Porphyry of Tyre (c. 234-304), Plotinus’ disciple and editor, remains an enigmatic figure in the history of Neoplatonism: “we are faced with a figure whom we know to have been respected in late antiquity, who was influential long beyond then, but we do not know with any certainty what he stood for philosophically or what was original with him in the central areas of philosophy” (Emilsson 2022). Despite Pierre Hadot’s (1966; 1968) and Andrew Smith’s (1974; 1987; 1993; 2011) groundbreaking work, Porphyry’s metaphysics have been less studied in comparison to other aspects of his thought, such as logic, the ethical-religious aspect, and his opposition to Christianity (which seems to have been exaggerated or at least to have been read rather univocally; see Edwards 2007; Becker 2016). This is due in part to the largely fragmentary nature of Porphyry’s surviving evidence but also to the fact that some of his treatises that do survive have sometimes been neglected as “soft” philosophy.

However, although Porphyry’s arguably most innovative metaphysical writings (such as, for instance, Περὶ ἀρχῶν and Περὶ ἀσωμάτων) have been almost entirely lost, judging from what is extant, it is clear that he systematically engaged with metaphysical and ontological issues concerning the higher realms of reality, God, mind, soul, transcendence, existence, time and eternity, causality, incorporeality, matter, etc. Relevant problems were discussed in several metaphysical treatises whose remnants and/or titles are collected by Andrew Smith in his Teubner edition (1993), and which include, among others, Ἀφορμαὶ πρὸς νοητά or Launching Points to the Intelligibles, commonly referred to as the Sententiae (ed. Lamberz 1975; Brisson et al. 2005), Σύμμικτα ζητήματα (fr. 256-263 Smith) reconstructed by Dörrie (1959), and Πρὸς Γαῦρον περὶ τοῦ πῶς ἐμψυχοῦται τὰ ἔμβρυα (ed. Dorandi in Brisson et. al. 2012; translated by Wilberding 2011). To the abovementioned works, one should add passages of metaphysical interest scattared throughout the corpus, from Porphyry’s Platonic commentaries, including the Commentary on the Timaeus (ed. Sodano 1964), to his historical, ethical, and mythical treatises. Most interestingly, latest research (Chiaradonna 2014; Id. 2022) tends to support Hadot’s ingenious but controversial (contra: Edwards 1990; Bechtle 1999, Corrigan 2000, Rasimus 2011) attribution of the anonymous Commentary on the Parmenides (ed. Kroll 1892; Linguiti 1995) to Porphyry or, at least, to an author belonging to his circle (Smith 2015). If Porphyry is indeed the highly original author of this commentary, we ought to reconsider his metaphysics as a whole.

This workshop examines aspects of Porphyry’s psychology. From a famous passage of the Life of Plotinus (13, 10-11), we gather that problems on soul were of special interest to Porphyry, who famously spent three days asking his teacher questions about soul’s presence to body. Porphyry’s views on soul, the third so-called “Hypostasis” (according to the formula “three primary Hypostases” that Porphyry chose for describing Plotinus’ first principles in the title of Enneads V 1), are contained in the Sententiae but also in other works most of which survive in fragments drawn mainly from Stobaeus, Nemesius of Emesa, St Augustine, and Eusebius of Caesarea. Relevant works include, for instance, Περὶ ψυχῆς πρὸς Βόηθον ε’ (fr. 241-250 Smith), Περὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεων (fr. 251-255 Smith), and Σύμμικτα ζητήματα (fr. 256-263 Smith).

Focusing on the surviving evidence, we are interested in questions concerning soul’s relationship to Intellect but also soul’s own divine nature, the distinction between higher or rational and lower or irrational soul (Trabattoni 2020) as well as soul’s connection with, and separation from, body. In what sense is soul in Intellect and still distinct from it? How can soul, an incorporeal entity, be present to body (Dörrie 1959; Emilsson 1994; Viltanioti 2017)? When does soul connect with body, at birth or in advance of it? What is the role of the astral body (πνεῦμα / ὄχημα)? In what sense(s) can soul, an indivisible entity, be said to have parts? What is the relationship between soul’s parts and powers? Does Porphyry distinguish between a necessary and a voluntary descent of Soul, like Plotinus? What is life and what is death in the case of the immortal soul (Viltanioti 2017)? What is soul’s fate after physical death? Does Porphyry deny, unlike Plotinus, transmigration of human souls into animals (Deuse 1983; Smith 1984)? How does the harmonisation of Plato and Aristotle (Karamanolis 2006) form the framework of Porphyry’s views on soul? To what extent is middle-Platonism present in Porphyry’s psychology (Zambon 2002)? How do later, Ancient and Byzantine, Neoplatonists approach Porphyry’s views on Soul? What additional information can we gain from the Arabic sources (Adamson 2007; D’Ancona 2008)?

By shedding new light on Porphyry’s views on soul, we aim at taking a departure from the traditional view (Bidez 1913; Dodds 1963) that tends to see Porphyry as a learned spokesperson of Plotinus rather than as an original metaphysician. To that aim, the workshop will be partly devoted to Περὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεων (fr. 251-255 Smith), a treatise that has not been systematically studied by now. Following Andrew Smith’s Teubner edition of Porphyry’s fragments and Tiziano Dorandi’s forthcoming edition of Stobaeus, we will provide a translation and commentary of this neglected work in which Porphyry investigates the problem of soul’s divisibility and offers a Platonic interpretation of Aristotle’s doctrine of soul’s powers.