὸν καὶ αὐτοκαλὸν παρ' ἔαυτοῦ τῆς καλλονῆς ἔχον τὸ εἶδος, προῆλθε δὲ προαιώνιος² ἀπ' αἰτίου τοῦ Θεοῦ ὡρμημένος, αὐτογέννητος ὥν καὶ αὐτοπάτωρ· οὐ γὰρ ἐκείνου κινουμένου πρὸς γένεσιν τὴν τούτου ἡ πρόδοδος γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ τούτου παρελθόντος 10 αὐτογόνως ἐκ Θεοῦ, παρελθόντος δὲ οὐκ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς

5

Dans le livre IV de son *Histoire philosophique*, Porphyre dit que Platon a parlé du Bien ainsi : « l'Intellect tout entier, dans lequel se trouvent certes les êtres qui sont réellement et toute l'essence des êtres, a été engendré de Celui-ci [du Bien] d'une manière totalement inconcevable à l'homme, et s'est autoconstitué. L'Intellect est le Beau primordial et le Beau en soi ayant la forme de la Beauté de lui-même. Par ailleurs, il a prééternellement procédé de sa cause, à savoir Dieu dont il a dérivé, s'engendant soi-même et étant son propre père. Car la procession a eu lieu non pas parce que Dieu s'est mis en mouvement pour engendrer l'Intellect mais car l'Intellect a

² Bourguière: προῆλθε <αἰώνιος> προαιωνίου.

{τίνος} χρονικῆς· οὕπω γὰρ χρόνος ἦν, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ χρόνου γενομένου πρόδη αὐτόν ἐστί τι ὁ χρόνος· ἄχρονος γὰρ ἀεὶ καὶ μόνος αἰώνιος ὁ νοῦς. ὥσπερ δὲ ὁ θεὸς ὁ πρώτος, εἰς καὶ μόνος ἀεὶ, κανὸν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ γένηται τὰ πάντα, τῷ μὴ τούτοις συναριθμεῖσθαι μηδὲ τὴν ἀξίαν αὐτῶν συγκατατάττεσθαι δύνασθαι τῇ ἐκείνου ὑπάρξει, οὕτω καὶ ὁ νοῦς αἰώνιος μόνος καὶ ἀχρόνως ὑποστάτης, καὶ τῶν ἐν χρόνῳ αὐτὸς χρόνος ἐστίν, ἐν ταῦτοτητι μένων τῆς ἔαυτοῦ αἰώνιας ὑποστάσεως.»

15

20

procédé de Dieu, en s'engendrant soi-même, sans pour autant procéder d'aucun commencement temporel. Car le temps n'existe pas encore. Et, une fois venu à l'être, le temps n'est rien par rapport à l'Intellect. Car l'Intellect est hors du temps et seul il est éternel. Comme le Premier Dieu, qui est un et seul toujours, bien que toutes choses naissent de Lui, parce qu'on ne peut ni le ranger au nombre de ces choses ni mettre la valeur de ces choses au même rang que son existence, de même l'Intellect, seul éternel et constitué hors du temps, est également temps des choses qui sont dans le temps, en demeurant dans l'immutabilité de son hypostase éternelle.»

T8 Porph. Princ. Fr 232 Smith = Procl. Theol. Plat. I 11 p. 51, 4-11 Saffrey-Westerink

Πορφύριος δὲ αὖ μετὰ τοῦτον ἐν τῇ Περὶ ἀρχῶν πραγματείᾳ τὸν νοῦν εἶναι μὲν αἰώνιον ἐν πολλοῖς καὶ καλοῖς ἀποδείκνυσι λόγοις, ἔχειν δὲ ὅμως ἐν ἔαυτῷ καὶ προαιώνιόν <τι· καὶ τὸ μὲν προαιώνιον> τοῦ νοῦ τῷ ἐνὶ συνάπτειν (ἐκεῖνο γὰρ ἦν ἐπέκεινα παντὸς αἰώνος) τὸ δὲ αἰώνιον δευτέραν ἔχειν, μᾶλλον δὲ τρίτην ἐν ἐκείνῳ τάξιν· δεῖ γάρ, οἵματι, τοῦ προαιώνιον καὶ τοῦ αἰώνιον τὸν αἰώνα μέσον ἴδρυσθαι.

Porphyre, à son tour, après Plotin, dans son traité Des principes, par nombre d'excellents raisonnements démontre que l'Intellect est éternel et que néanmoins il possède en lui-même quelque chose aussi de prééternel ; il démontre encore que ce qui dans l'Intellect est prééternel lie [l'Intellect] à l'Un (car l'Un est au-delà de toute éternité) et que l'éternel tient le deuxième ou plutôt le troisième rang dans l'Intellect ; car je pense qu'il faut placer l'Éternité entre ce qui est prééternel et ce qui est éternel.

(trad. H. D. Saffrey et L. G. Westerink, modifiée)

T9 Porph. Fr. 284, 10-14 Smith = Aug. CD X 23, 1-19 (I 436, 19 – 437, 5) ; Porph. Fr. 284a Smith = Aug. CD X 29, 1-3 (I 447, 25-28)

Dicit enim *deum patrem et deum filium*, quem Graece appellat *paternum intellectum vel paternam mentem*; de spiritu autem sancto aut nihil aut non aperte aliquid dicit; quamvis quem alium dicat *horum medium*, non intellego.

Il parle d'abord du *Dieu le Père* et du *Dieu le Fils*, qui à la manière grecque il appelle *Intellect paternel* ou *Intelligence du Père*; quant au Saint-Esprit, soit il n'en dit rien soit il n'en dit rien ouvertement; car ce que c'est cette autre chose qu'il appelle *leur intermédiaire*, je ne comprends pas.

Praedicas patrem et eius filium, quem vocas *paternum intellectum*³ seu *mentem*, et *horum medium* quem putamus te dicere spiritum sanctum, et more versto appellas *tres deos*.

Tu proclames le Père et son Fils, que tu appelles *Intellect paternel* ou *Intelligence*, ainsi que *leur intermédiaire*, que nous supposons que tu appelles Saint Esprit, et, selon vos moeurs, tu fais état de trois dieux.

T10 Porph. Fr. 366 Smith = Lyd. Mens. 159, 5-8

Θεῖος ὁ τῆς ἐννάδος ἀριθμὸς ἐκ τριῶν τριάδων πληρούμενος καὶ τὰς ἀκρότητας τῆς θεολογίας κατὰ τὴν Χαλδαϊκὴν φιλοσοφίαν, ὡς φησιν ὁ Πορφύριος, ἀποσώζων.

L'ennéade est un nombre divin, étant constituée de trois triades et préservant, ainsi que Porphyre le dit, les niveaux théologiques supérieurs selon la philosophie chaldaïque.

T11 Porph. Fr. 367, 8-16 Smith = Dam. Pr. I 86, 3-15

[...] κατὰ δὲ τὸν Πορφύρον ἐροῦμεν τὴν μίαν τῶν πάντων ἀρχὴν εἶναι τὸν πατέρα τῆς νοητῆς τριάδος; [...] Οὐκοῦν ἡ ἀσύντακτος αἰτία καὶ πάντων μία κοινὴ

[...] ou dirons-nous plutôt, en suivant Porphyre, que le Principe unique de toutes choses est le Père de la triade intelligible ? [...]

Mais alors comment la cause incoordonnée et commune à

³ Orac. Chald. Fr. 36 ; 37 des Places : νοῦς πατρός ; Fr. 39 ; 108 ; 109 : πατρικὸς νόος.

καὶ πάντη ἔργοντος πῶς ἀν συναριθμοῖτο τοῖς νοητοῖς καὶ μᾶς λέγοιτο τριάδος πατήρ; αὕτη μὲν γὰρ ἥδη κορυφὴ τῶν ὄντων ἐστίν, ἐκείνη δὲ τὰ πάντα ἐκβέβηκεν.

toutes choses et entièrement indicible serait-elle énumérée parmi les intelligibles, étant appelée Père de la triade intelligible ? Cette dernière est déjà le sommet des êtres, tandis que celle-là transcende tout.

ENGLISH TRANSLATION

T1 Procl. *in Ti. III 15, 14-22 Diehl*

[Eternity] seems to possess the monad of Being prior to it and the One-Being and to remain in this one, as our teacher [Syrianus] too thought concerning this ‘one’. It does this in order that it may be a one prior to being a dyad, since it is hardly likely to have departed from the One. The dyad within it which presents a premonition of plurality is united to the One-Being in which Eternity remains. However, the plurality of intelligibles is united to Eternity Itslef which includes and sustains all of their highest gradations in a manner that is transcendent and unitary (Trans. D. Baltzy).

T2 Procl. *in Ti. III 27, 13-24 Diehl*

If Intellect is secondary to Eternity and Soul is, in turn, an imitation of Intellect, how can time fail to be something superior even to Soul Itself and more substantial than it, since time is an image of Eternity? Consequently, as Intellect stands to Soul, so too will Eternity stand to time, and vice versa. Thus time is prior to Soul as Eternity is prior to Intellect and while Soul would have a share of time, time would not participate in Soul, for neither does Eternity participate in Intellect, but rather vice versa (Trans. D. Baltzy).

T3 Simpl. *in Phys. 794, 27 – 795, 7 Diels = Jamb. Fr. 68 Dillon*

He also presents another proof as follows : “The paradigm exists through all eternity, but the universe has come to be through all time without end, so that it is both present and future. What exists as a pattern in the intelligible world exists as an image in the generated world. What is THERE eternal is HERE temporal; and that which in the intelligible world is in being now and present, that in this world in continuity comes into being without end. The unchangingly self-subsistent appears in these regions as past, present and future. What THERE is undivided is HERE seen as divided. And now the intermediate dual nature of time has become clear; it is intermediate between eternity and the heavens, and it is dual insofar as it exists together with and in relation to the universe, but is ordered in relation to eternity; it is set over the one, and is a likeness of the other.” Such is the clear meaning of the relevant passages of the *Timaeus*, according to the divine lamblichus. But Proclus, the Lycian philosopher and the guide of our teachers, also holds roughly the same philosophical view about the separated time as lamblichus, and strives to demonstrate that it is not only Intellect but also a god, so that it has even been called on to appear by the theurgists (Transl. J. O. Urmson).

T4 Procl. *In Ti. III 21, 6-13 Diehl*

But neither should we follow those more worthy men who are getting closer to the facts of the matter about time’s distinctive property, if they say that it is something that results from the World Soul’s discursive activity; that is, while the soul is itself present all at once and exists changelessly, nonetheless its activity measures the celestial rotations and the periods of other souls by means of time. We must not commit ourselves to this position, even if these people are not too far off the real truth (Trans. D. Baltzy).

T5 Procl. *in Ti. III 33, 31-33 Diehl = Porphy. in Ti. fr. 78, p. 66, 14-67, 2 Sodano*

If, on the one hand, as Porphyry and certain other Platonists supposed, only sensible things participated in the things that are genuinely Being, then one would seek images among these [sensible] things alone (Trans. D. Baltzy).

T6 Porph. *Sent. 44, 17-68 Lamberz*

Nor does it [Intellect] get away from one thing to move to another; for in the case of that from which it has gotten away, by not thinking it, it would be devoid of thought with respect to that thing. But if, in its case [i.e. in the case of Intellect], one thing does not come after another, it [Intellect] thinks all things simultaneously; and, since it thinks all things simultaneously, and not now one thing and then another, [it intelligizes] all things simultaneously now and always. If then, in its case, there is “now”, while the past and the future are abolished, [it exists] in a non-extended timeless present, so that,

in its case, there is being together both with respect to multiplicity and with respect to temporal extension; for this reason, all things are at one in a non-extended and timeless unity. If this is so, then neither is there, within Intellect, whence and whither nor, consequently, motion, but only an activity at one in unity, [an activity] exempt from increase and change and from any sort of way out [from Intellect]. And if multiplicity comes to unity and the activity is simultaneous and timeless, then it is necessary that “what is always in one state” exists in close association with this essence; and that is eternity; hence, eternity exists in close association with Intellect.

On the other hand, time exists in close association with that which intelligizes not at one in unity, but transitively and in motion and in the mode of leaving off one thing and picking up another, of dividing and of having a way out. For what is to come and what has passed by exist in close association with the motion of that kind. And Soul moves from one thing to another, alternating the thoughts, without the previous ones’ departing nor the following ones’ coming in from anywhere else, but the former are as if they had passed by, although they remain within it [i.e. Soul], and the latter are as if they were coming in from elsewhere. Yet, they do not arrive from elsewhere, but from itself [i.e. from Soul] and from its moving from itself towards itself and [from its] directing its eye to its contents by turns. For it resembles a spring that does not have an outflow but gushes its contents towards itself in a circle.

Time, then, exists in close association with the movement of Soul, while eternity exists in close association with the stability of Intellect within itself. And eternity is not divided by Intellect as time is divided by Soul, because even the Parhypostases are united there. But what is subject to motion <in relation to what is stable> falsely appropriates eternity as its own, the measureless of its motion being taken in the sense of eternity, and, likewise, what is stable, in relation to what is subject to motion, falsely appropriates time as its own, as though it went through and multiplied its present according to the passage of time. For this reason, some people have assumed that time can be viewed [as being] at rest no less than in motion, and that eternity, as we have said, [is] the infinite time, each of the two [i.e. Soul and Intellect] applying to the other the condition proper to itself, that is, that which is always in motion [i.e. Soul], by virtue of that which is in an identical condition, through its own always, reflecting eternity, and that which remains in the identity of [its] activity [i.e. Intellect], applying, by virtue of the activity, time to the stability of itself.

Finally, in the sensible things, the divided time of different things is different, that is, for example, [the divided time] of the Sun [is] different, that of the Moon [is] different, that of the Morning Star [i.e. Venus] different, and, for each of the others, different. For this reason, the year of different things is different as well; and the [Great] year, which contains these [years], is summed up in the motion of Soul. Although these [planets] move in imitation of the motion of Soul, because the motion of Soul is of a different kind to the motion of these, the time of that [i.e. Soul] is also of a different kind to the time of these [i.e. planets]. For the latter is dimensional both with respect to local motions and transitions ** (Trans. J. Dillon, slightly modified).

T7 Porph. Phil. Hist. Fr. 223 Smith = Cyril. Contra Iul. I 32cd, 552 B 1 – C 8

For, in Book IV of History of Philosophy, Porphyry says that Plato spoke of the Good as follows: “from this (i.e. from the Good), in some way incomprehensible by humans, Intellect, in which, of course, true beings and all essence of beings [reside], came to be as a whole and having been hypostasized by itself. This (i.e. Intellect), of course, is the first beautiful thing and Beauty itself, since it has the Form of beauty from itself. And [Intellect] proceeded before eternity, coming out of its cause, [namely] God, having come into being by itself and being the Father of itself; for the procession took place not because God moved so that Intellect comes into being but because Intellect proceeded from God by generating itself. But it did not proceed from a temporal starting point. For time did not exist yet. But neither after coming into being, time is something with respect to Intellect : Intellect is always timeless and the only eternal thing. Just as the first God is always one and alone, even if all things come to be from Him, because He is not enumerated among these [things] nor is it possible that their value is counted together with His existence, in the same way, Intellect, having been hypostasized in a timeless manner so as to be the only eternal thing, is also time of the things that are in time, remaining in the unchangeness of its own eternal hypostasis.”

T8 Porph. Princ. Fr 232 Smith = Procl. Theol. Plat. I 11 p. 51, 4-11 Saffrey-Westerink

And again, after Plotinus, Porphyry, in his treatise On principles, evinces by many and beautiful arguments, that Intellect is eternal, but that, at the same time, it contains in itself something pre-eternal and the pre-eternal [element] of Intellect conjoins [Intellect] with the One (for that [i.e. the One] is beyond all eternity), and what is eternal has a second, or rather, third order in that [i.e. in Intellect]. For it appears to me to be necessary that eternity should be established in the middle of that which is pre-eternal and the eternal. (Trans. T. Taylor, slightly modified).

T9 Porph. Fr. 284, 10-14 Smith = Aug. CD X 23, 1-19 (I 436, 19 – 437, 5) ; Porph. Fr. 284a Smith = Aug. CD X 29, 1-3 (I 447, 25-28)

For he [Porphyry] speaks of God the Father and God the Son, whom he calls the Intellect or Mind of the Father; but of the Holy Spirit he says either nothing, or nothing plainly, for I do not understand what other he speaks of as holding the middle place between these two (284).

You proclaim the Father and His Son, whom you call Paternal Intellect or Mind, and, between these, an intermediate term, which we suppose you call Holy spirit, and, in your manner, you call [these] three gods (284a).

T10 Porph. Fr. 366 Smith = Lyd. Mens. 159, 5-8

The Ennead is a divine number, being composed of three triads and preserving, as Porphyry says, the highest theological levels according to Chaldaean philosophy.

T11 Porph. Fr. 367, 8-16 Smith = Dam. Pr. I 86, 3-15

Or shall we say, following Porphyry, that the one principle of all things is the Father of the intelligible triad? [...] Would then the separate and unique and common to all things and entirely unspeakable cause be enumerated among the intelligibles and be said to be the Father of a triad? For this [i.e. the intelligible triad] is already the highest level of beings, while that (the one principle of all things) transcends all things.

TABLEAUX

1.

Porph. Sent. 44 (T6), 31-44 Lamberz

Τῷ δὲ μὴ καθ' ἐν ἐνὶ νοοῦντι, ἀλλὰ μεταβατικῶς καὶ ἐν κινήσει καὶ ἐν τῷ τὸ μὲν καταλείπειν, τὸ δὲ ἐπιλαμβάνειν καὶ μερίζειν καὶ διεξοδεύειν παρυπέστη χρόνος· τῇ γὰρ τοιαύτῃ κινήσει παρυφίσταται τὸ μέλλειν καὶ παρεληλυ- (35) Θέναι. ψυχὴ δὲ μεταβαίνει ἀπ' ἄλλου εἰς ἄλλο ἐπαμείβουσα τὰ νοήματα, οὐκ ἐξισταμένων τῶν προτέρων οὐδέ ποθεν ἀλλοθεν ἐπεισιόντων τῶν δευτέρων, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ὕσπερ παρελήλυθε καίπερ μένοντα ἐν αὐτῇ, τὰ δὲ ὕσπερ ἀλλα- χόθεν ἐπεισιν, ἀφίκετο δὲ οὐκ ἀλλαχόθεν, ἀλλὰ παρ' (40) αὐτῆς καὶ αὐτόθεν εἰς έαυτὴν κινουμένης καὶ τὸ ὅμμα φερούσης εἰς ἀ ἔχει κατὰ μέρος πηγῇ γὰρ ἔοικεν οὐκ ἀπορρύτω, ἀλλὰ κύκλω εἰς έαυτὴν ἀναβλυζούση ἀ ἔχει.

Procl. In Ti. IV 3, 21, 6-13 Diehl (T4)

Ἄλλ' οὐδέ εἴ τινες ἔτι τούτων σεμνότεροι καὶ τῆς τῶν πραγμάτων ἐγγυτέρω χωρούντες ιδιότητος ἐκ τῆς ὅλης ψυχῆς γεννᾶσθαι φασι τὸν χρόνον **μεταβατικῶς** ἐνεργούσης [ἢ] αὐτῆς μὲν ἀθρώπως καὶ ἀμεταστάτως μετρούσης δὲ τῷ χρόνῳ τάς τε οὐρανίας (10) περιφορὰς καὶ τὰς περιόδους τῶν ἄλλων ψυχῶν, οὐδὲ τούτοις τό γε ήμέτερον ἐπιτρέψει, καίπερ οὐ πόρρω τῆς ἀληθείας κατηντηκόσι.

2.

Πατὴρ	(Αὔτοπάτωρ)
Αὐτοῦ	
(Πατήρ)	Αὔτοπάτωρ


3.

Ἐν (προαιώνιον) Un (prééternel)	Aἰών Éternité	Noῦς (αἰώνιον) Intellect (éternel)
Ἐν (προαιώνιον) Un (prééternel)	Aἰών Éternité	Noῦς (αἰώνιον) Intellect (éternel)
Ἐν (προαιώνιον) Un (prééternel)	Aἰών Éternité	Noῦς (αἰώνιον) Intellect (éternel)



4.

Ἐν Αἰών Νοῦς
 Ἐν Αἰών Νοῦς
 Ἐν Αἰών Νοῦς Χρόνος Ψυχή
 Νοῦς Χρόνος Ψυχή

5.



6.



Aiôn et les Temps, mosaïque d'Antioche, c. 250 de notre ère