

## Porphyry in Iamblichus' *De anima* - Handout

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### SOUL AN ATTUNEMENT

5. Next, let us consider (the claim that soul is an) attunement, not the attunement inherent in bodies, but that which is mathematical.

- It is this attunement, to speak simply, that which renders symmetrical and agreeable those things which differ in any way, that Moderatus applies to the soul.
- Timaeus, on the other hand, refers attunement to the soul as being a mean and conjunction in beings and lives and the generation of all things,
- while Plotinus, **Porphyry**, and Amelius have taught that it is attunement as residing in essentially preexistent reason-principles;
- while many of the Platonists and Pythagoreans adjudge it to be the attunement which is interwoven with the cosmos and inseparable from the heaven.

### SOUL AN INCORPOREAL ESSENCE

6. Let us now ascend to the consideration of that substance which is of itself incorporeal, distinguishing in order all the opinions about the soul in relation to it also. — There are some who maintain that such a substance as a whole is homogeneous and one and the same, such that all of it may be found in any part of it; and they place even in the individual soul the intelligible world, and gods and daemons and the Good and all the beings superior to it, and declare everything to be in each thing in the same way but in a manner appropriate to its essence. Numenius is unambiguously of this opinion, Plotinus not completely consistently, while Amelius is unstable in his allegiance to the opinion; as for **Porphyry**, he is in two minds on the subject, now dissociating himself violently from this view, now adopting it as a doctrine handed down from above. According to this doctrine, the soul differs in no way from intellect and the gods and the superior classes of being, at least in respect to its substance in general.

7. *The doctrine opposed to this*, however, separates the Soul off, inasmuch as it has come about as following upon Intellect, representing a distinct level of being, and that aspect of it which is endowed with intellect is explained as being connected with the intellect certainly, but also as subsisting independently on its own, and it separates the soul also from all the superior classes of being, and assigns to it as the particular definition of its essence, either the middle term of divisible and indivisible beings <and of corporeal and in>corporeal being, or the totality of the universal reason-principles, or that which, after the ideas, is at the service of the work of creation, or that life which has life of itself, which proceeds from the Intelligible realm, or again the procession of the classes of real Being as a whole to an inferior substance. It is these doctrines to which Plato himself and Pythagoras, and Aristotle, and all the ancients who have gained great and honorable names for wisdom are completely committed, as one will find if he investigates their opinions with scientific rigor; as for myself, I will try to base this whole treatise, concerned as it is with truth, on these opinions.

## WHICH POWERS BELONG TO THE SOUL

- **13.** Plotinus removes from the soul the irrational powers: those of perception, imagination, memory, and discursive reasoning. He includes only pure reason in the pure essence of the soul, on the grounds that it has a power bound up with the very nature of the soul's essence.
- Democritus the Platonist and his followers, however, attribute all these kinds of faculty to the essence of the soul.
- Plato assumes that the powers belong both to souls themselves and to the living beings, distinguishing each in accordance with each life.
- **Porphyry** and Plotinus and their followers maintain that the soul projects its own powers to each part of the universe and that the lives, howsoever they have been projected, are dissolved and cease to exist, similar to objects that grow from a seed, when the seed withdraws into itself.

*One might perhaps propose not unpersuasively the rather novel theory that these powers continue to exist in the universe and do not perish.*

## ON THE ACTS OF THE SOUL

**17.** Do all souls perform the same acts, or are those of universal souls more perfect, while those of the other souls correspond to the appropriate rank of which each partake?

- As far as the Stoics are concerned, reason is one, intellection absolutely identical, right actions equal and the virtues the same in the case of both the individual and the universal souls;
- Plotinus and Amelius are presumably of this opinion also (for on occasion they define the individual soul as being no different from the universal, but as being one with it);
- but according to **Porphyry**, on the other hand, the activities of the universal soul are totally distinct from the individual soul.

**18.** *Another view, however, might be proposed which should not be rejected*, which divides souls according to genera and species, making a difference between the perfect acts of universal souls, the pure and immaterial activities of divine souls and, different from these, the efficacious activities of daemonic souls and the great-hearted activities of heroic souls, and the acts of a mortal nature proper to animals and men, and so on for the rest. When these things have been defined, the features that are dependent on them admit of the same sort of distinction.

## ON THE ESSENTIAL UNITY (OR OTHERWISE) OF THE SOUL

**23.** There has been much controversy within the Platonic School itself,

- one group bringing together into one system and form the various types and parts of life and its activities, as for example Plotinus and **Porphyry**; and
- another, exemplified by Numenius, setting them up in conflict with each other;
- another again reconciling them from a postulated original strife, as for instance Atticus and Plutarch. These last maintain that there supervene on pre-existing disorderly and irregular motions other later ones which organize and arrange them, and from both of them they thus weave together a web of harmony.

## THE CAUSES OF THE SOUL'S DESCENT

- 23 [contin.]. The activities which induce the soul to descend are caused,
- according to Plotinus by the “primal otherness”,
  - according to Empedocles by “the flight from God” (Fr. 115 D-K.),
  - according to Heraclitus by “the rest which consists in change” (Fr. 84a D-K.),
  - according to the Gnostics by “derangement and deviation”,
  - according to Albinus by “the erring judgement of a free will”.

While of those who are at variance with these thinkers and who would attach evil to the soul in some way from elements which have accrued to it from outside,

- Numenius and Cronius in many places derive it from matter,
- Harpocraton also, on occasion, from the very nature of bodies,
- while Plotinus and **Porphry** most of the time derive it from Nature and the irrational life.

### [ON THE INFERIOR ACTIVITIES OF LOWER SOULS?]

- 24. According to Aristotle, on the other hand, it is by forms of life and other characteristics that these activities are distinguished from human ones.
- According to the Stoics, again, such inferior activities of life are continually detaching themselves in the sense of becoming less perfect, and the further they advance in the progress towards unreason, the more the inferior are separated from the superior in the direction of imperfection.
- Finally as I have heard from certain Platonists, such as **Porphry**, and many others, human activities show similarity to those of wild beasts, and those of animals to those of men, in so far as activities distinguished by being based on different essences are to be assimilated to one another.

### ON THE PLACES IN THE UNIVERSE FROM WHICH THE SOUL DESCENDS

26. Plotinus, **Porphry**, and Amelius assign equal status to all souls and bring them forth from the supracelestial soul to reside in bodies.

The depiction of the soul's first coming into existence seems very different in the *Timaeus*...

### WHEN DOES LIFE BEGIN?

- 31. < . . . > According to Hippocrates the Asclepiad, life is actually created and the soul becomes present when the sperm is formed into an embryo (for it is then suitably disposed to share in life);
- while according to **Porphry** it is as soon as the child is born.

*Some other opinion might arise, not expressed as yet, that there are very many powers and essential properties of the soul and that at critical moments, in different ways at different times, when the body that is coming into being is suited to do so, it partakes first of the vegetative life, then of sensation, then of the appetitive life, then of the rational soul, and lastly of the intellectual soul.*

These are the many opinions concerning the times at which the soul becomes associated in a natural union with the body.

## THE SOUL AFTER DEATH

37. < . . . > Plotinus and his school, on the other hand, champion the opinion that separates the irrational faculties from the reasoning element, either releasing them into the realm of generation or separating them from the discursive reasoning.

From this opinion arises a choice between two doctrines:

- a. Either each irrational faculty is freed into the whole life of the universe from which it was detached, where each remains as far as possible unchanged, as **Porphry** thinks.
- b. Or the whole irrational life continues to exist, separated from the discursive reasoning and preserved in the cosmos, as the most ancient of the priests declare.

## ON SUBSTANCES INTERMEDIATE BETWEEN BODY AND SOUL (VEHICLES)

38. In the same way there are very different views concerning the substances intermediate between body and soul.

- For some join the soul itself immediately to the organic body, as do the majority of Platonists.
- Others <say> that between the incorporeal soul and the earthly <body> ethereal, heavenly, and pneumatic wrappings surrounding the intellectual life-principle are brought forth for its protection, serve it as vehicles, and also bring it together in due proportion with the solid body, joining it thereto by means of certain intermediate common bonds.

## THE REWARD OF SOULS

47. Concerning the souls' reward, which they attain subsequently, when they depart from the body < . . . > to angels and angelic souls; this in general is the opinion of the ancients. Plutarch, **Porphry**, and the ancients preserve it in its proper rank. *Plotinus* separates it from all of them.

48. *The ancients* rightly attribute to the soul a disposition, good in form, similar to that of the gods in intellect, and a superintendence over things in this realm; **Porphry**, however, removes from it this latter characteristic.

*Some of the ancients* furthermore claim that it is superior to the reasoning element, and define its acts so precisely that not even the pure and most perfect reasoning element could attain them. < . . . > **Porphry** removes them completely from the independent life, on the grounds that they belong naturally to generation and were given as an aid to composite living beings.

49. < . . . > Plato's *Timaeus*, however, elevates them in their ascent even as they were sown variously by the Demiurge, some into the Sun, others into the Earth, none overstepping the boundary of the abode established in the demiurgic sowing.

50. < . . . > Numenius seems to prefer a unity and undifferentiated sameness of the soul with its principles, whereas the ancients preserve a coalescence with a different substance. The former compare it to a dissolving, the latter to a co-arrangement. The former treat it as a union without individuation, the latter one with individuation. Their individuated existence is not, however, governed by the cosmos or controlled by nature, as some of the Platonists have supposed, but is completely released from the universe, as we conceive to be the case with separated substances.

51. < . . . > **Porphyry** and his school, as far as human lives; and they posit another class of souls after this, the irrational. Further, Porphyry assimilates the soul to the universe, although it remains what it is in itself.

52. < . . . > According to the Platonists, they care for inanimate things.

53. After the souls have been freed from generation, according to the ancients they administer the universe together with the gods, while according to the Platonists they contemplate the gods' order. According to the former, in the same way they help the angels with the creation of the universe, while according to the latter they accompany them.

**Translations by John F. Finamore and John M. Dillon**, in: *Iamblichus De anima. Text, translation and commentary* ('Philosophia antiqua', 92), Leiden: Brill, 2002.

See also :

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(trying to put Iamblichus' testimony on Porphyry into perspective...)

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*The Fragments on Soul in Porphyry's In Timaeum  
and Porphyry's Role in the History of Platonist Exegesis*

*1. The generation of the soul: the issue of the mixing bowl*

T1. Porph. fr. 64 Sodano = Procl. *In Tim.* 2.162.25-163.10 (transl. Baltzly)

διττῆς δὲ τῆς κράσεως οὔσης, καθάπερ εἵπομεν, τῆς μὲν αὐτῶν τῶν στοιχείων ὑποστατικῆς, τῆς δὲ τοῦ ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων, ἐζήτησεν ὁ Πορφύριος ὀρθῶς, πότερον ἀμφοτέρως ἐν τῷ κρατῆρι ταύτας ἐποιήσατο ἢ τὴν μὲν ἔξω τοῦ κρατῆρος, τὴν δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ ἐνέκρινεν, ὅτι τὰ μὲν στοιχεῖα κινᾶς ἄνευ τοῦ κρατῆρος ἐνήργει, ἐπειδὴ οὐ κατὰ σύνοδον τῶν ἄκρων ἢ γένεσις τῶν μέσων ἐγένετο οὐδ' ὅλως ἡδύνατο εἰς ταὐτὸν ἀλλήλοις συνιέναι τὰ ἄκρα, τὸ δὲ ἐκ πάντων τῶν μέσων στοιχείων ἀπεργαζόμενος τῷ κρατῆρι χρῆται, ἐμβαλὼν εἰς αὐτὸν τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ μίσγων, ἵνα πᾶσα ἐκ πάντων ἢ ψυχὴ γένηται μία καὶ ὁμόχρους ἑαυτῇ καὶ ὁμοιομερής, πάντων τῶν γενῶν διὰ πάντων πεφοιτηκότων, καὶ ἵνα λάβῃ τὸ εἶδος ἢ ψυχὴ καὶ ὃ ἐστὶν ἀπὸ τοῦ κρατῆρος· κατὰ γὰρ τὸ ὅλον ἐκάστου τὸ εἶδος. ὥστ' εἰκότως ψυχοποιὸς ὢν ὁ κρατῆρ ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὴν ὁλότητα ποιεῖ τῆς ψυχῆς· διὸ καὶ ἡ δευτέρα κρᾶσις ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ κρατῆρι μόνον.

Now since the mixture is two-fold, as we said, the first being constituted of the very elements [i.e. the divisible and indivisible forms of Being, Sameness and Difference], but the other being what results from the mixing of the elements, Porphyry correctly inquires whether both of these mixtures were made in the mixing bowl, or one outside the bowl and the other in it. Porphyry decided that when he combines the elements, the Demiurge acts without the mixing bowl since the genesis of the intermediate forms is not brought about by bringing together the extreme terms, nor is it generally possible to bring terms maximally opposed together in the same thing. But [the combination] that results from all the intermediate [forms of] the elements is accomplished by means of the mixing bowl. He pitched the elements into it and mixed them so that the soul that came to be as a result of all these elements might be entirely single, consubstantial with itself and homoiomerous, with all of the genera pervading through all. He did this, in addition, in order that the soul may take its form and essence from the mixing bowl, for the form of each thing is in accordance with the whole. As a result, since it is plausibly regarded as 'soulmaking', the mixing bowl makes the wholeness of the soul in itself, and on account of this fact only the second mixing takes place within the mixing bowl.

T2. Attic. fr. 14 = Procl. *In Tim.* 3.247.12-15

καὶ ἔγωγε καὶ τὸν φιλοπονώτατον Ἀττικὸν ἐθαύμασα διττόν που τὸν κρατῆρα λέγοντα εὐρών, καὶ ταῦτα εἰωθότα σφόδρα παρέπεσθαι ταῖς ῥήσεσι· μέμνηται δὲ ὁμῶς <ἐκεῖνος> τοῦ διττοῦ κρατῆρος καὶ τὸν Φαῖδρον ἐξηγούμενος.

I for my part was also amazed by the painstaking Atticus when I found him saying somewhere that the mixing-bowl was two things, and this from somebody in the habit of paying the closest attention to the letter of the text. In spite of this he makes mention of the twin mixing-bowls even when interpreting the *Phaedrus*.

## 2. The Harmonic Structure

Porph. fr. 65-68 Sodano = Macr. *In Somn. Scip.* 2.1.5-3.3

pp.	Topic	Major Parallel passages in Middle Platonist Texts
2.1.5-7	Physics of sound	Theon of Smyrna ( <i>Exp.</i> ); Nicomachus ( <i>Ench.</i> ) Aelianus ( <i>In Ti.</i> ).
2.1.8-13	Pythagoras' Empirical Discovery of Concords	Theon of Smyrna - different version ( <i>Exp.</i> ); Nicomachus ( <i>Ench.</i> ).
2.1.14-20	The Fundamental Harmonic Ratios (including the 'triple')	Theon of Smyrna ( <i>Exp.</i> )
2.1.21-25	Discussion of the Semitone	Theon of Smyrna ( <i>Exp.</i> ); Nicomachus ( <i>Ench.</i> ); Plut. <i>An.Procr.</i>
2.2.1-13	Basic Notions of Arithmetic Related to Harmonic Theory	Theon of Smyrna ( <i>Exp.</i> ) Plutarch, <i>An.Procr.</i> (very weak parallel)
2.2.14	Quotation of the <i>Divisio Animae</i> Passage	--
2.2.16-19	Harmonic Ratios in the First Numeric Series	Theon of Smyrna ( <i>Exp.</i> ) Plutarch, <i>An.Procr.</i> (very weak parallel)
2.2.20-24	Cicero	
2.3.1-3	Hint at the Relation Between Plato's Harmonics and the Myth of Er	Theon of Smyrna, <i>Exp.</i> (very weak parallel) Plutarch, <i>An.Procr.</i> (very weak parallel)

T3. Aelianus in Porph. *In Harm.* 96.7-15 and 33.16-21 (the quotation going on up to 37.5)

Αἰλιανὸς δ' ὁ Πλατωνικὸς Εἰς τὸν Τίμαιον γράφων κατὰ λέξιν λέγει ταῦτα. Συμφωνία δ' ἐστὶν δυεῖν φθόγγων ὁξύτητι καὶ βαρύτητι διαφερόντων κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ πτόσις καὶ κρᾶσις. τῶν δὲ συμφωνιῶν ἕξ τὸν ἀριθμὸν οὐσῶν ... ἀπλᾶς μὲν ἐκάλουν οἱ παλαιοὶ τήν τε διὰ τεσσάρων καὶ διὰ πέντε, συνθέτους δὲ τὰς λοιπὰς. ἀπλᾶ δὲ λέγονται, ὅτι αἱ μὲν ἄλλαι ἐκ συμφωνιῶν καθεστήκασιν, αὗται δ' οὐ.

Aelianus the Platonist, writing in his *On the Timaeus*, says the following, in exactly these words.

'Concord is the simultaneous incidence and blending of two notes that differ in height and depth of pitch. Of the concords, which are six in number, the ancients called the fourth and the fifth "simple" and the remainder "composite". They are called "simple" because the others are constituted out of concords, but these ones are not. '

[...]



Πεπείραται δὲ καὶ Αἰλιανὸς ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ τῶν Εἰς τὸν Τίμαιον ἐξηγητικῶν παραστῆσαι τὸ τοιοῦτον, οὗ τὴν λέξιν παραγράφομεν ἔχουσιν οὕτως.

Αἱ δὲ φωναὶ διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων ὀξύτητι καὶ βαρύτητι. ἴδωμεν οὖν, τίνες εἰσὶ τῆς διαφορᾶς τῶν φθόγγων ἀρχηγοὶ αἰτίαι. πάσης δὴ φωνῆς ἀρχηγὸς αἰτία ἐστὶν ἡ κίνησις.

Aelianus, in the second book of his *Commentary on the Timaeus*, attempted to defend this sort of view: his words, which we shall transcribe exactly, are as follows.

'Sounds differ from one another in height and depth of pitch. Let us see, then, what are the principal causes of the difference between notes. The principal cause of all sound is movement.

### 3. The soul and the planets

T7. Porph. fr. 79 Sodano = Procl. *In Tim.* 2.214.5-215.5 (isodromi e movimento dei pianeti)

Πορφύριος δὲ θαυμαστόν τινα τρόπον καίτοι τούτων προειρημένων ὅτι μὲν ἡρμοσται ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ ὅτι πάντα τὸν κόσμον ἀρμονίας πληροῖ, διὰ πολλῶν κατεσκεύασεν, ἕκ τε τοῦ πληθοῦς εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν, πληθος δὲ οὖσαν ἢ ἀσύντακτον εἶναι ἢ ἡρμοσμένον, τοῦτο δὲ εἶναι ἀληθές, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκεῖνό γε (δημιούργημα γὰρ οὖσα τοῦ νοῦ πῶς ἂν ἄτακτος εἴη καὶ ἀνάρμοστος), καὶ ἐκ τοῦ πάντα τὰ ἐγκόσμια κατὰ λόγους ἀρμονικοὺς ποδηγεῖν, τὰς τε τῶν ζώων γενέσεις καὶ τὴν μίαν αὐτῶν σύνταξιν πρὸς τὸ πᾶν. τίνες δὲ εἰσιν οἶδε οἱ λόγοι κατὰ τὴν ὑπόστασιν αὐτὴν ὁρώμενοι τῆς ψυχῆς, οὔτε ἐδίδαξεν οὔτε φροντίδος ἡξίωσεν, ἀλλ' ἔφατο τὴν οὐσίαν τῆς ψυχῆς ἔχειν ἐν ἑαυτῇ τοὺς ἀρμονικοὺς λόγους οὐχ ὡς ἄλλων εἰκόνας, οὐδ' ὡς ἀρχὰς ἐτέρων, ἀλλ' ὡς συνδέοντας τὸ πληθος τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ δυνάμεων· καὶ γὰρ ὄντως εἰ μὴ μόνον ἐστὶν ἀμέριστος. ἀλλὰ καὶ μεριστὴ, δεῖ μὴ μόνον εἶναι μίαν αὐτῆς τὴν οὐσίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πεπληθυσμένην, εἰ δὲ πεπληθυσμένην, ἢ ἀνάριθμον ἢ ἡριθμημένην. ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀνάριθμον ἀδύνατον· τὸ γὰρ ἀνάριθμον πληθος ἄτακτον. ἡριθμημένην ἄρα. εἰ δὲ ἡριθμημένην, ἢ ἐξ ἀναρμόστων μερῶν ἢ ἐξ ἡρμοσμένων. ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀναρμόστων ἀδύνατον· οὐδὲν γὰρ τοιοῦτον ὃν ἔχει κατὰ φύσιν. ἐξ ἡρμοσμένων ἄρα πάντως. ἀλλ' εἰ ἐξ ἡρμοσμένων, ἀνάγκη κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην ἀρμονίαν, εἴπερ ἐστὶ τὸ πρῶτον τῶν ἡρμοσμένων. ἀρίστη δὲ ἀρμονιῶν ἢ κατὰ τὸ διατονικὸν γένος· τοῦτο γὰρ σεμνὸν καὶ ἀδρόν. κατὰ τοῦτο ἄρα ἡρμοσται πάντως ἡ ψυχὴ· ὥστ' εἴη ἂν ἡ οὐσία αὐτῆς ἐκ μερῶν κατὰ τὸ διάτονον γένος ἡρμοσμένων. κωλύει δὲ οὐδὲν καὶ τούτων ἀληθῶν ὄντων ὅμως εἶναι καὶ εἰκόνας τοὺς ἀρμονικοὺς λόγους θεῶν τινῶν πραγμάτων οὕτως, ὡς καὶ τὸ σῶμα σφαιρικὸν μὲν ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τοῦ σφαιρικοῦ μίμημα εἶναι λέγεται νοῦ· καὶ συμβαίνει ταῦτα ἀλλήλοις. ταῦτα μὲν ὁ Πορφύριος εἰπὼν παρέσχεν ἡμῖν συλλογίζεσθαι τι περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀληθές.

Since some of those things that were said beforehand were offered in such a remarkable manner, Porphyry built his case that the soul is harmonised and that it fills the cosmos with all the harmonies on the basis of several reasons. He argues from the fact that the soul is a plurality. But, being a plurality, it must be either one that is harmonised or one that is disordered. The former, however, is true and not the latter (for the creation of Intellect would not in any way be disordered or lacking in harmony). He also argues from the fact that all the things within the cosmos are guided by harmonic ratios, both the generations of living beings and their single arrangement in relation to the universe. But how these ratios are defined in terms of the soul's very hypostasis, he neither teaches us nor sees fit to attend to. But the essence of the soul has been declared to have these harmonic ratios in itself – not as images of other things, nor as first principles of something else – but as something that binds together the plurality of powers in it. For if it really is not only indivisible, but also divisible, then it is equally necessary that its Being be not only single, but also one that has been pluralised. But if it has been pluralised, then it is either numberless or counted by some definite number. But it is impossible for it to be without number, for a numberless plurality is without order. So therefore it has been numbered. But if it is numbered, then it is either composed from parts that are harmonious or those that are inharmonious. But it is impossible for it to be composed from inharmonious parts, for nothing of this sort possesses being in a way that is natural. Therefore it is composed from parts that are entirely harmonious. But

if it is composed from parts that are entirely harmonious, it is necessary that it exists in accordance with the best harmony – if indeed, it is the first of the things that are harmonised. But the best harmony is that which exists in accordance with the diatonic genus, for this is dignified and strong. Thanks to this fact, then, the soul is entirely harmonised, with the result that its essence would be composed of parts in accordance with the diatonic genus. But nothing prevents this being true while at the same time the harmonic ratios are images of certain divine things, as in the case where the body of the world is a sphere, but this is because the spherical shape is said to be an imitation of Intellect. These things entail one another. These things that Porphyry says at least afford us the opportunity to draw some true conclusion about the soul.

Cf.

- Theon, *Exp.* 138.9-146.2, on the order of the Planets.
- Plut. *An.Procr.* 1029C3-8, on the order of the Planets.

**PORPHYRY ON THE PARTS OF THE SOUL****A Commentary on *Περὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεων* 253F Smith=3F Dorandi****A. Contents**

I. Introduction; II. From Plato to Plotinus: Porphyry and his Predecessors; III. The Soul as a Grain of Wheat: Metaphysics as Mystery; IV Epilogue.

**B. Texts****T1 Porph. *On the Powers of the Soul*, 3F, 10-16 Dorandi**

παρὰ δὲ Πλάτωνι καὶ Ἀριστοτέλει ἐν τοῖς Ἠθικοῖς (EN p. 1102b28–9) τριμερὲς ἡ ψυχὴ λέγεται εἶναι, καὶ κεκράτηκε τοῦτο παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀγνοοῦσιν ὥς ἡ διαίρεσις τῆς κυστάσεως ἔνεκα τῶν ἀρετῶν παρείληπται· οὐ γὰρ ἀπλῶς εἰς κύλληψιν πάντων τῶν μερῶν. τὸ γὰρ φανταστικὸν καὶ αἰσθητικὸν καὶ τὸ νοερὸν καὶ <τὸ> φυτικὸν οὐ δήπου ἐν τῇ διαίρεσει ταύτῃ περιληφθήσεται.

Furthermore, in Plato and in Aristotle's *Ethics*, the soul is said to be tripartite. And this view has prevailed among the many, who ignore that the division has been applied to the soul because of the constitution of the virtues and not simply with a view to comprising all the parts. For, I presume, the imaginative part and the sensitive part and the intellective and the vegetative ones will not be included in this division.

(my translation)

**T2 Porph. *On the Powers of the Soul*, 3F, 33-38 & 68-77 Dorandi**

Λογγίνος (fr. 22 Patillon-Brisson) δὲ οὐδὲ τὸ ζῶιον πολυμερὲς εἶναι ἀλλ' ἀμερὲς, πολυδύναμον δέ, τὸ τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἐν τοῖς σώματι πολυμερῇ φάσκων τὴν ψυχὴν γίνεσθαι, καθ' ἑαυτὴν οὐσαν ἀμερῇ. ὅτι δὲ οὐ πολυμερὲς, οὐ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ μονοδύναμος· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ ἐν ἀμερὲς δυνάμεις πλείους ἔχειν.

Thus, Longinus thinks that Plato's "living being" does not have many parts either, but that it is partless, albeit endowed with many powers. For, he says, although, in the bodies, the soul becomes multipartite, it is itself partless. But the fact that it does not consist of many parts does not entail that it also has one power; it is, indeed, possible for one partless thing to have more than one power.

πῶς οὖν ἀμερὲς ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ πάλιν τριμερὲς; οἱ μὲν οὖν τὰ μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν ἀκούσαντες εἰκότως ἀποροῦσι, πῶς καὶ ἀμερὲς καὶ τριμερὲς, καὶ λύουσι φάσκοντες κατὰ μὲν ἴδιον λόγον καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὴν εἶναι ἀμερῇ, τριμερῇ δὲ καθ' ὅσον ἐν σώματι γενομένη μεριστῶι ὄντι ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο μέρος ἐπέχει τοῦ σώματος εἰς τὰς διαφόρους αὐτῆς ἐνεργείας. οὐ γὰρ δὴ <ἡ> αὐτὴ κεφαλὴν ἔχει καὶ θώρακα καὶ τοῦ ποτ' ἤπαρ, ἀλλ' αἱ διὰ τούτων διάφοροι ἐνέργειαι διαμεριστῶς καὶ μερῶν γιγνόμεναι διαφόρων τοῦ σώματος ἀπ' ἐκείνων αὐτῇ τῶν μερῶν μερισμὸν ἐπανέθεσαν.

How is it possible then that the soul is partless and still tripartite? Those who understand the parts of the soul in a quantitative sense have every reason to be at a loss to explain how the soul is both partless and tripartite. They solve the problem by saying that, in itself and according to its own reason-principle, the soul is partless, but that it is tripartite inasmuch as, when coming to be in body, which is divisible, the soul occupies different parts of the body in order to exercise its various activities. In fact, it is not the soul itself that occupies someone's head and chest and liver; rather, by being distributed and by belonging to various bodily parts, the various activities, which act through these parts, ascribe, because of these parts, division to the soul.

**T3 Porph. *On the Powers of the Soul*, 3F, 78-95 Dorandi**

Νικόλαος (test. 9 Lulofs) δὲ οὐκ ἠξίου τὰ μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν λαμβάνειν, ἀλλὰ μάλλον κατὰ τὸ ποιόν, ὥσπερ καὶ τέχνης καὶ φιλοσοφίας· ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ποσοῦ τὸ ὅλον ἐκ τῶν μερῶν συμπληροῦται καὶ γίγνεται ὡς κατὰ τὴν πρὸς ἕτερον ἀντεξέτασιν πλέον ἢ ἔλαττον, ἢ μικρότερον ἢ μεῖζον, προστιθεμένου μέρους ἢ

However, Nicolaos did not consider the quantitative understanding of the parts of the soul as worthy of discussion. Rather, he thought that they should be understood in a qualitative sense, just like the parts of art and of philosophy. For, in the case of quantity, the whole is made up of the parts, and, by adding or by removing a part, we get a relatively greater or lesser amount or a relatively smaller or bigger thing.

ἀφαιρουμένου. ψυχῆς δὲ <οὐχ> οὕτως λέγομεν εἶναι μέρη (οὐ γὰρ δὴ τὸ ποτὸν αὐτῆς ὑπὸ τούτων συμπληροῦται, οὔτε γὰρ μέγεθος ἐστίν, οὔτε τι ἔχει πλήθος), ἀλλ' ὡς τέχνης μέρος. διαφέρει δὲ καὶ τούτων· τέχνη μὲν γὰρ, ἀπὸν τι μέρος, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ὁλόκληρος οὐδὲ τελεία, ψυχὴ δὲ πᾶσα τελεία ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ πᾶν ζῶιον οὐ κομικάμενον τὸ κατὰ φύσιν τέλος ἀτελές ἐστίν. ἀκούει τοίνυν Νικόλαος τὰ μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς ὡς δυνάμεις τοῦ ἔχοντος· τὸ γὰρ ζῶιον καὶ ὅλως τὸ ἔμψυχον τῶι ψυχῇ ἔχειν πολλὰ δύναται, οἷον ζῆν, αἰσθάνεσθαι, κινεῖσθαι, νοεῖν, ὁρέγεσθαι, ὧν πάντων αἰτία καὶ ἀρχὴ ἡ ψυχὴ. ταύτας οὖν τὰς δυνάμεις, ἀφ' ὧν λέγεται τὸ ἔμψυχον ταῦτα δρᾶν ἢ πάσχειν, μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς τίθεται ὡς εἰρηται.

#### T4 Porph. *On the Powers of the Soul*, 3F, 95-108 Dorandi

οὐδὲν <δὲ> κωλύει αὐτῆς ἀμεροῦς οὔσης μεριστῶς δέχεσθαι τὰς ἀπ' αὐτῆς τῶν ἐνεργειῶν ἐνδόσεις. μεριστὸν οὖν τὸ ζῶιον, εἰς τὴν ἐπίνοιαν αὐτοῦ καὶ τοῦ σώματος παραλαμβανομένου, ἀφ' οὗ αἱ ζωτικαὶ ἐνεργεῖαι κατὰ ψυχῆς ἐνδοσιν > δεχόμεναι τὴν εἰς μέρη τῶν διαφόρων ἐνεργειῶν κατὰτάξιν καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ τὸ μέρος ἔχειν προσανέθεσαν. καὶ μήποτε διττῶς ἐπινοουμένης τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ ἐχούσης τὴν ζωὴν, τὴν τε καθ' αὐτὴν καὶ τὴν κατὰ σῶμα, ἐν τῇ κατὰ σῶμα ζωῇ ὑφίσταται τὰ μέρη. ὡς γὰρ πυρὶ σπάρῃ ἐν τῇ πρὸς τὴν γένεσιν σῶμα ὑφίσταται τὰ μέρη, τοῦ σπάρου τοῦ λόγου<sup>1</sup> οὐκ ὄντος μεριστοῦ ἐν δὲ μεριστῶι θεωρουμένου, ἀφ' οὗ πάλιν ἐπᾶνεις εἰς τὸ ἀμεριστόν, οὕτω καὶ ψυχῇ ἀμερίστωι οὔσῃ ἐν τῇ σπορᾷ παρῶνται τὰ μέρη.

#### T5 Plot. IV 9, 3, 17-23

καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ σπέρματι πλείους αἱ δυνάμεις καὶ ἔν· καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς τούτου πολλὰ ἔν. Διὰ τί οὖν οὐ πανταχοῦ πᾶσαι; Καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῆς μιᾶς ψυχῆς πανταχοῦ λεγομένης εἶναι ἢ αἰσθησις οὐκ ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς μέρεσιν ὁμοία, ὅ τε λόγος οὐκ ἐν ὅλῳ, τό τε φυτικὸν καὶ ἐν οἷς μὴ αἰσθησις· καὶ ὁμῶς εἰς ἕν ἀνατρέχει ἀποστάντα τοῦ σώματος.

#### T6 Plot. IV 2, 18-22 & IV 1, 65-67

Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἑνταῦθα μόνον μεριστῇ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀμερίστω· τὸ γὰρ μεριζόμενον αὐτῆς ἀμερίστω μερίζεται. Εἰς ὅλον γὰρ τὸ σῶμα δοῦσα αὐτὴν καὶ μὴ μερισθεῖσα τῷ ὅλῳ εἰς ὅλον τῷ ἐν παντὶ εἶναι

But it is not in this sense that the parts of the soul are said to exist (for, in the case of the soul, there is no quantity made up of these parts, since the soul has neither size nor number), but like the parts of art. Yet, the parts of the soul differ from the parts of art as well: if a part were removed, art would be neither a whole nor perfect. But every soul is perfect, whereas the living being as a whole will be imperfect, if it does not accomplish the purpose ascribed to it by nature. Thus, Nikolaos understands the parts of the soul as powers of what has a soul. For the living being and, in general, what has a soul, by virtue of having a soul, is capable of many things, such as living, perceiving, moving, thinking, desiring. The cause and principle of all these is the soul. These powers then, by means of which what has a soul does or suffers the aforesaid things, he takes to be parts of the soul, as mentioned.

Although the soul itself is partless, nothing prevents it from receiving in a divisible way what its own activities impart [to it]. Hence, the living being is divisible, its concept also including the body. By receiving from the body the distribution of the various activities into parts and by imparting it to the soul, the life-giving activities ascribe partition to the soul as well. And, perhaps, given that the soul is conceived of in two ways and has a twofold life, namely, the life as such and the life in relation, the parts exist in the case of the life in relation. When a seed is sown, the parts exist within the framework of the relation to generation: the reason-principle of the ear of wheat is not divisible; yet it is seen in something divisible, from which it reverts back to indivisibility. Likewise, in the case of the soul, although it is indivisible, the parts subsist in the time of sowing [i.e. when the soul is “sown” in the body].

For in the seed there are many powers and it is one; and from this one come many units. Why then are not all souls everywhere? Well, in the case of the one soul which is said to be everywhere in the body, the sense-perception is not alike in all the parts, and the reason is not in the whole, and the growth principle is also in the parts where there is no perception; and all the same it runs up into one when it leaves the body.

(Trans. A. H. Armstrong)

<sup>1</sup> 105 τοῦ λόγου FA : τοῦ ὅλου P Dorandi : ὅλου Cant.

μεμέρισται.

in every part.

μεριστή μὲν, ὅτι ἐν πᾶσι μέρεσι τοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἔστιν, ἀμέριστος δέ, ὅτι ὅλη ἐν πᾶσι καὶ ἐν ὅτῳ οὖν αὐτοῦ ὅλη.

It is divisible in that it is in all the parts of that in which it is, but indivisible in that it is present in all the parts of it as a whole and in any one part as a whole.

#### T7 Plot. VI 4, 4, 30-32 & IV 3, 19, 9-15

τὰ δὲ σώματα μέγεθος ἔχοντα ταύτης τῆς ψυχῆς φύσεως αὐτοῖς παρούσης, μᾶλλον δὲ τῶν σωμάτων ἐκεῖ γενομένων, ὅσον ἐστὶ μεμερισμένα, κατὰ πᾶν μέρος ἐκείνης ἐμφανταζομένης τῆς φύσεως, περὶ τὰ σώματα οὕτως ἐνομίσθη εἶναι μεριστή.

Since the bodies have magnitude and this nature of soul is present to them (or rather the bodies come to be there in it), in so far as they are divided into parts, that nature being imagined present in every part, in this way it was considered to be divided in the sphere of bodies.

Τὴν δὴ σώματος φύσιν ὁρᾶν δεῖ πρὸς τὸ ζῆν οἷας ψυχῆς προσδεῖται, καὶ ὃ τι δεῖ τῆς ψυχῆς πανταχοῦ τῷ σώματι καὶ ὅλῳ παρεῖναι. Πᾶν μὲν δὴ τὸ αἰσθητικόν, εἴπερ διὰ παντὸς αἰσθήσεται, ἀφικνεῖσθαι πρὸς τὸ μερίζεσθαι· πανταχοῦ μὲν γὰρ ὃν μεμερίσθαι ἂν λέγοιτο· ὅλον δὲ πανταχοῦ φαινόμενον οὐ μεμερίσθαι ἂν παντελῶς λέγοιτο, περὶ δὲ τὰ σώματα γίγνεσθαι μεριστόν.

One must then observe what kind of soul the nature of body requires in order to live, and what of soul must be present everywhere to body as a whole. Now the whole of the sense faculty, since it is going to operate throughout the whole body, comes to divide itself; for since it is everywhere it might be said to be divided; but since it appears everywhere as a whole, it could be said not to be absolutely and completely divided, but to become “divisible in the sphere of body”.

#### T8 Porph. Intr. 1, 9-14 Busse

αὐτίκα περὶ τῶν γενῶν τε καὶ εἰδῶν τὸ μὲν εἶτε ὑφέστηκεν εἶτε καὶ ἐν μόναις ψιλαῖς ἐπινοίαις κεῖται εἶτε καὶ ὑφεστηκότα σώματά ἐστιν ἢ ἀσώματα καὶ πότερον χωριστὰ ἢ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς καὶ περὶ ταῦτα ὑφεστῶτα, παραιτήσομαι λέγειν βαθυτάτης οὐσης τῆς τοιαύτης πραγματείας καὶ ἄλλης μείζονος δεομένης ἐξετάσεως.

For instance, I shall omit to speak about genera and species, as to whether they exist or they consist in mere conceptions only; whether also, if existent, they are bodies or incorporeals, and whether they are separate from, or in, sensibles, and exist about these, for such a treatise is most profound, and requires another more extensive investigation

(trans. F. Owen).

#### T9 Porph. Sent. 19 Lamberz

Ἡ τῶν ἀσωμάτων προσηγορία οὐ κατὰ κοινότητα ἐνὸς καὶ ταύτου γένους οὕτω προσηγόρεται καθάπερ τὰ σώματα, κατὰ δὲ ψιλήν τὴν πρὸς τὰ σώματα στέρησιν· ὅθεν τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν ὄντα, τὰ δὲ οὐκ ὄντα εἶναι οὐ κεκώλυται. καὶ τὰ μὲν πρὸ σωμάτων, τὰ δὲ μετὰ σωμάτων· καὶ τὰ μὲν χωριστὰ σωμάτων, τὰ δὲ ἀχώριστα· καὶ τὰ μὲν καθ' ἑαυτὰ ὑφεστηκότα, τὰ δὲ ἄλλων εἰς τὸ εἶναι δεόμενα· καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐνεργείαις τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ζωαῖς αὐτοκινήτοις, τὰ δὲ ταῖς ζωαῖς παρυφιστάμενα καὶ ταῖς ποιαῖς ἐνεργείαις.<sup>2</sup> κατὰ γὰρ ἀπόφασιν ὧν οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐ κατὰ παράστασιν ὧν ἔστι προσηγόρεται.

The appellation “incorporeals” does not owe its provenance to the commonality of a single same genus, as is the case with bodies, but by reference to a mere lack of bodies; this is why there is nothing in the way of some of them being beings, and others non-beings, and some being prior to bodies, while others are accompaniments of bodies; of some being separable from bodies, while others are inseparable; of some subsisting in themselves, while others have need of other things for their existence; of some being identical with activities and self-moving lives, while others subsist due to the lives and the corresponding activities. For they have received this appellation of theirs by way of negation, stating what they are not, not by way of assertion of what they are

<sup>2</sup> Following J. Dillon, for παρυφιστάμεναις of W, adopted by Lamberz and T. Dorandi, I adopt the reading παρυφιστάμενα of UN. Dillon preserves the addition of <καί> proposed by L. G. Westerink. It is, however, possible to omit it, in which case I would translate: “due to the [self-moving] lives through the corresponding activities”.



(trans. J. Dillon, slightly modified)

**T10 Porph. Sent. 42**

Ἀσώματα τὰ μὲν κατὰ στέρησιν σώματος λέγεται καὶ ἐπινοεῖται κυρίως, ὡς ἡ ὕλη κατὰ τοὺς ἀρχαίους καὶ τὸ εἶδος τὸ ἐπὶ ὕλης, ὅταν ἐπινοῇται ἀποληφθὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ὕλης, καὶ αἱ φύσεις καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις· οὕτως δὲ καὶ ὁ τόπος καὶ ὁ χρόνος καὶ τὰ πέρατα. τὰ γὰρ τοιαῦτα πάντα κατὰ στέρησιν σώματος λέγεται. ἥδη δὲ ἦν ἄλλα καταχρηστικῶς λεγόμενα ἀσώματα, οὐ κατὰ στέρησιν σώματος, κατὰ δὲ <τὸ> ὅλως μὴ πεφυκέναι γεννᾶν σῶμα. διὸ τὰ μὲν κατὰ τὸ πρῶτον σημαινόμενον πρὸς τὰ σώματα ὑφίσταται, τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὸ δεύτερον χωριστὰ τέλεον σωμάτων καὶ τῶν περὶ τὰ σώματα ἀσωμάτων· σώματα μὲν γὰρ ἐν τόπῳ καὶ πέρατα ἐν σώματι, νοῦς δὲ καὶ νοερὸς λόγος οὔτε ἐν τόπῳ οὔτε ἐν {τῷ} σώματι ὑφίσταται οὔτε προσεχῶς ὑφίστησι σώματα οὔτε παρυφίσταται σώμασιν ἢ τοῖς κατὰ στέρησιν σώματος λεγομένοις ἀσωμάτοις. οὐδ' εἰ κενὸν οὖν τι ἐπινοηθεῖ ἀσώματον, ἐν κενῷ οἶόν τε εἶναι νοῦν· σώματος μὲν γὰρ δεκτικὸν ἂν εἴη τὸ κενόν, νοῦ δὲ ἐνεργεῖαν χωρῆσαι ἀμήχανον καὶ τόπον δοῦναι ἐνεργείᾳ. διττοῦ δὲ φανέντος τοῦ γένους, τοῦ μὲν οὐδ' ὅλως οἱ ἀπὸ Ζήνωνος ἀντελάβοντο, τὸ δ' ἕτερον παραδεξάμενοι καὶ τὸ ἕτερον μὴ τοιοῦτον εἶναι καθορῶντες ἀναιροῦσιν αὐτό, δέον ὡς ἄλλο γένος ἦν ὑποπεθεῖναι καὶ μὴ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἕτερον μηδὲ τοῦτο μὴ εἶναι δοξάσαι.

Of incorporeals, some are so called and conceived of properly by virtue of lack of body, as is the case with matter, according to the ancients, and the form in matter, when it is conceived of separate from matter, and natures and powers; and this is the case also with place and time and limits. For all such entities are so called by virtue of lack of body. But, it is accepted that there is another class of entities that are catachrestically termed “incorporeals”, not by virtue of lack of body, but rather by virtue of not having it in their nature to generate a body at all. Hence, those things termed incorporeal according to the first meaning of the term, “exist” close to bodies, while those so termed according to the second meaning are entirely separate from bodies and from the incorporeals that are related to bodies. For bodies exist in place and limits have their subsistence in a body, whereas Intellect and discursive reasoning, which derives from Intellect, exist neither in place nor in body, nor are they the immediate causes of the existence of bodies, nor do they subsist depending upon bodies or upon the incorporeals that are so called by reason of lack of body. And even if one conceived of some kind of incorporeal void, it would not be possible for Intellect to inhabit such a void; for void would be capable of receiving body, but it would be incapable of containing the activity of Intellect and of giving place to the activity. So then, the genus [of incorporeals] having been revealed as twofold, the followers of Zeno completely ignored one of the two, and, having accepted the second and seen the first as not being of the same sort, they abolish it, whereas they should have suspected that it was a different genus and not opine that, because the one type has no existence, the other also has none.

(trans. J. Dillon, slightly modified)

**T11 SE Adv. Math. 8, 11-12 = Fr. 33 B, I p. 197 Long-Sedley (SVF II, 166; part)**

καὶ δὴ τῆς μὲν πρώτης δόξης προεστήκασιν οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς, τρία φάμενοι συζυγεῖν ἀλλήλοις, τό τε σημαινόμενον καὶ τὸ σημαῖνον καὶ τὸ τυγχάνον, ὧν σημαῖνον μὲν εἶναι τὴν φωνήν, οἶον τὴν Δίων, σημαινόμενον δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ ὑπ' αὐτῆς δηλούμενον καὶ οὗ ἡμεῖς μὲν ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ παρυφισταμένου διανοίᾳ, οἱ δὲ βάρβαροι οὐκ ἐπαῖουσι καίπερ τῆς φωνῆς ἀκούοντες, τυγχάνον δὲ τὸ ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενον, ὥσπερ αὐτὸς ὁ Δίων. τούτων δὲ δύο μὲν εἶναι σώματα, καθάπερ τὴν φωνήν καὶ τὸ τυγχάνον, ἐν δὲ ἀσώματον, ὥσπερ τὸ σημαινόμενον πρᾶγμα, καὶ λεκτόν, ὅπερ ἀληθές τε γίνεται ἢ ψευδός.

The Stoics defended the first opinion, saying that three things are linked together, “the signification”, “the signifier”, and “the name-bearer”. Of these, the signifier is the utterance, for instance “Dion”; the signification is the actual thing revealed by the utterance, and which we apprehend as subsisting in our thought, whereas those who do not speak Greek do not understand, although they hear the utterance; the name-bearer is the external subject, for instance, Dion himself. Of these, two are bodies, namely, the utterance and the name-bearer, and one [is] incorporeal, namely, the thing signified, and sayable, which is true or false.

(trans. Long and Sedley, slightly modified)

**T12 Porph. Sent. 4**

τὰ καθ' αὐτὰ ἀσώματα ὑποστάσει μὲν καὶ Things in themselves incorporeal are not present to bodies and

οὐσία οὐ πάρεστιν οὐδὲ συγκρίνεται τοῖς σώμασι, τῇ δὲ ἐκ τῆς ῥοπῆς ὑποστάσει τινὸς δυνάμειως μεταδίδωσι προσεχοῦς τοῖς σώμασιν. ἡ γὰρ ῥοπή δευτέραν τινὰ δύναμιν ὑπέστησε προσεχῇ τοῖς σώμασιν.

do not mix with in their reality and their essence, but rather, in virtue of a reality generated by the inclination, they impart a power which is close to bodies. For the inclination generates a secondary power which is close to bodies.

(trans. J. Dillon, slightly modified)

### T13 Porph. *Sent.* 37 (part)

Οὐ διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν σωμάτων δεῖ νομίζειν τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ψυχῶν γενέσθαι, πρὸ δὲ τῶν σωμάτων εἶναι καὶ πολλὰς καὶ μίαν, οὔτε τῆς μιᾶς καὶ ὅλης κωλυούσης τὰς πολλὰς ἐν αὐτῇ εἶναι οὔτε τῶν πολλῶν τὴν μίαν εἰς αὐτὰς μερίζουσῶν. διέστησαν γὰρ οὐκ ἀποκοπεῖσαι οὐδὲ ἀποκερματίσασαι εἰς ἑαυτὰς τὴν ὅλην, καὶ πάρεσιν ἀλλήλαις οὐ συγκεχυμέναι οὐδὲ σωρὸν ποιοῦσαι τὴν ὅλην· οὔτε γὰρ πέρασιν εἰσι διειλημμέναι οὔτε πάλιν ἀλλήλαις συγκεχυμέναι, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ἐπιστῆμαι συνεχύθησαν αἱ πολλαὶ ἐν ψυχῇ μιᾷ καὶ πάλιν οὐκ ἔγκεινται ὡς τὰ σώματα τῇ ψυχῇ ἑτεροουσίως, ἀλλὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ποιαὶ ἦσαν ἐνέργειαι. Ἀπειροδύναμος γὰρ ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς φύσις καὶ καθ' ἕκαστον τὸ τυχὸν αὐτῆς ψυχῇ, καὶ αἱ πᾶσαι μία καὶ πάλιν ἡ ὅλη ἄλλη παρὰ πάσας. ὡς γὰρ τὰ σώματα ἐπ' ἄπειρον τεμνόμενα οὐ καταλήγει εἰς ἀσώματον, κατ' ὄγκον λαμβανόντων τῶν τμημάτων τὴν διαφοράν, οὕτω ψυχῇ εἶδος οὐσα ζωτικὸν ἐπ' ἄπειρον κατὰ τὰ εἶδη συνείληπται, παραλλαγὰς ἔχουσα εἰδητικὰς καὶ ἡ ὅλη σὺν ταύταις οὐσα καὶ ἄνευ τούτων· ἡ γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτῆς οἷον τομὴ ἑτερότης ἦν μενούσης τῆς ταυτότητος. [...] αὐτὴ δι' αὐτὴν ἡ ταυτότης αὐτῆς πάντα ποιεῖ καὶ εὐρίσκει διὰ τῆς ἐπ' ἄπειρον εἰδητικῆς ἐνεργείας, τοῦ τυχόντος μέρους πάντα δυναμένου ὅταν σωμάτων καθαρεύῃ, ὡς τὸ τυχὸν μέρος τοῦ σπέρματος τὴν τοῦ παντός σπέρματος ἔχει δύναμιν. Ὡσπερ δὲ κρατηθὲν ἐν ὕλῃ τι σπέρμα καθ' ἕκαστον ὧν ἐδύνατο λόγων ἐν τοῖς μέρεσι τῇ ὕλῃ κρατεῖται καὶ πάλιν συναχθὲν εἰς τὴν τοῦ σπέρματος δύναμιν καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν μερῶν ἔχει τὴν πᾶσαν δύναμιν, οὕτω καὶ ψυχῆς ἀύλου τὸ ὡς μέρος ἐπινοούμενον τῆς πάσης ψυχῆς ἔχει τὴν δύναμιν. τὸ δὲ πρὸς ὕλην ῥέψαν κεκράτηται μὲν καθ' ὃ εἶδος ῥέψαν ἐπιτηδείως ἔσχε προσομιλεῖν ἐνύλῳ, ἔχει δὲ τὴν τῆς ὅλης δύναμιν ἤδη καὶ ἐντυγχάνει οὕση ἐν ἑαυτῷ, ὅταν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐνύλου ἀποστὰν ἐν ἑαυτῷ γένηται. ἐπεὶ δὲ πρὸς μὲν ὕλην ῥεπούση ἀπορία πάντων καὶ τῆς οἰκείας δυνάμειως κένωσις, εἰς δὲ τὸν νοῦν ἀναγομένη τὸ πλῆρες αὐτῆς κατὰ <τὸ> τὴν δύναμιν ἔχειν τῆς πάσης εὐρίσκετο, τὴν μὲν εἰκότως Πενίαν, τὴν δὲ Κόρον<sup>3</sup> οἱ τοῦτο πρῶτον γνόντες τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ πάθος ἠνίξαντο.

One should not think that it is by reason of the multiplicity of bodies that the multiplicity of souls comes about, but rather that prior to bodies they are both many and one, with the single universal soul not preventing the existence of many souls within it, and the many not effecting a partition of the single soul between them. For they distinguish themselves without cutting themselves off, nor fragmenting the universal soul into themselves, and they are present to each other without confusion, nor by making the universal a mere conglomeration; for they are not divided from one another, even as the many sciences are not blended together in a single soul, and, again, are not merely juxtaposed in the soul like bodies, maintaining a distinction of substance, but they are qualitatively distinct activities of the soul.

For the nature of the soul is endowed with an infinity of powers and any individual “part” of it is still soul, and all are one, and, again, the whole is distinct from all. For even as bodies, even when infinitely divided, do not emerge as something incorporeal, since their divisions produce their distinctions in the mode of mass, so the soul, being itself a life-giving Form, is, like the Forms, conceived of even to infinity, having specific variations and being present as a whole with them and also without them; for what is sort of division in its case is really just otherness, with the sameness remaining as well. [...]

All on its own, its sameness performs and discovers everything by virtue of its formative activity, extending as it does to infinity, with any and every part having the potency of all when it is free of the body, even as any and every part of a seed possesses the potency of the whole seed.

And even as a seed, when retained by matter, is retained in all the parts of the matter in accordance with each of the reason-principles of which it contains the power, and, again, when, drawn together into the power of the seed, it has its whole power in each of its parts, even so that which is thought of as a part of the immaterial soul possesses the power of the whole soul. That aspect which is inclined towards matter is retained insofar as, in its capacity as a Form which has inclined, it has adapted itself to consort with what is material. But it already has

<sup>3</sup> κόρον ω Stob : Πόρον Cr Theiler

the power of the whole soul as well and it encounters it as existent within itself, whenever it distances itself from the material and comes to be in itself. And since, in its inclination towards matter, it experiences deprivation of everything and nullification of its own power, whereas when it is elevated towards Intellect it discovers its fullness in virtue of possessing the power of its totality, those who first recognised the experience which the soul undergoes, expressing themselves ruddingly, reasonably called the one aspect of it Poverty, and the other Ressource.

(trans. J. Dillon, slightly modified)

**T14 Hippol. Haer. V 8, 39-40 & Mesom. Fr. 5, 16 Heitsch**

Λέγουσι δὲ αὐτόν, φησί, Φρύγες καὶ «χλοερὸν στάχυν τεθερισμένον» καὶ μετὰ τοὺς Φρύγας Ἀθηναῖοι, μουῦντες Ἐλευσίνια καὶ ἐπιδεικνύντες τοῖς ἐποπτεύουσι τὸ μέγα καὶ θαυμαστὸν καὶ τελεώτατον ἐποπτικὸν ἐκεῖ μυστήριον, ἐν σιωπῇ τεθερισμένον στάχυν

He says that the Phrygians call him [Attis] “verdant harvested ear of wheat” and, in addition to the Phrygians, the Athenians, when they celebrate the Eleusinian Mysteries and, in silence, show to the initiates of the highest grade the great and admirable and most perfect epoptic mystery of Eleusis, call him “harvested ear of wheat.”

[...] ὁ τε Κρόνιος ἄμητος

[...] and the harvest of Cronus

**T15 Porph. VP 15, 1-6 = Porph. 419T Smith**

Ἐμοῦ δὲ ἐν Πλατωνείοις ποίημα ἀναγνόντος «Τὸν ἱερὸν γάμον», καὶ τινος διὰ τὸ μυστικῶς πολλὰ μετ’ ἐνθουσιασμοῦ ἐπικεκρυμμένως εἰρησθαι εἰπόντος μαίνεσθαι τὸν Πορφύριον, ἐκεῖνος εἰς ἐπήκοον ἔφη πάντων· «ἔδειξας ὁμοῦ καὶ τὸν ποιητὴν καὶ τὸν φιλόσοφον καὶ τὸν ἱεροφάντην.»

At Plato’s feast I [Porphyry] read a poem, “The Sacred Marriage”; and because much in it was expressed in the mysterious and veiled language of inspiration someone said, “Porphyry is mad.” But Plotinus said, so as to be heard by all, “You have shown yourself at once poet, philosopher, and hierophant.”

(Trans. A. H. Armstrong)

**T16 Theo Smyrn. De util. math. 14,18-16,1 Hiller**

καὶ γὰρ αὐτὴν τὴν φιλοσοφίαν μῆσιν φαίη τις ἂν ἀληθοῦς τελετῆς καὶ τῶν ὄντων ὡς ἀληθῶς μυστηρίων παράδοσιν. μῆσεως δὲ μέρη πέντε. [...] τρίτη δὲ <ή> ἐπονομαζομένη ἐποπτεία· τετάρτη δέ, ὁ δὴ καὶ τέλος τῆς ἐποπτείας, ἀνάδεσις καὶ στεμμάτων ἐπίθεσις, ὥστε καὶ ἑτέροις, ἃς τις παρέλαβε τελετάς, παραδοῦναι δύνασθαι, δαδουχίας τυχόντα ἢ ἱεροφαντίας ἢ τινος ἄλλης ἱερωσύνης [...] ἐποπτεῖαν δὲ ὀνομάζει τὴν περὶ τὰ νοητὰ καὶ τὰ ὄντως ὄντα καὶ τὰ τῶν ἰδεῶν πραγματεῖαν. ἀνάδεσιν δὲ καὶ κατὰστεψιν ἡγητέον τὸ ἐξ ὧν αὐτός τις κατέμαθεν οἷον τε γενέσθαι καὶ ἑτέρους εἰς τὴν αὐτὴν θεωρίαν καταστήσαι.

And one would say that philosophy is an initiation into the truth and a transmission of teachings about true Beings considered as the authentic Mysteries. There are five parts in initiation: [...] in the third place comes *epopteia* (“full vision”, the highest degree of initiation). The fourth stage, which is the end and the goal of *epopteia*, is the binding of the head and the placement of the crowns, in order that he who has received the sacred things, becomes capable in turn of transmitting the tradition to others, either by being Dadouchos or Hierophant, or by some other priestly work. [...] He calls *epopteia* the engagement with questions concerning the intelligibles and true Being and the Forms. Finally, he says that the binding and the crowing of the head must be understood as the faculty which is given to the disciple by those who have taught him, to lead others to the same contemplation.

(Trans. R. and L. Lawlor, slightly modified)