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1. Introduction

[T1] Porphyry, *De Abstinencia*. [1.41]. Why should we make the passions (πάθη) wither and ourselves die to them, why should we practise this every day, if it were possible (as some have argued) for us to be active in accordance with intellect while we are involved in mortal concerns that are unsupervised by the intellect? [...] **Where there is sensation and apprehension of sensation (αἴσθησις καὶ ταύτης ἀντίληψις), there is detachment from the intelligible (τοῦ νοητοῦ ἢ ἀπόστασις);** and inasmuch as non-rationality (ἄλογίας) is aroused, to that extent there is detachment from intellection. It is not possible, when being carried hither and thither, to be there despite being here. **We pay attention not with part of ourselves but with all of ourselves** (οὐ γὰρ μέρει ἡμῶν, ἀλλ' ὅλοι τὰς προσοχὰς ποιούμεθα). [1.42] Many *barbaroi*, too, have been overthrown by thinking that someone impassioned by sensation can be active about the intelligibles... (tr. Clark, adapted)

[T2] Hermias, *On Phaedrus* 77,20-78,7. [77,20-25] [The] gods for their part conduct their own secondary and tertiary activities while remaining in their own primary activities and not departing from them. But if a person, while projecting (προβάλλων) a secondary or tertiary activity from within himself, abandons (ἀφίσταται) his primary [activity], or even forgets about it, then he errs (ἀμαρτάνει)... [78,4-7] For Socrates, the ascent (ἄνοδος) to his own first principles, i.e. to contemplation, is very easy and smooth. **In the first place, he didn't abandon his primary activity when projecting the secondary one** (πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲ τὴν δευτέραν ἐνέργειαν προβάλλων ἀφίστατο τῆς πρώτης)... [58,19-59,25] [Socrates] is susceptible to the reception of more complete and divine illuminations... **Sense-perceptions and imaginal representations (φαντασίαι) are suppressed when more perfect [forces] are working on them....** (After Baltzy-Share, my emphasis)

2. Porphyry

2.1. Preamble: The Puzzle of Attention

[T3] Porphyry, *Life of Plotinus* 8,7-24. [Plotinus] was wholly concerned with mind (νοῦς)... Even if he was talking to someone, engaged in continuous conversation, he kept his train of thought. He could take his necessary part in the conversation to the full, and at the same time keep his mind fixed (τηρεῖν τὴν διάνοιαν) without a break on what he was considering (σκέψει). When the person he had been talking to was gone... he went straight on with what came next, keeping the connection... In this way he was present both to himself and to others, and never relaxed his self-turned attention (πρὸς ἑαυτὸν προσοχή) except in sleep. (After Armstrong)

[T4] James Wilberding, 'Automatic Action in Plotinus', *OSAP* 34 [2008], 391-2. This is a clear statement of the compatibility between theoretical contemplation and other-directed action. **It is, not, however, a clear**

statement that that both of these activities can actively be pursued at once, as Harder's and Bréhier's translations would suggest. As the larger context makes clear, Plotinus has already thought through some issue from beginning to end before the conversation in question takes place. Once the conversation is over, he resumes putting his thoughts down on the page as if he had never been interrupted. Thus, Porphyry is far from claiming that Plotinus made active contemplative progress while chatting over tea about some unrelated subject. He is simply paying tribute to the resilience of his master's power of concentration... The idea here is not that Plotinus can actively be making progress in both the human and the noetic arenas at precisely the same moment. Rather, they are both present to him in the sense that he never loses touch of either, and **for this reason he can alternately pursue the one without losing track of where he is in the other.** [Compare Charles Brittain, 'Attention Deficit in Plotinus and Augustine', *Boston Area Colloquium* 18.1 [2003], 223-75, on 'single-operation' and 'multiple-operation' accounts of attention in Porphyry and Augustine.]

[T5] Plato, *Rep.* 6, 500c-501b. Then the philosopher... becomes as divine and orderly as a human being can... and if he should come to be compelled to make a practice—in private and in public—of stamping what he sees there into the people's characters, instead of shaping (πλάττειν) only his own, do you think he will be a poor craftsman of moderation, justice, and the whole of popular virtue? —Not at all. — ... Will they be harsh with philosophers... when we say there is no way a city can ever find well-being (εὐδαιμονία) unless its plan is drawn by painters who use the divine model (θεῖος παράδειγμα)... they would take the city and people's habitual characters (πόλις τε καὶ ἥθη) as their sketching-slate... —as they work, they would look often in each direction (ἐκατέρωσ' ἀποβλέπειν): on the one hand, toward what is in its nature just, beautiful, temperate, and all the rest; and on the other, toward what they are trying to put into human beings... until they had made people's characters as dear to the gods as possible. (Tr. after Reeve)

2.2. Porphyry's Enmattered Forms

[T6] Porphyry, *Isagoge* 7.19-24. Socrates is said to be an individual, and so are this white thing, and this person approaching, and the son of Sophroniscus (should Socrates be his only son). **Such items are called individuals because each is constituted of proper features the assemblage of which will never be found the same in anything else**—the proper features of Socrates will never be found in any other of the particulars. (tr. Barnes)

[T7] Plotinus, *Enn.* 6.3.8.20-21. But then, is sensible substance a conglomeration of qualities and matter? (ἀλλὰ ἄρά γε ἡ αἰσθητὴ οὐσία συμφόρησις τις ποιότητων καὶ ὕλης) (tr. after Armstrong)

[T8] Plotinus, *Enn.* 6.3.8.27-38. I do not mean this in the sense that when [a quality] is there with the others it is substance, completing one mass of a particular size and quality, but elsewhere when it is not contributing to completion it is a quality, but that **even in the former case each particular one is not a substance**, but the whole made up from them all is substance. And there is no need to object if we make sensible substance out of non-substances; for **even the whole is not true substance but imitates the true substance**, which has its being without the others which attend on it, and the others come into being from it, because it truly is; but here what underlies is sterile and inadequate to be being, because the others do not come from it, but it is a shadow, and upon what is itself a shadow, a picture and a seeming.

[T9] Plotinus, *Enn.* 6.3.15.25-39. It was said about the qualitative that, mixed together with others, matter and the quantitative, it effects the completion of sensible substance, and that this so-called substance is this compound of many, and is not a "something" but a "something like"; and the rational form, of fire for instance, indicates rather the "something", but the shape it produces is rather a quale. **And the rational form of man is the being a "something" (ti), but its product in the nature of body, being an image of the form, is rather a sort of "something like" (poios).** It is as if, the visible Socrates being a man, his painted picture, being colours and painter's stuff, was called Socrates; in the same way, therefore, since there is a rational form according to which Socrates is, the sense-perceptible Socrates should not rightly be said to be Socrates, but colours and

shapes which are representations of those in the form; and this rational form in relation to the truest form of man is affected in the same way. And so much for that.

2.3. Porphyry on Attending to Sensibles or Intelligibles: A 'painterly' model

[T10] Plotinus, *Enn.* 1.4.10. Why should not mind (*nous*) itself be active [without sensation], and also its attendant soul (*psychē*), which comes before sensation and any sort of apprehension (*antilēpsis*)? There must be an activity prior to apprehension if 'thinking (*noein*) and being are the same' [Parmenides fr. B3]. It seems as if apprehension exists and is produced when the activity of mind bends back again (*anakamptein*) and when whatever in the life of the soul is active in thinking (*noein*) is in a way projected back, as happens with a mirror-reflection when there is a smooth, bright, untroubled surface. (After Armstrong) [Compare T1 on *antilēpsis*]

[T11] Porphyry, *On the Faculties of the Soul*, fragment. We propose to describe the faculties of the soul [...] Aristo ... attributes to the soul an apprehensive faculty (*antilēptikēn dunamin*), which he divides into two parts... sensibility (*to aisthētikon*), the principle and origin of partial sensations (*tōn kata meros aisthēseōn*)... the other... intelligence (*nous*). Aristo holds that sensibility acts only with the help of sense-organs, and that intelligence does not need them. Why then does he subordinate each of these to a single genus, called the apprehensive faculty?

[Porphyry responds to Aristo] Both [sensibility and intelligence] doubtless apprehend, but the one apprehends the sense-form of beings, while the other apprehends their essence. Indeed, sensibility does not apprehend the essence, but the sense-form, and the figure; it is intelligence that apprehends whether the object be a man or a horse. There are, therefore, two kinds of apprehension that are very different from each other: sensory apprehension receives an impression, and applies itself to an exterior object, while intellectual apprehension does not receive an impression.

There have been philosophers who separated these two parts. They called intelligence or discursive reason the understanding which is exercised without imagination and sensation; and they called opinion the understanding which is exercised with imagination and sensation.

Others, on the contrary, considered rational being, or nature, a simple essence, and attributed to it operations whose nature is entirely different. Now it is unreasonable to refer to the same essence faculties which differ completely in nature: for thought and sensation could not depend on the same essential principle, and if we were to call the operation of intelligence an apprehension, we would only be juggling with words. We must, therefore, establish a perfectly clear distinction between these two entities, intelligence and sensibility. (Fragment of Porphyry derived from Stobaeus, *Eclogae Physicae*, 1.49.24 ed. Heeren, tr. Guthrie; my emphasis)

[T12] Report of Ammonius Saccas on the union of soul and body. Ammonius, teacher of Plotinus, thus explained the present problem [...] What proves that the soul does not form a mixture with the body is the soul's power to separate from the body during sleep—leaving the body as it were inanimate, with only a breath of life, to keep it from dying entirely—and using her own activity only in dreams, to foresee the future, and to live in the intelligible world. This appears again when the soul gathers herself together to devote herself to her thoughts; for then she separates from the body so far as she can, and retires within herself better to be able to apply herself to the consideration of intelligible things. (Compare *Enn.* 4.3.20; and *Phaedo* 67c-d: 'And does purification (*katharsis*) not turn out to be what we mentioned in our argument some time ago, namely, to separate (*khōrizein*) the soul as far as possible from the body and accustom (*ethisai*) it to gather itself and collect itself (*sunageiresthai te kai athroizesthai*) out of every part of the body and to dwell by itself (*oikein... monēn kath' hautēn*) as far as it can both now and in the future, freed, as it were, from the bonds of the body?') (From *Nemesius On Human Nature* 2, tr. Guthrie)

3. Iamblichus

3.1. Iamblichus on Enmattered Forms

[T13] Porphyry and Iamblichus at Simplicius *in Cat.* 53,7-18. Porphyry says that the concept (*epinoia*) of ‘animal’ is twofold: one is of the coordinated (*katatetagmenon*) animal, and the other of the uncoordinated (*akatataton*). Thus, the uncoordinated is predicated of the coordinated, and thereby it is ‘different’. Iamblichus, however, says that ‘it is not genera which are predicated of substrata, but other things by means of these. For when we say, “Socrates is a man”, we are not saying he is the generic (*genikon*) Man, but rather that he *participates* in the generic Man, just as saying that “the vine is white” is the same as saying “it bears white grapes”, since the vine is so called by reference to its fruit. Aristotle made clear distinctions with regard to these matters in the *Metaphysics*. Here, however, he has used meanings in a more common way, as we also do when we say that “definitions are from genus and differentiae”: here we do not take “genus” in the proper sense, but are using it instead of “case”, which is explained by “participation in the generic”.’ [Construals of the Porphyry testimonium are controversial: for instance, P. Hadot offered an ontological interpretation, construing ‘uncoordinated’ as *ante rem* Idea; Ebbesen and later Lloyd regard Porphyry’s intent as logico-semantic only; see Chiaradonna, ‘Porphyry and Iamblichus on Universals and Synonymous Predication’, p. 13, and Chase, *Simplicius on Categories* ad loc.]

[T14] Riccardo Chiaradonna, ‘Porphyry and Iamblichus on Universals’, p. 15. While Porphyry’s genus is a physical form, Iamblichus points out that the genus is a transcendent *ante rem* form and that physical individuals participate in it (Simplicius *in Cat.*, p. 53, 10-12 Kalbfleisch). For Iamblichus, the ‘generic’ man is not the embodied form of man, but the transcendent form.

[T15] Simplicius *in Cat.* 130.14–19. But Iamblichus says: ‘Like the other enmattered forms, number is present in, and co-exists with, things that are enumerated; but it does not have its being in them in an unqualified sense, nor is its being supervenient on them by concurrence, nor does it arrive with the status of an accident, **but it has some substance of its own along with the things <that it is in>**, according to which it determines the things that participate and arranges them according to the appropriate measure” (ὁ δὲ Ἰάμβλιχος φησιν ὅτι “ὥσπερ τὰ ἄλλα ἐνυλὰ εἶδη, οὕτως καὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς πάρεστι μὲν καὶ συνυπάρχει τοῖς διαριθμουμένοις πράγμασιν, οὐ μέντοι ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀπλῶς ἔχει τὴν ὑπόστασιν, οὐδὲ ἐπιγινωμένην αὐτοῖς κατ’ ἐπακολούθησιν οὐδὲ ἐν συμβεβηκότος τάξει παραγινωμένην, ἔχουσιν δὲ τινα ἰδίαν μετὰ τῶν πραγμάτων οὐσίαν, καθ’ ἣν ἀφορίζει καὶ πρὸς τὸ οἰκεῖον μέτρον συντάττει τὰ μετέχοντα).

[T16] Simplicius *in Cat.* 145.15–19. As the form approaches matter a certain power, a mixture of the two, comes-to-be; for in so far as this power partakes of the form, what is enmattered is likened to it and becomes great and small; but according to its own indeterminacy it partakes of the more and less, relationship to something and change to contraries (προσιόντος γὰρ τοῦ εἶδους τῇ ὕλῃ σύμμικτός τις ἀπ’ ἀμφοῖν γίνεται δύναμις· καθ’ ὅσον μὲν γὰρ μεταλαμβάνει τοῦ εἶδους, ὁμοιοῦται πρὸς αὐτὸ καὶ γίνεται πολὺ καὶ μέγα τὸ ἐνυλόν, κατὰ δὲ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀπειρίαν τοῦ μὴ ὄν καὶ ἦττον καὶ τῆς πρὸς τι σχέσεως καὶ τῆς ἐπὶ τὰ ἐναντία μεταβολῆς μεταλαμβάνει).

For broad comparison, see also G. Karamanolis, ‘Porphyry and Iamblichus’, in J. Warren & F. Sheffield, *Routledge Companion to Ancient Philosophy*, ch. 43.

3.2. Iamblichus on the Descending Soul

[T17] Iamblichus, *De Anima*, from Stobaeus 367.1-368.20. [...] Now Plato does not think that the powers exist in the soul as separate from it, but says that they are naturally conjoined with the soul and coexist with it in a single form because of the incomposite essence of the soul. [...] According to those who think that the soul lives a double life, one in itself and one in conjunction with the body, they are present in the soul in one way but in the common animal in another, as Plato and Pythagoras think. According to those, on the other hand, who think that there is a single life of the soul, that of the composite — because the soul is

commingled with the body, as the Stoics say, or because the soul gives its whole life to the common living being, as the Peripatetics confidently assert — according to them there is a single way in which the powers are present: by being shared in or by being mingled with the whole living being. (tr. Finamore & Dillon) [Compare: Porphyry in T11, above]

[T18] Iamblichus, *De Anima*, from Stob. 369.3-370.17. Plotinus removes from the soul the irrational powers: those of perception, imagination, memory, and discursive reasoning. He includes only pure reason in the pure essence of the soul, on the grounds that it has a power bound up with the very nature of the soul's essence. Democritus the Platonist and his followers, however, attribute all these kinds of faculty to the essence of the soul. Plato assumes that the powers belong both to souls themselves and to the living beings, distinguishing each in accordance with each life. Porphyry and Plotinus and their followers maintain that the soul projects its own powers to each part of the universe and that the lives, howsoever they have been projected, are dissolved and cease to exist, similar to objects that grow from a seed, when the seed withdraws into itself. One might perhaps propose not unpersuasively the rather novel theory that these powers continue to exist in the universe and do not perish.

[T19] Iamblichus, *De Anima* from Stobaeus 1.378.18-380.28. Individual souls, on the other hand, attach themselves to bodies, fall under the control of bodies, and come to dwell in bodies that are already overcome by the nature of the Universe. [...] Furthermore, pure and perfect souls come to dwell in bodies in a pure manner, without passions and without being deprived of intellection, but opposite souls in an opposite manner. [...] For the soul that descends for the salvation, purification, and perfection of this realm is immaculate in its descent. The soul, on the other hand, that directs itself about bodies for the exercise and correction of its own character is not entirely free of passions and was not sent away free in itself. The soul that comes down here for punishment and judgment seems somehow to be dragged and forced. <Certain more recent philosophers> [...] do not make these distinctions [...]

3.3. Inspired Contemplation and Action in Iamblichus: A 'dancerly' model

[T20] Damascius *On Phaedo* 1.144: The Scale of Virtues [See Figure 1 below]. [Lists (1) natural, (2) habituated, (3) civic, (4) purificatory, (5) contemplative virtues] (6) Paradigmatic virtues are those of the soul when it no longer contemplates the intelligence (contemplation involving separateness), but has already reached the stage of being by participation the intelligence that is the paradigm of all things; therefore these virtues too are called 'paradigmatic', inasmuch as virtues belong primarily to intelligence itself. This category is added by Iamblichus in his treatise *On Virtues*. Lastly, there are (7) the hieratic virtues, which belong to the godlike (θεοειδές) part of the soul; they correspond to all the categories mentioned above, with the difference that while the others are existential, these are unitary (ἀντιπαρήκουσαι πάσαις ταῖς εἰρημέναις οὐσιώδεσιν οὐσαις ἐνιαυαί γε ὑπάρχουσιν). This kind, too, has been outlined by Iamblichus, and discussed more explicitly by the school of Proclus. [Ed. and tr. Westerink 1977, lightly adapted; repr. PT 2009]

[T21] Damascius *On Phaedo* 1.172. To some philosophy has primary value (προτιμῶσιν), as to Porphyry and Plotinus and a great many other philosophers; to others, hieratic practice, as to Iamblichus, Syrianus, Proclus, and the hieratic school generally. Plato, however, recognizing that strong arguments can be advanced from both sides, has united the two into one single truth by calling the philosopher a 'Bacchus' [...] (After Westerink)

[T22] Hermias *On Phaedrus* 88,17-31. And there is [yet] another [part of the soul] above this that is the highest and most unified [part] (ἀκρότατον... ἐνιχώτατον) of the entire soul, that wants what is good for all things and always devotes itself to the gods and is ready to bring about whatever they wish. This is called One of the soul (ἐν... τῆς ψυχῆς) and bears the image (ἰνδαλμα) of the One above being (ὑπερουσίον ἑνός), giving unity to the entire soul. (Baltzly-Share 2018 & forthcoming)

[T23] Hermias *On Phaedrus* 89,14-19. So the inspiration that is primarily and properly speaking and truly from gods occurs in connection with this One of the Soul that is above discursive thought and above the intellect in it [sc. in the soul]—a one that is at other times [sc. in the absence of inspiration] like someone who is exhausted and asleep [cf. Plotinus *Enn.* 1.4.9-10]. But when this one is illuminated, the whole of life—the intellect, discursive thought, the irrational [part of the soul] (ἀλογία)—is illuminated and a reflection (ἠδάλμα) of the inspiration is granted all the way [down] to the body itself. (Tr. Baltzly-Share, adapted)

[T24] Hermias *On Phaedrus* 93,19-30. Originally and at first the soul was united with the gods and that ‘one’ of its was joined to (συνήπτο) the gods. Then, withdrawing from that divine union, it descended to intellect (νοῦς) and no longer possessed [all] there is (τὰ ὄντα) in a unified manner and in one but gazed upon it and saw it by means of simple apprehensions (ἀπλᾶς ἐπιβολαίς) and, as it were, direct contacts [on the part] of its mind (θίξεσι τοῦ νοῦ). Then, withdrawing from intellect too and descending to reasoning and discursive thought (διάνοια), it no longer gazed upon it by means of simple apprehensions either, but by moving syllogistically and step by step and one thing after another from premisses to conclusions. Then, departing too from pure reasoning and the psychic mode (ιδιώματος), it descended into generation and was infected with great irrationality and confusion. It must, then, return once more to its own origins and go back once more to the place whence it descended. And in this ascent and restoration these four types of madness assist it.... (After Baltzly-Share) [See Figure 2 for ‘scale of inspirations’ in Hermias, deriving from Syrianus.]

[Review T2, above: Socrates’ contemplation and action]

[T25] Hermias *On Phaedrus* 58,19-59,25. [F]or ways of life of ours that are appropriate and of a particular kind, appropriate irradiations and inspirations are granted us from the gods, and we are familiarized (οἰκειούμεθα) to different gods at different times according to the nature of our life... **So, since the present life of Socrates is purificatory (καθαρτική) and elevating** (for he wishes to save the young man and remove him from [the spell of] the beauty in [the realm of] generation, or external beauty, **and since the Nymphs and Dionysus are overseers of generation, on that account he declares that he is inspired by the Nymphs, or Nymph-possessed (νυμφόληπτος)**... as if he had offered up his life to the gods that oversee generation and was receiving inspiration from that source... because... **he is susceptible to the reception of more complete and divine illuminations (εἰς τὴν τῶν τελειοτέρων καὶ θεῶν ἐλλάμψεων ὑποδοχὴν).** Perceptions and mental representations (φαντασίαι) are suppressed when more perfect [forces] are working on them.... [Socrates said he is talking in dithyrambs because of Dionysus, and] **Dionysus... creates the enmattered forms for a second time and prepares all generation to go forth...** the god’s activity is in [the realm of] generation, which is where the disjointed and compound [occur]. (After Baltzly-Share) [Purificatory virtue arises by inspiration from Dionysus; note with Olymp. *On Phaedo* 4.3 that the purificatory person sees sense-objects and Forms].

[T26] *Chaldaean Oracles* fr. 1. You must not perceive it intently, but keeping the pure eye of your soul turned away, you should extend an empty mind (κενὸν νόον) toward the intelligible (νοητόν) in order to comprehend it, since it exists outside of mind (νοῦς). (After Majercik)

[T27] Olympiodorus, *On Alcibiades* 63,11-64,1. If learning is sometimes superior to discovery—for instance, when we learn from gods through dreams—we should recognize that in this situation, activity motivated by another is actually preferable to activity motivated by oneself; for it benefits us to be led by a god rather than by ourselves.

[T28] Plotinus, *Enn.* 6.9.10,19–21. ... the vision is hard to put into words. For how could one announce that as ‘another’ when he did not see, there when he had the vision, another, but one with himself? (διὸ καὶ δύσφραστον τὸ θέαμα· 20 πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἀπαγγεῖλαι τις ὡς ἕτερον οὐκ ἰδὼν ἐκεῖ ὅτε ἐθεάτο ἕτερον, ἀλλὰ ἐν πρὸς ἑαυτόν;) (Armstrong)

3.4. Iamblichus and the Third Demiurge

[T29] Adrien Lecerf, 'Iamblichus and Julian's "Third Demiurge": A Proposition', in Berchman & Finamore [eds.], *Iamblichus and the Foundations of Late Platonism* [Brill, 2012], p. 181. Following a principle set out by [J.] Bouffartigue,¹ we may consider substantially Iamblichean any passage of Julian's Orations that bears parallels with Proclean texts.

[T30] Julian, *Oration to the Mother of the Gods* 161d-162a. The nature of the third creator, who contains in himself the separate concepts of the forms that are embodied in matter and also the connected chain of causes, I mean that nature which is last in order, and through its superabundance of generative power descends even unto our earth through the upper region from the stars—this is he whom we seek, even Attis (tr. Wright)

[T31] Julian, *Mother of the Gods* 165a-b. Accordingly, since for the forms embodied in matter a wholly immaterial cause has been assigned, which leads these forms under the hand of the third creator—who for us is the lord and father not only of these forms but also of the visible fifth—from that creator we distinguish Attis, the cause which descends even unto matter, and we believe Attis or Gallus is a god of generative powers.

[T32] Julian, *Mother of the Gods* 168a. Therefore it is not contradictory to suppose that our Attis also is a sort of demigod—for that is actually the meaning of the myth—or rather for the universe he is wholly god, for he proceeds from the third creator, and after his castration is collected again and reunited to the Mother of the Gods. But though he seems to lean and incline towards matter, one would not be mistaken in supposing that, though he is the lowest in order of the gods, nevertheless he is the leader of all the tribes of divine beings

[T33] Julian, *Oration to King Helios*, 140a. Again, to take another point of view, the demiurge of the whole is one (εἷς μὲν ὁ τῶν ὅλων δημιουργός), but many are the demiurgic gods who revolve in the heavens (πολλοὶ δὲ οἱ κατ' οὐρανὸν περιπολοῦντες δημιουργικοὶ θεοί).

[T34] Proclus, *On Timaeus* I, 309.14–15. After Iamblichus, Theodorus, following Amelius, says that there are three Demiurges.

[T35] Proclus, *On Timaeus* I, 446.1–8. Of the Demiurgies, (1) the first is total, one and indivisible; (2) the second is divisible, pluralized and proceeds by fragmentation; (3) the third is not only divisible, as is the one before it, but it is also in contact with things that come to be and the Forms contained in them. And in his work [Plato's] you may also find the Monads of these three Demiurgies, that of Zeus, that of Dionysus, that of Adonis, according to which he also distinguished between the three Constitutions, as we have said elsewhere (cf. Proclus, *On Republic* II, 8.15–21 Kroll)

[T36] Proclus, *On Cratylus* §182, ll. 25–26. All particular creation depends on the Dionysiac monad.

[T37] Julian, *Against Heracleios*, 222a3–5. [T]he essential nature of Dionysus, uniform and wholly indivisible as it is in the divisible world and preexisting whole and unmixed in all things (tr. Wright)

A series of demiurgic gods

(1) Helios–Zeus

Total, one,
indivisible

(2) Dionysus

Divisible, pluralized

(3) Adonis

Divisible, now in
contact with
becoming

(4) Attis

Inclines and returns
from the unlimited

¹ *L'Empereur Julien et la culture de son temps*, coll. "Antiquité", 133; Paris: Institut d'Études Augustiniennes, 1992, 355.

[T38] Iamblichus, *On Ethical and Theological Arithmetic*, extract. The earthly [aspect of the monad], indivisible in the divided, full in the lacking (καὶ τὸ περίγειον [sc. τῆς μονάδος] ἀδιαίρετον ἐν τοῖς διηρημένοις, πλήρεις ἐν τοῖς <ἐν>δεέσιν) (Preserved in Psellus, ed. O'Meara, *Pythagoras Revived*, pp. 222–229, ll. 74–75)

[T39] Adrien Lecerf, 'Iamblichus', pp. 186–88. The “dismemberment” (σπαραγμός) of Dionysus, which is almost certainly the basis for the doctrine of the “divided demiurgy” is mentioned in *Against the Galilaeans*, 49a... the consequence must be that Julian’s “third Demiurge” is an equivalent to Adonis, the third term of Proclus’ demiurgic Triad that acts, for us, as a piece of comparison. But this is obviously more difficult, as nowhere in Julian’s works is Adonis to be found. We then have to take into account the functional analogies between the two gods [sc. Adonis and Attis] [...] According to Proclus, Adonis, who is responsible for the third Demiurgy, is the “Demiurge who renews what is submitted to birth and death” (τὸν τὰ γιγνόμενα καὶ φθειρόμενα ἀνυφαίνοντα (δημιουργόν) [*On Republic* II, 8.20–21]). We have an exact parallel for this phrase in Sallustius’ *Concerning the Gods and the Universe*: ὁ δὲ Ἀττίς τῶν γινομένων καὶ φθειρομένων δημιουργός [*De Diis et Mundo*, IV, 8] [...] The proximity between these two gods would tentatively account for the substitution of Attis in place of Adonis (or, rather, the former’s subjection to the latter, if he [sc. Adonis] really is the “third Demiurge”). That it made more sense, from an Iamblichean point of view, to include Adonis was well seen by Opsomer [Opsomer (2003) 40–42], who convincingly asserts that the theologization of Adonis in Neoplatonism rose from an interpretation of *Phaedrus* 276b: the “gardens of Adonis”, which, growing and decaying soon after, can easily be interpreted as symbols of generation and corruption.²

[T40] Adrien Lecerf, 'Iamblichus', pp. 196–97. In Julian’s *Oration*, Attis himself symbolizes the metaphysical tension that appears as the Form approaches matter. This is the meaning of the myth: Attis, possessing the causes of enmattered Forms, becomes mad and approaches the cave of the Nymph, i.e. the cause presiding over matter. Using metaphorical language, the myth describes this as madness and as a fall: Attis’ “inclination” (νεύσις, 166d) towards matter represents the danger of unlimitedness. Fortunately, the Mother saves him, at the expense of his castration. “What is the meaning of this castration?” Julian asks: “it is the checking of the unlimited: for now was generation confined within definite Forms checked by creative Providence” [167c6–d1]. “This castration, so much discussed by the crowd, is really the halting of his unlimited course” [168d4–5]. We must above all notice the opposition between Form and unlimitedness here: “forever [Attis] cuts short his unlimited course through the cause whose limits are fixed, even the cause of the Forms” (ἀεὶ δὲ ἀποτέμνεται τὴν ἀπειρίαν διὰ τῆς ὀρισμένης τῶν εἰδῶν αἰτίας) [171d2–3] [...] The Iamblichean tenets of Julian’s *Oration* now appear in full light: while the highest divine levels preserve undefiled the Forms of higher beings, the lowest gods (and in particular Attis, often described by Julian as the “last of the Gods”) take charge of the enmattered Forms, i.e. Forms that mingle with matter and accomplish a descent of sorts on their own.

4. Postscript: Scales of Virtue and Inspiration

[T41] Olympiodorus, *On Phaedo* 8.2. ... Let us enumerate the degrees of virtues. They are five ... [(1) natural, (2) habituated, (3) civic, (4) purificatory, (5) contemplative]. Plotinus holds that there is (6) another degree... that of the paradigms. There are... our soul is at first illuminated by *nous*... then becomes in a way identical with the source of the illumination and acts unifically according to the paradigmatic virtues (ἐνοειδῶς ἐνεργεῖ κατὰ τὰς παραδειγματικές, 8.2.18–19; not ‘in union with the One’ with Wk]. The object of philosophy is to make

² Lecerf adds: ‘I would seriously doubt the plausibility of Opsomer’s hypothesis in his article, tentatively identifying Adonis with the sublunar Demiurge of Iamblichus’ Fr.1 In Sophistam. I would rather see in him the god Hades, because of his association to soul *katharsis* (a prerogative of Hades, according to Proclus’ *In Cratylum*), and above all because the sublunar Demiurge is described as a Sophist. Hades is described as a Sophist in Plato’s dialogues; Adonis is not’. (188)

us νοῦς, that of theurgy to unite us with the intelligible principles and conform our activity to the paradigms. [Compare Damascius *On Phaedo* 1.144, T20 above]

[T42] **Marinus, *Life of Proclus* 3.** First, let us divide the virtues into their kinds, [1] the natural, [2] the ethical and [3] the political, and again those which transcend these, [4] the purificatory, [5] the contemplative, and [6] those that are called theurgic, while as to [7] those that are higher even than these we shall keep silence, because they exceed the human condition. (After Edwards)

[T43] **Olympiodorus, *On Alcibiades* 172,5–12.** ‘[S]elf-knowledge’ is said in many ways (πολλαχῶς ἐστὶ γινῶναι ἑαυτόν): it is possible (ο) to know oneself with respect to one’s external [possessions]; and of course it is possible (1) to know oneself with respect to one’s body; and it is possible (3) to know oneself as a civic or social person (πολιτικῶς), when one knows oneself in the tripartition of one’s soul [as reason, spirited-emotion, and appetite in harmony]; and it is possible (4) to know oneself as a purificatory person (καθαρτικῶς), when one knows oneself in the act of liberation from the affections (πάθη); and (5) it is possible to know oneself as a contemplative person (θεωρητικῶς), when a person contemplates himself as liberated (ἀπολελυμένον ἑαυτόν); (6) it is possible to know oneself theologically (θεολογικῶς), when a person knows himself according to his paradigmatic Form (τὴν ἰδέαν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ); and (7) it is possible to know oneself in an inspired sense (ἐνθουσιαστικῶς), when a person knows oneself according to unity (κατὰ τὸ ἕν) and, thus bonded to his proper god, acts with inspiration (συναπτόμενος τῷ οἰκείῳ θεῷ ἐνθουσιᾷ). [Cp. *On Alc.* 20,4-13: choose the walk of life ‘according to essence’, ‘natural’, bonded with one’s god]. (Griffin 2014 & 2016)

[T44] **Proclus *On Cratylus* §113, 65,20-26.** And proceeding even higher than this [region], they have been able to reveal the limit of the intelligible gods only by name and indicate the beings beyond, since they are ineffable and incomprehensible, by analogy alone. This is because even at the intelligible level itself of the gods only this God who encompasses the paternal order is said by wise men to be nameable, and **theurgy ascends all the way to this order.** (Duvick 2007)

[Figure 1] Scale of Virtues, per Damascius *On Phaedo* 1.138-44, augmented by Olympiodorus *On Phaedo* 8.2-4³

No.	Sources	Level	Tier of <i>aretē</i>		Description		Reading	
7	Iamblichus	Beyond Philosophy	Hieratic (<i>hieratikē</i>)	Inspired (<i>enthousiastikē</i>)	Ritual praxis	Divine inspiration	<i>Orphica, Chald. Or.</i>	Increasing Unity ↑
6	Plotinus & Porphyry		Paradigmatic (<i>paradeigmatikē</i>)		<i>Nous</i> containing Forms (Plotinus) Union of soul with <i>nous</i> reaching Intelligibles (after Iamblichus)		Pl. <i>Tim., Parm.</i>	
5		Philosophy	Contemplative (<i>theōrētikē</i>)		Soul's <i>logos</i> as <i>nous</i> witnessing Forms		Pl. <i>Symp, Tht.</i>	
4			Purificatory (<i>kathartikē</i>)		Soul's <i>logos</i> withdrawing from <i>alogos</i> faculties, cultivating single-pointed attention. → <i>Apatheia</i> .		Pl. <i>Phd.</i>	
3			Civic (<i>politikē</i>)		Soul's <i>logos</i> harmonizing faculties: <i>Logos, thumos, epithumia</i> → <i>Metriopatheia</i> .		Pl. <i>Alc., Grg., Rep.</i>	
2		Iamblichus	Before Philosophy	Habituated (<i>ēthikē</i>)		Tenuously virtuous dispositions caused by habit & upbringing.		
1		Natural (<i>phusikē</i>)		Virtuous dispositions from natural temperament (<i>krasis</i>)		Pl. <i>Legg.</i>		

[Figure 2] Hermias' Scale of Inspirations, summarizing *On Phaedrus* 88,15-96,24

Scale of Inspirations	Inward activity	Outward activity	Scale of Virtues
Inspiration of Erōs	Fusing unity with a god's	Love	Paradigmatic virtue
Inspiration of Apollo	Bringing psychē to unity	Prophetic activity	Contemplative virtue
Inspiration of Dionysus	Making a whole of psychē	Ritual activity	Purificatory virtue
Inspiration of the Muses	Harmonizing psychē	Music, rhythm	Civic virtue

³ **Background:** Plato, *Tht.* 176B & *Rep.* 500C–D (likeness to God); *Rep.* 441D–443B & *Phaedo* 82A–B ('civic' virtues); *Phaedo* 69C ('purificatory' virtues); Aristotle, *EN* 2.1, 1103a14–18 and 6.13, 1144b9 ('natural' & 'habituated' virtues, & distinction from practical wisdom); Aristotle, *EN* 10.7, 1177a12–24 ('contemplative' virtue). **Sources:** Plotinus, *Enn.* 1.2; Porphyry, *Sent.* 32; Iamblichus, *On Virtues* [lost]; Macrobius, *Somn. Scip.* 1.8,5; Hierocles, *carm. aur.* 422b5–9; Marinus, *Life of Proclus* 3; Ammonius, *in Int.* 135,19–32; Philoponus *in Cat.* 141.25–142.3; Damascius *On Phaedo* 1.138–44; Olymp. *On Phaedo* 8.2–4 and *On Alc.* 172,5–12; on curriculum, Ammonius, *in Cat.* 6.9–20; Philoponus, *in Cat.* 5.34–6.2; Olymp., *Prol.* 9.14–30; Simplicius, *in Cat.* 6.6–15 and *On Epict.* 2,30–3,2. **Studies:** Chiaradonna 2021 ('Ethics and the Hierarchy of Virtues'). See Finamore 2021, Baltzly 2004, Dillon 1996, O'Meara 2013 and 2012, Tarrant 2007. On curriculum, Hoffmann 1987, Griffin 2014 and 2016, Intro. Westerink 1976, 116–18 (n. ad. Olymp. *in Phaed.* 8.2), offers a summary of textual sources.